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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What makes the Catholic Church politically active? Much work has been done on 
this in the past four decades as we have seen the dramatic democratization of much of 
Latin America and a parallel shift in the position of the Church from a defender of the 
authoritarian status quo to a promoter of political liberalization. Almost all of the efforts 
to understand when, where and how the Church decides to become politically active or 
remain a passive observer of political change have focused on the Church within a 
country as a unitary actor. That is, scholars have focused on the Chilean Church, the 
Nicaraguan Church, or the Mexican Church. The fundamental thesis developed and 
evaluated in the following pages is that in order to more fully understand the positioning 
of the Church during a particular country’s period of political change, we must go 
beneath the national level and think of not one Church, but instead of a complex mosaic 
of churches, all of the Catholic faith, operating within one country and with very 
disparate views on such issues as political and social change. Simply put, we can greatly 
enhance our analytical leverage with a move to the local level, because despite an 
abundance of largely cross-national work, the church, the state, and other political and 
social actors are not unitary actors within a given society. Rather, increasingly “we live in 
a world that no longer can be defined by one church in mutual alliance with one state. 
Reality is far richer” (Levine 2009: 410). 
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In pursuing this question across time and space within the single case of Mexico, 
this dissertation examines when and why the church at the local level responds to changes 
in its surrounding political environment, and when it does not. Uneven political and 
social change at the local level across Mexico represents a unique opportunity to 
understand the relationship between religion and politics in a context where countless 
democratic transitions around the world have left in their wake an abundance of 
authoritarian enclaves at the local level (Lawson 2000; Lujambio 2000; 2001; Hiskey 
2005; 2011; Hiskey and Bowler 2005). In Latin American settings in which electoral 
democracies seem to be the only game in town at the national level, little is gained 
preserving the national focus of the religion and politics literature, given that 
explanations regarding the role of the church during the political liberalization process 
have little to say about the widespread variation in local level processes that were taking 
place underneath the national-level banner of democratization. 
 
Thus, it is necessary to analyze what the church says at the local level, taking the 
church’s internal organization seriously and turning our academic focus to the 
decentralized and relatively autonomous role played by the individual dioceses within 
countries experiencing fundamental political change (Camp 1997: 20).1  By looking at 
the subnational variation in dioceses’ messages in the context of an uneven political and 
social change period, we can begin to understand better how the church responds to 
political and social change in ways that cross-national and national analyses do not allow.  
 
                                               
1 Here the dioceses are defined as ecclesiastical territories entrusted to bishops’ authority to shepherd those 
parishioners who live in that particular territory, which typically maps to a country’s subnational political 
divisions (Sota and Luengo 1994; Camp 1997; CEM 2009). 
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Under the hierarchical organization of the Catholic Church, bishops still have 
room to maneuver that allows them to interpret beliefs and rituals handed down from 
above. This leeway is extended when the church pursues policies of openness 
(Mainwaring 1986; Cleary 2009), a renovation of more traditional beliefs (Williams 1973; 
Mainwaring 1986; Mainwaring and Scully 2003); and an increased focus on policy 
prescriptions designed to address a particular social issue. All of these, in many ways, 
almost force bishops into a position of needing to de fine specific priorities for their 
particular local church (Peritore 1989; Acuña 1989; Ramos 1992; Camp 1997; Gill 1998; 
Soriano 1999; Hagopian 2009a). 
 
At the core of this notion is the idea that the emphasis of what positions are taken 
by dioceses will be a function, among other factors, of what is happening around them, 
along with other, more conventional predictors of the church’s messages, such as the 
bishop’s particular ideology, education (Smith 1982; Acuña 1989; Ramos 1992; Stein 
1995; 1998; Camp 1997; Soriano 1999; Jelen 2003), and the socioeconomic and ethnic 
makeup of the population he serves. In this way, it is important to carefully identify 
positions taken by the church at the diocese level, given that these positions could be the 
product of a combination of contextual factors such as local political and social change 
(or lack thereof), and clergy’s different ideological tendencies that differ in degree and 
intensity from the national pattern (Camp 1997: 26).  
 
Despite the theological and organizational commonalities across dioceses, there is 
much variance regarding the emphasis placed on certain topics by local churches, and 
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although the church’s position regarding specific topics is similar across dioceses, there is 
variance regarding what topics are prioritized, such as change or support for the status 
quo with respect to questions of local democratization processes and moments of social 
change. Thus, the question becomes why certain bishops choose to emphasize particular 
messages while others focus on another agenda. Some bishops may preach about political 
and social change, either promoting such change or validating what has already occurred, 
while other bishops within the same country may choose to preach about, and defend, the 
status quo (Walzer 1987; Guth and Turner 1989; Beatty and Oliver 1989; Lynch 1991; 
1993). Only by opening the black box of the subnational components of a national church 
can we begin to more fully understand the interplay between the Church and a country 
undergoing political and social change.  
 
The idea is that political and social change will induce some type of response 
from the Catholic Church. While virtually all research on this topic suggests a national-
level change in the Church’s message in response to national-level changes in politics of 
a country’s political system, we also know that such national-level change does not occur 
evenly within the borders of a country. Thus, it is plausible to argue that we should find 
fairly dramatic differences in how local processes of political change will influence the 
teachings of the Church. Generally speaking, political change may manifest itself in one 
of two ways in terms of its influence on the Church: a) the church may get on board with 
the emergent calls for political and social change and become a supporter of calls for 
further change; or b) the church may become more strident in its defense of the political 
and social status quo, perhaps urging its followers to work for stability instead.  
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What explains why in some cases the first message is adopted and in others the 
second? In answering this question, part one of this dissertation addresses a central 
concern with the role of religion in politics: what makes the Catholic Church politically 
active? This research assumes that construction and ranking of church messages “may be 
shaped by the context of the place at present” (Stein 1995: 147), and church messages 
constitute ex post reactions to political and social events taking place around them, rather 
than assuming that the church seeks to initiate actions. These assumptions are based on a 
long line of research into the reactive, rather than pro-active nature of the Catholic 
Church across most Latin American countries (Propaganda Fide 1984; 1986; 
Mainwaring and Wilde 1989; Peritore 1989; Buttler Flora and Bello 1989; de C. Azevedo 
1993; Stein 1995; Boff 1996; Gill 1998; García 1999; Lies and Malone 2006; Hagopian 
2009a), and particularly in Mexico (De la Rosa 1979; Acuña 1989; Ramos 1992; Muro 
1994; Camp 1997; Hernández 1997; Soriano 1999; Gill 1999; García 1999; Chand 2001). 
 
In the second part of the dissertation, I turn to an exploration of the potential 
impact these distinct messages may have on those who receive them, the parishioners. To 
this end, while an admittedly difficult empirical task of establishing direct cause and 
effect, I attempt to establish an association between the teachings of the Church and the 
political and social attitudes of those who attend church on a regular basis.   
 
The research and design of this dissertation serve two main purposes. First, 
drawing on the traditional scholarly literature on theology and religion and politics in 
Latin America, I propose a theory of how and why political and social context at the local 
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level exercise an influence on local churches’ messages in Mexico across four main 
topics: politics, moral values, social issues, and the internal organization of the church. 
Then, I empirically test the impact of political and social change on the Catholic Church 
messages, analyzing bishops’ writings. Second, drawing on the scholarly literature on 
political communication, I provide a theoretical mechanism of how and why local 
churches’ messages might influence parishioners’ religious and political attitudes. I then 
test some of the implications of this theory using public opinion surveys administered in 
Mexico during distinct time periods. 
 
In my analysis of church messages, I measure the dependent variable, the diocese-
level messages, using data from official documents issued by Mexican bishops, also 
known as pastoral letters. These pastoral letters are official communications issued by 
bishops in their own jurisdiction, (i.e. in their own dioceses or in their own pastoral 
regions, which are comprised of neighbor dioceses), in order to express the church 
position regarding specific political, social, moral, and internal organization problems. 
 
In particular, church messages about politics refer to democracy, church-state 
relations, free and fair elections, electoral fraud, participation, civic engagement, and 
turnout. Messages about social issues include poverty, migration, the drug war, violence, 
homicides, roles of the police and the army, economic crisis, and natural disasters 
(hurricanes, earthquakes, flooding). Messages about moral values are comprised of birth 
control, laic and religious education, marriage and family problems, abortion, euthanasia, 
gay marriage, and gay adoption. Finally, messages about the church internal organization 
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topics include rules for different groups and ministries, such as the clergy, church groups, 
laity organizations, and religious orders in relation to papal documents, National 
Conference of Bishops’ documents, and pastoral plans, in matters such as clergy alcohol 
abuses, disobedience, and unorthodox rituals. Internal organization also includes 
clarifications of specific requirements to receive sacraments, and spiritually-centered 
sermons, such as theological lectures and theoretical explanations without concrete daily 
life examples regarding politics, moral values, or social issues (De la Rosa 1979; Acuña 
1989; Ramos 1992, Soriano 1999; Chand 2001; Pacheco 2005; Díaz-Domínguez 2006a; 
Hagopian 2009a; CEM and dioceses websites). 
 
When analyzing church messages, two periods are included: a pre-
democratization period, from 1968 to 1995, in which political change, represented by 
increasing electoral disputes, plays a key role in shaping church messages about politics; 
and the year 2000, a watershed year for Mexico’s democratization in which national-level 
alternation took place.2 In order to empirically test the effect of political and social 
change on church messages, I use original datasets of church messages, bishops’ 
individual characteristics, and measures of political and social change at the local level. 
My findings highlight the importance of the political context at the local level as a 
determinant of bishops’ messages after controlling for ideological leanings. 
 
The two parts of this dissertation, the first that seeks to understand subnational 
variation in church messages, and the second that explores parishioners’ religious, social, 
                                               
2 A third period, the post-democratization era, it is succinctly analyzed in the eighth chapter, in which 
social turmoil, in the form of the country’s tragic drug war, plays a key role in shaping church messages 
about social issues from 2008 to 2011. 
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and political attitudes, are connected by three main topics: politics, moral values, and 
social issues. For each I first explore the church’s messages related to these issues for 
three distinct time periods, 1968-1995 – the pre-democratization period; 2000 – a year 
that marks the definitive arrival of national-level democracy; and 2008-2010 – two years 
that represent the height of the country’s drug war. I then attempt to link the attitudes of 
those with high levels of church attendance during particular years associated with each 
of these three time periods.3  
 
In this way, this dissertation is organized as follows. Following this introductory 
first chapter, the second chapter offers a theory of how and why political and social 
context at the local level should exercise an influence on local churches’ messages. This 
chapter examines previous literature that explains the nature of the Church’s message in a 
context of regime change, at the cross-national level through a focus on such factors as 
the characteristics of the parishioners (the audience); the doctrinal teachings; global shifts 
in the Church’s message (e.g, Vatican II); church-state relations; and the degree of 
religious competition. The second chapter concludes with a discussion of the specific 
causal mechanisms that link political change and bishops’ ideology to the preachings of 
the many local churches across Mexico.  
 
                                               
3 Analyses of parishioners’ attitudes involve data drawn from particular years from each of three time 
periods mentioned above. For the pre and a post democratization periods, from 1978 to 2005, I use the 
1978 Maquila surveys, and five waves of the World Values Surveys (from 1981 to 2005); b) a post 
democratization period, the 2010, year in which moral values were prevalent among bishops’ messages, in 
order to assess the association between church messages about moral values, and parishioners’ attitudes 
toward homosexuals and leftist political options, in which I use the 2010 Americas Barometer Surveys; and 
c) a post democratization era, the 2010, year in which the drug war was prevalent in Mexico, in order to 
assess the association between church messages about social issues represented by the drug war death toll, 
and parishioners’ attitudes toward the drug war, in which I use the 2010 ENVUD surveys. 
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The third chapter analyzes the role of bishops’ groups in shaping the messages of 
individual bishops, with an emphasis on principal consecrators, those senior bishops who 
ordain new ones. I also highlight the key role played by papal nuncios when consecrating 
new bishops in terms of their influence on the ideological leanings of bishops within that 
particular network of bishops.  In addition, the third chapter also analyzes bishops’ 
individual characteristics, such as urban origins, place in which bishops studied, in 
Mexico or abroad, previous pastoral experience, bishops consecrated by papal nuncios, 
and those who attended to Vatican II as Council Fathers.  
 
The fourth chapter develops and tests a set of hypotheses concerning the role of 
political change and bishop ideology in shaping church messages. Here I offer empirical 
evidence based on Bayesian models that analyze an original dataset of bishops’ writings, 
biographies, and political and social data at the local level, from 1968 to 1995. Overall, 
the findings suggest that political change does indeed exercise an influence on church 
messages, fueling bishops’ statements about politics, particularly among progressive 
bishops. Further, I find that even conservative bishops are more likely to talk about 
politics when the right-of-center opposition is leading the change.  
 
The fifth chapter approaches the question of subnational variation in the church’s 
message through analysis of bishops’ ideology, using the 2000 Bishops Survey, 
administered to 66 Mexican bishops during the early meetings of the 2000 National 
Conference of Bishops. Here I look more specifically at the main determinants of bishops’ 
ideological leanings and find that socially oriented bishops are less likely to emphasize 
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spiritual messages, whereas traditional bishops are less likely to emphasize social justice 
messages. 
 
Chapters Six through Nine represent Part Two of the dissertation in which I 
analyze the determinants of parishioners’ attitudes and attempt to link them to the 
messages they are receiving by the church. The sixth chapter presents a theory of how 
and why church messages might be influential in shaping the attitudes of parishioners, 
drawing theoretical insights from political communication theories and the religion and 
politics literature. Succinctly, the intuition guiding this theory sees those parishioners 
with high levels of church attendance as more likely to receive and accept the church 
message if they express a willingness to accept church mandates. The combination of 
these two individual-level characteristics then become a key element to understanding the 
association between church messages and parishioners’ attitudes. 
 
The seventh chapter tests the association between church messages about politics 
and parishioners’ attitudes toward democracy. I analyze the five waves of the World 
Values Surveys (from 1981 to 2005) to test the empirical distinction between religiosity, 
moral values, and economic conservatism estimating confirmatory factor analyses. I also 
estimate the association between religiosity and support for democracy. Overall, I found 
that these three concepts -religiosity, moral values, and conservatism - are distinct; and 
religiosity is positively related to support for democracy, especially among Northern 
Catholics. This is partially explained by prevalent church messages about politics among 
dioceses of that region during a time of watershed political change.  
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The eighth chapter tests the association between church messages about social 
issues (violence) and parishioners’ attitudes toward the drug war, through use of the 2010 
ENVUD surveys that offer a unique state-level representative sample from all of 
Mexico’s thirty-one states and the Federal District. In order to test the association 
between church critiques about the drug war and parishioners’ attitudes, I estimate the 
effect of church attendance on respondents’ assessments of who is leading the war on 
drugs, whether the government or drug traffickers, using a hierarchical linear model, in 
which the state level measure is the drug war death toll (Presidencia 2011). Overall, the 
evidence suggests that in states with high levels of drug violence, and presumably where 
the Church is most outspoken about the drug war, church attendance seems to be related 
to individuals’ criticism of the government’s performance in the drug war. This is 
partially explained by prevalent church messages about social issues, such as violence. 
 
The ninth chapter tests a posited association between church messages about three 
main topics, politics, moral values, and social issues, and parishioners’ attitudes toward 
democracy, gay marriage, and the drug war, using the 2010 Americas Barometer surveys. 
I estimated a series of Bayesian linear models in order to see whether there is an 
association between those parishioners who are continuously exposed to the church 
messages and parishioners’ higher levels of support for democracy, lower levels of 
support for gay marriage, and critical views on the drug war. To pursue this, I collected 
and coded additional church messages between 2008 and 2010 classifying them in three 
categories: politics, moral values, and social issues, I then assign to the 2010 Americas 
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Barometer surveys’ respondents a corresponding value based on the respective message 
at the state level they are arguably exposed. 
 
Overall, the evidence from the ninth chapter suggests that these differences in the 
topical emphasis of church messages across distinct regions in Mexico are to some extent 
related to parishioners’ attitudes. Bayesian models reveal that church messages about 
politics are associated with parishioners’ higher levels of support for democracy; church 
messages about moral values are associated with the lowest parishioners’ support for gay 
marriage; and church messages about social issues are linked to critical parishioners’ 
attitudes toward the drug war. Although only suggestive, and clearly in need of future 
research, these models represent a first look at the possible implications of the 
subnational variations in the church’s messages that I uncover and examine in Part I of 
this dissertation. Finally, the tenth chapter offers concluding remarks, discusses the 
implications of this research, and explores potential avenues for future research 
considering other places and times that allow us to make useful generalizations based on 
this pioneering subnational, theological, and quantitative line of research.    
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CHAPTER II 
 
MIXED CHURCH MESSAGES AND UNEVEN LOCAL CONTEXTS 
 
In the following pages I draw upon the traditional scholarly literature of religion 
and politics in Latin America to develop a theory of how and why political events at the 
local level exercise an influence on churches’ messages.4 In the process I take advantage 
of the social and political variation at the sub-national level in Mexico to highlight the 
ways in which the church’s messages emphasize different topics across different 
subnational contexts. The research also reveals the influence that distinct local political 
and social contexts have on the degree to which the church clings to the status quo in its 
message to followers or pushes for political and social opening (Camp 1997: 271). 
 
This chapter contains an overview of previous religion and politics theories and 
explains how this body of research has only partially answered the question of how and 
why church leaders preach what they preach. It then presents a theoretical departure from 
this research in order to elaborate a more comprehensive approach that will help better 
understand what characteristics of the local context are necessary to influence the 
Catholic Church’s messages it preaches to society. More specifically, the chapter offers a 
description of the precise mechanisms that explain under what conditions local churches 
preach about the status quo or about change considering the impact of uneven political 
and social context in subnational units. 
                                               
4 When referring to the Catholic Church, I will use indistinctly the church or the Catholic Church. In 
addition, I will use the label “local churches” when referring to the Catholic Church at the sub-national 
level, i.e. the church at the state level or at the diocese level.  
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Fundamentals: An Overview 
 
With the many countries that have undergone dramatic regime change from 
authoritarian rule to democratic over the past four decades, we still lack consistent 
explanations for why some churches might promote such change, offering moral 
justifications and legitimacy for the emerging political change while other churches seem 
to justify a “message” of silence in support of a “wait-and-see” approach. Efforts to 
explain the nature of the Catholic Church’s message in a context of regime change have 
focused on five main factors: (1) the doctrinal teachings of the particular Church in 
question; (2) global shifts in the Church’s message (e.g., Vatican II); (3) church-state 
relations; (4) the degree of religious competition; and (5) the characteristics of the 
parishioners (the audience). I will briefly discuss these five approaches and how they may 
or may not apply to the case of Mexico’s Catholic Church. I then turn to an analysis of 
subnational variations in the Church’s messages during Mexico’s extended, and highly 
uneven, democratization process that took place over the past three decades, and the 
nature of its mixed subnational messages during a time of political and social instability.  
 
A line of work on understanding the Church’s role in political change involves the 
idea that particular religions have distinct doctrinal principles that will shape clergy 
behavior and their positions on such issues as political or social change. The Protestant 
ethic, for example, is purported to increase democratic commitment, whereas Catholic 
principles may tend toward support for the status quo through social obedience (Weber 
[1905]1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: 323; Norris and Inglehart 2004).  
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This dichotomous division fails, though, to recognize variation among different 
levels of a church within a region such as Latin America, and the degree to which those 
varying levels of political activism are oriented toward the promotion of  democratic 
change or defending an authoritarian status quo (Turner 1971; Williams 1973; Levine 
1986; Mainwaring 1986; Berryman 1987; Huntington 1991; Gill 1998; 2001; 
Mainwaring and Scully 2003; Philpott 2004; 2009; Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán 2005; 
Hagopian 2009a), as the Brazilian and Argentine examples reveal (Peritore 1989; Gill 
1998). In addition, this dichotomy fails to capture the potentially important sub-national 
variation in political activism among Catholic local churches (Peritore 1989; Acuña 1989, 
Ramos 1992; Camp 1997; García 1999; Mackin 2003). In short, while a focus on the 
Church’s general doctrinal teachings may help us understand the larger orientations of a 
particular clergy, it does not allow us to go inside the black box of a church’s sub-
national mosaic of mixed messages that likely exists, particularly when those churches 
are operating in highly distinct contexts of political and social change.  
 
A related body of work finds that it is periodic, watershed doctrinal changes in a 
Church that are the primary factor explaining clergy behavior. Scholars argue that 
changes have come from the Vatican II aggiornamento, which increased Catholic 
democratic commitment, especially in Latin America, at the Latin American Conferences 
of Bishops held in Medellín (1968); Puebla (1979); and Aparecida (2007) (CELAM 2004; 
2013) in which the Catholic Church in Latin America adopted the Vatican II message, 
renovated the church message to highlight the unequal economic and political conditions 
of Latin American parishioners, and brought the focus of the Church squarely on the poor 
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(Williams 1973; Mainwaring 1986; Berryman 1987; Gill 1998; Chesnut 2002; 
Mainwaring and Scully 2003; Cleary 2009).  
 
Although this view about doctrinal changes produced by single events that took 
place at one point in time is widely used in the literature, it fails to recognize cross-
national and sub-national variation that existed.  For example, at the same time Vatican II 
was being adopted in some countries, there remained some national conferences of 
bishops in Latin America that did not embrace that doctrinal change of a preferential 
option for the poor, remaining instead on the side of dictatorships throughout much of the 
1970s (Gill 1998; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005). Within countries as well, Vatican 
II provoked internal dissension in such countries as Brazil and Mexico – with some 
elements of the church accepting the new doctrine and others rejecting it outright. In 
order to overcome this limitation and better understand other possible outcomes, I study 
individual bishops’ ideology across time during periods of distinct social and political 
change, i.e. times of political transition and times of violence related to the drug war. 
 
Relations between the church and the state have also garnered scholars’ attention 
to explain which factors shape the church’s messages. Gill (1998; 2001) has argued that a 
church’s political activism is partially driven by its reaction to a particular government’s 
policies on religious prerogatives and subsidies (Gill 1998), whereas Hagopian (2009a) 
has emphasized how prerogatives and subsidies have imposed restrictions on the church’s 
political and moral positions. In places where the church was stronger, we observed the 
rise of Christian Democratic political parties, such as in Europe (Kalyvas 1996), and 
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political parties inspired by the Catholic Social Doctrine principles in Latin America 
(Lynch 1991; 1993; Middlebrook 2000; Mainwaring and Scully 2003). Other scholars 
argue that government’s severe anti-church policies explain the church’s political 
reaction (Ludlow 1984; Loaeza 1985; Blancarte 1992; Kalyvas 1996; Gill 1998; 1999; 
Hagopian 2009a).  
 
In this way, the permanence of the Catholic Church’s quasi-monopoly over Latin 
American religion (albeit one that is increasingly challenged) is arguably facilitated by 
political and legal conditions in Latin American countries, such as an official state 
religion and religious subsidies. Examples of these benefits are state assistance to pay 
clergy salaries, optional or even mandatory religious education in public schools, lower 
tariffs for Church’s imports, preferential tax status, and legal access to the mass media 
(Gill 1998: 49).5  Consequently, scholars explain a Catholic’s pro-establishment, status 
quo position as due to these privileges in different countries, such as Dominican Republic 
(Betances 2007), Chile (Smith 1982; Gill 1998; Lies 2003; Lies and Malone 2006), 
Brazil (Peritore 1989; Serbin 1995), and Argentina (Gill 1998). 
 
These explanations, however also fail to recognize sub-national differences in 
both the church and the state, and the relationship that exists between one and the other. 
                                               
5 Analyses of constitutions and statutory laws from 18 Latin American countries reveal that six nations 
grant special constitutional status to the Catholic Church (Argentina, Guatemala, El Salvador, Dominican 
Republic, Panama, and Costa Rica). In two more countries, special status was removed until recent times 
(Colombia and Paraguay). In addition, nine countries offer State subsidies to pay priests salaries and 
financial support for religious schools in rural and poor areas (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela); and four countries offer special tax status and 
exemptions to the Catholic Church (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Uruguay). Finally, in eleven 
countries there is optional religious education in public schools (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Peru) as documented by Frances 
Hagopian (2009a: 30-34). 
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The degree to which, for example, a particular anti-church national policy is implemented 
and enforced can potentially vary across a country as a function of the particular 
relationship a certain diocese has with state and national-level government officials 
(Brandenburg 1964; Meyer 1973; Eckstein 1977; Camp 1997). Such a situation, then, 
creates very distinct church-state relations within the same country. In order to overcome 
this limitation, this research study evaluates political and social change at the sub-
national level paying particular attention to the distinct local conditions that may affect 
church-state relations.6  
 
Scholars explain the mixture of outcomes by the variation that exists when 
studying the association between democracy and the Catholic Church based on religious 
competition and the church spiritual mission. In places in which there is religious 
competition or a socially committed church, scholars have found that the church supports 
democracy, whereas in places in which there is a Catholic quasi-monopoly or the church 
emphasizes conservative moral values, scholars have found that the church tends to 
support authoritarian rulers or at least resist change in the status quo (Gill 1998; Philpott 
2004; Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán 2005).  
 
Scholarly works have centered their focus on associations between democracy 
and the Catholic Church at the national level. Overall, results are mixed from this body of 
research. Although there are examples of the national church supporting the military 
juntas in Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, and Paraguay (Gill 1998; 2001), and church support 
                                               
6 The fourth chapter devotes a specific section to analyze the empirical impact of several variables 
conceptually described here. The church-state conflict variable however was finally excluded from the 
empirical analysis due to lack of variation and availability when using detailed subnational data. 
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for the 1948 coup in Venezuela (Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán 2005), there are also 
examples of the church opposing the military government in Chile under Pinochet (Gill 
1998) and the hegemonic party in Mexico (Camp 1997).  
 
Finally, recent scholarly work has sought to offer a more nuanced account of the 
church’s role in politics, and the sources of its political orientation. Trejo (2009) 
highlights the role of religious competition in shaping the Catholic Church’s message in 
particular locales, though without considering specific church messages. When religious 
competition represented a credible threat to the Latin American Catholic Church’s “lazy 
monopoly”, national conferences of Catholic bishops were forced to shift their political 
positions in order to retain parishioners, offering a democratic discourse in opposition to 
authoritarian rulers (Gill 1998; Chesnut 2002; Levine 2010). Once again, though, this 
explanation fails to capture subnational variation among bishops who preach to different 
regions in the same country (Mackin 2003). Given that the main assumption in this 
account is the influence of national factors, such as the diminishing religious prerogatives 
and subsidies offered by the State to the national Catholic Church (Gill 1998), the 
religious competition argument is inconclusive at the subnational level when prerogatives 
and subsidies are offered at the national level.  Also, labeling national conferences of 
Catholic bishops as a “center of gravity”, only designed to capture the church “official” 
position (Mainwaring 1986; Gill 1998; Hagopian 2009a) is equally constraining when 
dealing with different emphases in the church messages at the subnational level.  
Religious competition also fails to explain how and why Catholic bishops would take 
advantage of a democratic discourse in order to retain inattentive and politically 
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uninterested parishioners at the national, and at the subnational levels (Mackin 2003; 
Philpott 2004; 2009).  
 
Although Mexico is an overwhelming Catholic country (84 percent of Mexicans 
are Catholics, as reported by the 2010 Census), it is the only country in the region 
excluded from contemporary accounts of church prerogatives, privileges and subsidies.7 
Thus, if religious leaders usually rely on states subsidies because they cannot survive 
“chronically underfunded” (Gill 1998: 61), then, the question becomes how and why 
Mexico’s clergy are able to exercise indirect influence on politics under challenging 
conditions, when compared to the rest of Latin American countries. In this way, it is 
plausible to suppose that a deviant case (Eckstein 1975) could offer some insights when 
compared to different Catholic settings that face fewer restrictions8 when one follows the 
religious economy main arguments.9 
 
Finally, another approach to understand the determinants of a church’s message 
during times of political and social change focuses on the religious and political attitudes 
of parishioners themselves. Scholars have tried to explain the Church’s political role 
                                               
7 Religious subsidies are not part of Mexico’s political arena, because there is no official religion in Mexico, 
and State subsidies and religious education are banned by the law (religious education officially prohibited 
but essentially tolerated). Although the 1992 constitutional amendments deregulated relations between the 
Church and the State and the new provisions may fuel the Church’s role in politics (Lamadrid 1994; Camp 
1997; Gill 1999), previous and new social and political roles of the Church however, are not necessarily 
explained by religious subsidies, given that neither the 1917 Mexican Constitution nor the 1992 
constitutional provisions granted any type of State financial support to any church. 
8 Following the deviant case approach (Peters 1998), and the critical case approach (Eckstein 1975) which 
is a case in which at first glance the probability to falsify established hypotheses is very likely, I develop 
theoretical mechanisms at the sub-national level in order to offer controlled comparisons (Peters 1998; 
Snyder 2001). 
9 An additional argument against the religious economy school regarding the importance of public funding 
for the Catholic Church states that if Catholic clergy are not dependent on state subsidies, then clergy are 
free to issue political messages because they, in this private funding scenario do not have this concern for 
state retribution.  
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through analysis of indirect measures, such as church attendees’ attitudes (Domínguez 
and McCann 1996: 104; Moreno 1999: 141; Lawson 1999: 166-169; Magaloni and 
Moreno 2003; Domínguez, Lawson and Moreno 2009: 279); the mean value of 
parishioners’ opinions among those who live near the parish (Wald, Owen and Hill 1988; 
Beatty and Oliver 1989; Huckfeldt, Plutzer and Sprague 1993; Welch, Leege, Wald and 
Kellstedt 1993); the proportion of a local population with a particular religious affiliation 
(Zavala 1991; Trejo 2009); religious fractionalization (Trejo 2009); and parishioners’ 
reports of political sermons (Díaz-Domínguez 2006a).  
 
Though useful, these measures are unable to assess actual changes in the Church’s 
message itself. Indeed, the inability to generate systematic data directly drawn from 
Church officials regarding its message concerning political and social change has been an 
important obstacle to this line of research (but see Lies 2003; Smith 2008). While taking 
into account the religious leanings of the population in question is certainly important, 
this thesis argues we must have some way to assess the nature of this variable itself: the 
message the church is sending out to those parishioners.   
 
This study rests on a new measure of local church messages that involves an 
extensive content analysis of over three thousand writings and sermons of bishops 
charged with political, social, moral, and internal guiding to priests and parishioners, 
across the initial 68 dioceses in 1968 to the current 91 dioceses in 2011. It is noteworthy 
to remark that pastoral letters, homilies, sermons and writings are important for priests 
(Sota and Luengo 1994), the faithful (Camp 1997), and bishops themselves. For example, 
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according to 65 percent of Mexico’s bishops, what guides the faithful to understand and 
evaluate, in the light of the Catholic faith, the changing realities as we live are sermons, 
homilies, pastoral letters, and local church documents (the 2000 Bishops Surveys). 
Before offering a more extensive discussion of the results of these measurement efforts, 
however, I first turn to a discussion of the theoretical determinants of subnational 
variations in the church’s message across Mexico. 
 
Toward a Theory of Church Message Formation 
 
The main motivation for going beyond a national level approach to measuring the 
Church’s message across Mexico is that the church and the state are not unitary actors. 
Levine notes that “we live in a world that no longer can be defined by one church in 
mutual alliance with one state. Reality is far richer” (Levine 2009: 410, emphasis of the 
author). In pursuing these questions in two points in time across subnational units within 
the single case of Mexico, the study presents research that examines the subnational level 
and effectively questions when, how and why the church responds to change surrounding 
a particular political and social event and when it does not.  
 
By analyzing what the church says in a certain place and time within the borders 
of a single country, I am better able to take advantage of the church’s relatively 
decentralized organization through dioceses.  This also helps to turn our analytical focus 
toward the decentralized and relatively autonomous role played by the individual 
dioceses (Camp 1997: 20). Here the dioceses are defined as ecclesiastical territories 
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entrusted to bishops’ authority to shepherd those parishioners who live in that particular 
territory, which typically maps to a country’ sub-national political divisions.  By looking 
at the sub-national variation in dioceses’ messages in the context of an uneven political 
and social change period, we can begin to understand better how the church responds to 
political and social change in ways that cross-national and national analyses do not 
allow.10 
 
The structure of the Catholic Church relies on relatively decentralized dioceses. 
Thus, the church organization might be described as follows. In order to legitimize a 
particular view - while delegitimizing another- any religion, through its institutions 
creates a corpus of beliefs and ritual practices that can give strength and coherence to a 
group of believers who constitute a relatively hierarchical organization, the church 
(Weber [1905]1993; Williams 1973; Sota and Luengo 1994; Gill 1998). Discursive and 
ritual activities are generally developed by specialists, the clergy.  For these ritual 
activities a relatively hierarchical organization seems to be more effective to control and 
preserve a relative homogenous message (Kalyvas 1996).  
 
To begin understanding subnational variations in the messages of the Catholic 
Church in Mexico, therefore we first must understand the Church’s organizational 
structure. Its hierarchical organization consists of several ministries entrusted to bishops, 
                                               
10 Uneven political and social change at the local level across Mexico offers an opportunity to understand 
the relationship between religion and politics because after democratic transitions, authoritarian enclaves at 
the local level still remain (Lawson 2000; Lujambio 2000; 2001; Hiskey 2005; Hiskey and Bowler 2005; 
Domínguez, Lawson and Moreno 2009). In Latin American settings in which electoral democracies seem 
to be the only game in town at the national level, little is gained preserving the national focus of the religion 
and politics literature, given that explanations regarding the role of the church during the political 
liberalization process have little to say about local level efforts and effects. 
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priests, brothers and nuns. The principal offices of the church begin with the pope and 
move downward to the cardinals and then national conferences comprised of bishops 
from each country (Mainwaring 1986; Gill 1998; Hagopian 2009a). Below national 
conferences are individual bishops, whose function is providing company and guidance 
to local churches within their diocese, according to the corpus of beliefs and ritual 
practices officially sanctioned (Camp 1997). At the end of the chain of command are the 
pastors, priests, deacons, brothers and nuns, who are responsible for meeting the religious 
needs of parishioners, but have no chance to provide dramatic changes to the official 
guidelines handed down to them from above. In looking at differences in the Church’s 
message within a country, then, I focus on the bishops that represent and lead the 91 
ecclesiastical territories across Mexico (Sota and Luengo 1994; Stein 1998; 2000), as 
shown in Graph 2.1. 
 
Under this relatively hierarchical organization, although bishops’ actions with 
respect to altering the official Church doctrine are structurally limited, they do in fact 
have margins of maneuver that allow them to interpret the beliefs and rituals of the 
church in a particular way. This leeway is extended when the church holds policies of 
openness (Mainwaring 1986; Clearly 2009), renovation of beliefs (Williams 1973; 
Mainwaring 1986; Mainwaring and Scully 2003); and increasing perceptions about what 
action is needed given a particular context, almost forcing bishops to define specific 
priorities for the local church (Peritore 1989; Ramos 1992; Camp 1997; Gill 1998; 
Soriano 1999; Lies 2003; Hagopian 2009a).11     
                                               
11 While priests have a more personal relationship with their parishioners and are able to emphasize certain 
teachings, bishops are a higher authority on doctrinal issues and have more power over the arguments that 
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Graph 2.1. Ecclesiastical Territories across Mexico 2009. Source: National Conference of 
Mexico’s Bishops. 
 
This dissertation argues that the positions taken by dioceses will be a function of 
what is happening around them, along with other, more conventional, predictors of the 
church’s message, such as the bishop’s particular education and socioeconomic 
background (Smith 1982; Luengo 1992; Sota and Luengo 1994; Stein 1995; 1998; Camp 
                                                                                                                                            
priests are asked to present. Bishops, in addition, have some jurisdiction when deciding who is appointed at 
the local level, particularly in parishes, as such one would argue that it is plausible that change at the local 
level is due to the bishop’s influence over who is at the parish level. In this specific case, delegation 
dilemmas are less likely to emerge when bishops have increased control over the clergy’s appointment 
process. Bishops normally have increased control when they have occupied their position for some time, 
giving them more influence over their dioceses (Luengo 1992; Ramos 1992; Camp 1997; Hernández 1997; 
Aguilar 2000).  
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1997; Aguilar 2000; Jelen 2003), the socioeconomic and ethnic makeup of the population 
he serves (Smith 2008; Trejo 2009), and other such individual and contextual factors 
(Aguilar 2000; Smith 2008). 
 
In this way, it is important to carefully identify positions taken by the church at 
the diocese level, given that these positions could be the product of a combination of 
political and social change, and clergy’s different ideological tendencies that differ in 
degree and intensity from the national pattern (Camp 1997: 26). This theoretical focus 
seeks to bring the local level approach back to religion and politics in Latin American 
settings, and move beyond the conventional assumption that the church can uniformly 
define its concerns as “a common order of priorities” within a given country that is 
experiencing dramatically different processes of political and socioeconomic change 
(Hagopian 2009a: 259). 
 
Though there are many theological and organizational commonalities across 
dioceses within a particular country, I show below that there is significant variance 
regarding the emphasis of topics discussed by the local churches, such as political change 
or support for the status quo through preaching about conservative moral values. Thus, 
the question becomes which messages a particular bishop chooses to emphasize. Some 
bishops may preach about political change based on free and fair elections messages, 
while other bishops may choose to preach about the status quo focusing on moral value 
messages, such issues as abortion, homosexuality, and family values (Walzer 1987; Guth 
and Turner 1989; Beatty and Oliver 1989; Lynch 1991; 1993; Jelen 2003; Lies 2003). 
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Here I understand this latter group of bishops to be indirectly supporting the political 
status quo and the official political party12 by fighting political change initiated by the left 
wing, while the former group is explicitly speaking out about the need for free and fair 
elections when facing electoral fraud at the local level (De la Rosa and Reilly 1985; 
Ramos 1992; Camp 1997; Chand 2001). 
 
At the core of this notion is the idea that political change will induce some type of 
response from the Catholic Church. While virtually all research on this topic suggests a 
national-level change in the Church’s messages in response to national-level changes in a 
country’s political system, it plausible to find fairly dramatic differences in how local 
political change will influence the teachings of the Church, particularly in a country like 
Mexico that underwent a prolonged, and highly uneven, process of democratization in 
which some states were far ahead of the national democratization process while other 
states continue to lag behind in this process.13 
                                               
12 In general, “official political party” refers to the party in office. In the Mexican context however it also 
refers to the political party (the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the PRI) that have remained in office 
since the 1929 at the national level (Branderburg 1964; Camp 1997; Lujambio 2000) and it lost the 2000 
presidential elections (Magaloni 2006). 
13 It is important, however, to succinctly address again one potential shortcoming regarding the unit of 
analysis. In most cases the bishop at the diocese level does not represent the most extensive and intimate 
point of contact between the church and parishioners (Smith 2008: 7). Typically, the natural point of 
contact between the church and parishioners are individual priests at the parish level, given that low clergy 
could exercise more political influence on parishioners when they attend to religious services on weekly 
basis than sporadic bishops’ public statements (Smith 2008: 37). Nevertheless, the bishop has an important 
influence over clergy within his diocese (Luengo 1992; Sota and Luengo 1994; Camp 1997; Chand 2001) 
and collecting church messages from dioceses as sub-national units, it represents an important 
improvement when compared to other efforts used in past research, such as the mean value of parishioners’ 
beliefs at the parish level (Huckfeldt, Plutzer and Sprague 1993; Welch, Leege, Wald and Kellstedt 1993). 
In this way, although the bishop in his diocese is still slightly far away from rank and file parishioners 
(Smith 2008), bishops represent an intermediate point between just assuming that the message is there and 
parishes’ mean values extracted from parishioners data. Actually, a similar problem emerges when only 
priests and pastors are considered, because there is another intermediate point of contact between priests 
and the faithful when dealing with administration of some sacraments: deacons. In fact, permanent deacons 
across Latin America ranked relatively high the relations between deacons and bishops, using a 7 point 
scale: 5.9 in 2007; 6.3 in 2008; 6.1 in 2009; 6.0 in 2010; and 5.9 in 2011, as reported by the Annual 
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What explains why in some cases the first message is adopted and in others the 
second one? In answering this question this chapter addresses a larger concern in work on 
the role of religion in politics: what makes the Church politically active? In the absence 
of anything else, a conventional perspective would predict that progressive bishops are 
more likely to support change, whereas conservative bishops are more likely to support 
the status quo (Mainwaring 1986; Walzer 1987; Peritore 1989; Aguirre and Vitoria 1990; 
Lehmann 1990; Lynch 1991; Quiroz 1993; Grassi 2003; Cleary 2009; Hagopian 2009a).  
 
Nevertheless, as Levine says “reality is far richer,” and part of that reality is the 
political and social context that pastors and bishops confront at the ground level on a 
daily basis. This local-level reality is ignored by the church hierarchy and thus rarely 
influences the church’s message at the national level until such change exceeds 
boundaries to call the attention of the church’s message-making elite. I therefore argue 
that the local political and social context plays a relevant role in shaping the message that 
actually reaches the masses.  
 
This dissertation analyzes two historical moments of dramatic but territorially 
highly uneven change across Mexico, the rise of local electoral competition that began in 
the 1980s, and the high levels of violence that have afflicted certain areas of Mexico 
since 2007.  Adding to these contextual factors is another factor that varies greatly across 
Mexico - the degree to which the country’s historically stringent anti-church policies are 
                                                                                                                                            
Permanent Deacons Surveys conducted by the CIDAL and coordinated by Deacon Miguel Ángel Herrera 
Parra, available at: http://www.diaconadoarqmex.com/DHerrera03.pdf and http://www.idz-
drs.de/newsletter/informativo_72.pdf (Herrera 2011). Results from the 2012 surveys are available at: 
http://www.idz-drs.de/newsletter/informativo_98.pdf.  
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enforced at the state and dioceses level. Since the Mexican Revolution and the Cristero 
rebellion that followed in the first three decades of the 21st century, Mexico has had 
among the strictest separation of church and state laws in Latin America (Gill 1999; 
Hagopian 2009a). Across Mexico that needs to be, at least theoretically, taken into 
account, in order to understand the relationship a local diocese has with the central 
government, and the extent to which Mexico’s anticlerical legacy remains intact during 
times of political and social change (Meyer 1973; Gill 1998; 1999; Hagopian 2009a; 
Cleary 2009). 
 
At the core of this perspective is the notion that the construction and ranking of 
specific church messages “may be shaped by the context of the place at present” (Stein 
1995: 147). The general assumption is that clergy messages constitute ex post reactions to 
political and social events taking place around them rather than assuming that the church 
seeks to initiate actions. These assumptions are based on a long line of research into the 
reactive, rather than pro-active nature of the Catholic Church across most Latin American 
countries (Propaganda Fide 1984; 1986; Mainwaring and Wilde 1989; Peritore 1989; 
Buttler Flora and Bello 1989; de C. Azevedo 1993; Stein 1995; Boff 1996; Gill 1998; 
Lies 2003; Lies and Malone 2006; Hagopian 2009a), and particularly in Mexico (Ramos 
1992; Muro 1994; Camp 1997; Hernández 1997; García 1999; Soriano 1999; Gill 1999; 
Aguilar 2000; Chand 2001).14  
                                               
14 Actually, bishops’ reactions would vary from a given set of topics to another one. In fact, 23 percent of 
Mexican bishops try to exercise influence on the local political context by contacting public officials; 21 
percent try to influence on the local economic context by contacting government officials, economic 
leaders, and workers; and finally, 17 percent of Mexican bishops try to exercise influence on the social 
context by contacting public officials, mass media, community leaders, and universities (the 2000 Bishops 
Surveys). 
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In this way, church messages at the local level could shape the public agenda, but 
only following earlier changes in the political and social system that the church has 
responded to, and in the process, validated after political and social changes shaped 
church messages. Prior to the 1980s, Mexico’s subnational units experienced few cases of 
political and social change (Molinar 1991; Lujambio 2000; De Remes 2000; 2006) and 
accordingly, we only begin to find reports of a political theme in the messages of the 
Catholic Church at the local level by the late 1970s (De la Rosa 1979; Acuña 1989; 
Barranco and Pastor 1989; Ramos 1992; Muro 1994; Camp 1997; Hernández 1997; 
Soriano 1999; Chand 2001; Mackin 2003). Consequently, I track church messages since 
1968 in order to fully capture this initial variation. 
 
In order to capture the nature of political change at the local level, I focus on the 
ratio of opposition party votes versus the official party at the time, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) (Lawson 2000; Lujambio 2000; Hiskey 2005; 2011; Hiskey 
and Bowler 2005; Klesner 2011). To capture electoral challenges to the PRI’s one-party 
regime from the left, I use the vote share in municipal elections for parties that 
represented the independent left (as opposed to those center-left “parastatal” parties that 
were actually “creations” of the PRI).  
 
Regarding the left wing, in a few states, such as Veracruz and Nayarit, I include 
the Popular Socialist Party (PPS), in Tamaulipas the Authentic Party of the Mexican 
Revolution (PARM), and the Socialist Workers Party (PST) in Coahuila – even though in 
most states during the 1970s and 1980s these parties were largely considered “proregime” 
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or “parastatal” parties (Eisenstadt 2004: 118). In general the authentic, or independent, 
left during this period was represented by the Mexican Workers Party (PMT), and the 
Mexican Communist Party (PCM)/ Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM)/ Mexican 
Socialist Party (PMS), all of which contributed to the formation of the country’s 
dominant center-left party of today, the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD).  
 
For electoral opposition from parties representing the right, I focus primarily on 
the votes of the long-established (1939) National Action Party (PAN), choosing to 
exclude the PDM due to its almost one state presence (in the state of Guanajuato) and 
unintended ties to the PRI as well (Molinar 1991; Aguilar and Zermeño 1992; De Remes 
2000a; 2006; Lujambio 2000; De Remes 2000b; Eisenstadt 2004; Banamex 2004; State 
Electoral Commissions websites; CIDAC 2011; CEDE-UAM 2012).15 As with the left 
opposition, my final measure here is a ratio of the PAN vote divided by the PRI vote.16 
 
The specific tipping point in which political change should start to influence the 
church’s political messages is an empirical question that I will answer in the following 
chapters. For now, suffice it to say that I expect that changes in the political context at the 
local level will activate variations in local church messages (Camp 1997: 276).  I also 
include in the analysis the ideological tendencies of individual bishops, viewing these as 
                                               
15 CIDAC, and CEDE-UAM electoral databases are publicly available. CIDAC at: 
http://www.cidac.org/esp/Datos_Electorales.php and CEDE-UAM at: http://csh-
iztapalapa.uam.mx/cen_doc/cede/?page_id=1349   
16 Although some scholars have pointed out that turnout should be one of the most important dependent 
variables when studying the church influence on politics (Hernández 1997; Camp 1997), there are two 
reasons to exclude this line of research in this dissertation: a) I am interested on church messages as the 
dependent variable, and b) reliable turnout data is hard to find through the 1980s in subnational Mexico 
because very few local election commissions included electoral roll information (De Remes 2000a; 2000b). 
In addition, voting age population estimations through census data did not reach the necessary accuracy 
(Molinar 1991). 
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a function of several indicators, such as the orientation of the curricula and seminaries in 
which the bishop studied; whether the bishop studied abroad; his previous pastoral 
experiences; and bishops’ principal consecrators (CEM 2010; Cheney 2013). All these 
indicators will tap the concept of individual bishops’ ideological tendencies, a variable 
that theoretically must be included in any effort to understand the particular message 
orientation of bishops (Sota and Luengo 1994; Gill 1998; Mackin 2003; Hagopian 2009b). 
By including this as an important variable in the following analysis, I am then able to 
uncover the role a bishop’s local political context also plays in shaping his views and 
interpretation of the Catholic Church’s message (Lehman 1990; Burdick 2010).  
 
The final theoretical aspect to understanding subnational variations in the message 
of the church concerns the enforcement of anti-church policies by the central government.  
I expect that conservative clergy “favor avoidance of involvement in temporal affairs 
unless vital church interests are at stake”, whereas progressive clergy “feel that the 
church should speak out on social injustices while adopting a policy of critical 
collaboration with the regime” (Tate 1990: 145; Muro 1994; Camp 1997; Gill 1998, 
Mainwaring and Scully 2003; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005).  
 
Moving to the variable of the levels of enforcement of anti-church policies across 
Mexico, the starting point is recognition that Mexico’s church-state relations have 
historically been defined by restrictions that have been in place since the 1857 and the 
1917 Mexican constitutions, in which the state did not recognize any legal status to 
churches, banning the church’s voice and participation in politics, and eliminating any 
33 
 
religious prerogatives (Loaeza 1985; Blancarte 1992; Lamadrid 1994; Gill 1999; Díaz-
Domínguez 2006b; Hagopian 2009a). However, implementation and enforcement of 
these anti-church policies varied from region to region, even before and certainly after the 
1992 new constitutional provisions, in which churches received constitutional recognition 
from the State (Lamadrid 1994; Camp 1997; Gill 1999; Díaz-Domínguez 2006b).17  In 
order to capture this variation, I started to track Church-State conflicts at the state level 
reported by scholars and weekly magazines between 1968 and 1995 (De la Rosa 1979; 
De la Rosa and Reilly 1985; Köppen 1989; Barranco and Pastor 1989; Proceso 1976-
1988). Unfortunately, I did not find enough data, but a theoretical development of the 
Church-State relations at the subnational level is still an important aspect to take into 
account. Now, I will turn my focus to the precise theoretical mechanisms of how church 
messages are generated. 18 
 
 
 
                                               
17 Some scholars argue that anti-church policies helped the church to get politically stronger, gaining 
political presence during the late seventies and mid-eighties when compared to the Cristero war times 
(Meyer 1973). For example, the constitutional prohibition to hold Catholic foreign clergy in Mexico’s 
dioceses fueled the presence of native clergy who developed profound communitarian roots (Brandenburg 
1964; Turner 1971; Camp 1997), and also, the role played by the local clergy as mediators of social 
disputes (Eckstein 1977; Camp 1997; Mackin 2003; Trejo 2009). In fact, one half of Mexico’s bishops 
reports that their dioceses maintain usual contacts with political parties, 60 percent reports having contacts 
with public officials in charge of social programs, and 80 percent of bishops reports frequent contacts with 
political leaders (the 2000 Bishops Survey). Actually, some scholars consider the Catholic Church as an 
interest group that the Mexican government should take into account when making public policy (Granados 
1981; Lamadrid 1994). In sum, there are reasons to believe that the anti-church national policy was 
unevenly implemented and enforced across Mexico before and after the 1992 constitutional provisions 
(Molinar 1987; Luengo 1992; Sota and Luengo 1994; Camp 1997; Chand 2001). 
18  Although some scholars argue that priests are not necessarily taking their cues from the bishops, 
because they are taking their lead from the parishioners, essentially due to Pentecostal competition, which 
prompts a priest to preach a message that is generally more liberal in the Chilean case (Lies 2003), it is 
important to remark that levels of Evangelicalism in subnational Mexico are no greater than 10 percent in a 
very limited set of states, making empirical tests of the religious economy school hard to verify. I included 
the percentage of protestants in order to capture the notion of this school, which is clergy members will 
preach what parishioners want to hear (Lies 2003).  
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Promoting Change versus Defending the Status Quo  
 
In this section, I illustrate what I refer to as the “ideal-type conditions” in which 
bishops are more or less likely to issue political and social messages that emphasize 
either supporting change or the status quo. These ideal-type conditions consist of the 
combination of three elements at the local level: a) social and political change; b) the 
level of enforcement of anti-church policies in the region; and c) bishops’ ideology when 
examining the rise of local electoral competition during the 1970s and 1980s. Anti-
church policies are defined as the number of Church-State conflicts at the state level 
reported by scholars and weekly magazines between 1968 and 1995; and finally, a 
bishop’s ideological orientation, categorized as progressive and conservative.19 
 
This section begins by examining the expectations for a situation where there is 
very little political and social change taking place within a diocese; anti-church policies 
are equally enforced across states, and the dominant bishop ideology is conservative. I 
will then vary the values on these three factors and discuss expectations for each scenario.  
                                               
19 Although church-state relations are theoretically important, the lack of detailed information at the 
subnational level precluded the possibility of including that measure. I explored different sources to 
measure indicators derived from constitutional and legal comparisons that capture anti-church electoral 
policies, such as prohibitions for the clergy to perform poll-stations work; observing elections; running for 
office; registering to vote; proselytizing in favor or against political parties or candidates; criticizing public 
officials or government’s programs; and organizing church meetings toward political ends (Madrazo 1993; 
Crespo 1996; Becerra, Galindo, Palma, and Woldenberg 1996; Díaz Domínguez 2006b). These studies 
however did not uncover the church-state early conflicts during the 1980s. In addition, case studies at the 
local level typically detail whether local churches develop activities banned by the Mexican constitution, 
such as celebrating outdoors religious services with no official permission, registering clergy to vote before 
the 1992 constitutional provisions, and holding meetings with public officials as mediators of social 
disputes (Eckstein 1977; De la Rosa 1979; Ornelas 1983; Moncada 1985; Messmacher 1985; Rubin 1987; 
Molinar 1987; Muro 1994; Hernández 1997; Camp 1997; Chand 2001; Mackin 2003; Díaz-Dominguez 
2006b; Trejo 2009). Information extracted from these studies however did not offer enough variation due to 
the small number of cases, when matching church-State conflicts and bishops’ writings. 
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The absence of political and social change will decrease the probability of 
political messages issued by local churches, regardless of a bishop’s ideology, due to the 
reactive, rather than the pro-active nature of the Catholic Church’s typical relationship 
with politics. Regarding anti-church policies, when there is no gap in local and federal 
statutes, it is more likely to observe political messages issued by local churches, due to 
the fact that bishops do not hold important reasons to complain about how the 
government is dealing with church-state relations, thus bishops are less likely to issue 
political messages.  
 
Finally, in relation to bishops’ ideology, as we might expect, conservatives will be 
more inclined to support status quo messages due to the lack of “political or social salient 
issues” as well as the fact that by definition a conservative ideology tends toward being 
resistant to change. In sum, the combination of the absence of significant political change; 
low levels of church-State conflicts; and an ideologically conservative bishop will 
decrease the likelihood of the church’s political change messages, due to the strength of 
the status quo in this context – there is very little political or social change for the local 
church to respond to, the state’s similar enforcement of the nation’s anti-church 
legislation provides reasons for the local church to not “rock the boat”, the natural 
inclination of a conservative ideology is to remain supportive of the status quo.20  
 
                                               
20 Although one can expect that political church messages mainly come about in times of change, during 
systematic precarious times, it is also plausible to observe clergy reactions to chronic bad times, especially 
when the policy of avoiding direct confrontation with the regime over time fails to stop the worsening of 
the current situation. Over time, it becomes difficult or even impossible for clergy of any denominational 
affiliation or ideological stripe to ignore the evidence of the corrosive nature of the worsening of different 
social problems, such as poverty or perennial selective repression. Defining the tipping point, however, it is 
an empirical question. 
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In contrast, where there is very little political and social change but there are 
differences between local and national anti-church regulations in which local regulations 
increase levels of enforcement, progressive bishops are more likely to initiate calls for 
social change as a reaction to the anticlerical position of the state government. Calls for 
social change would be comprised of messages emphasizing negative consequences of 
poverty among minority groups, such as indigenous people or urban dwellers. This is due 
to the negative consequences of the church-state conflict. Under the same conditions, i.e. 
the lack of social and political change and higher levels of anti-church local regulations, 
conservative bishops are less likely to support political and social change messages, due 
to the lack of political options to channel the church’s discontent.21  
 
When we introduce political and social change into this situation we can expect 
various outcomes to emerge with respect to the local church’s message: with a significant 
presence of opposition political parties during the period of political regime change or 
increasing levels of social instability during the country’s recent drug war, all else equal, 
we should see an increase in the likelihood of political messages being issued by local 
churches. It is in these situations, though, that the bishops’ ideology becomes particularly 
important.  
 
                                               
21 Actually, I expect, based on a limited participant observation during the early 1990s, and a preliminary 
examination of case study works written during the 1980s, that we do not observe this combination, given 
that places in which there is a match between a hegemonic party format and conservative bishops, it less 
likely to observe church-state conflicts, arguably due to the fact that the existent status quo seems to be 
convenient for both the hegemonic party and the local church, and consequently, an aggressive 
implementation of anti-church policies is less likely to take place (Hernández 1997; Camp 1997). 
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In places where there is a significant presence of opposition political parties, 
progressive bishops are more likely to issue messages about political change, because 
they are more receptive to the changing local political context in which electoral 
competition seems to be in line with progressive background (Mackin 2003).22 In contrast, 
in situations where conservative bishops are in place, the emergence of political 
competition would collide with the bishops’ ideology, leading them to issue messages in 
support of status quo, due to the fact that local electoral competition would represent in 
some ways a threat to the conservative faction of the Church and its focus on moral 
values above all else.  
 
This central role of ideology becomes clear when considering the fierce 
opposition of many bishops to political parties that relied on “Marxist-Leninist” 
principles in the late 1970s (Ramos 1992; Camp 1997: 75), or why some bishops are 
currently opposed to leftist parties that sponsor and approve bills legalizing abortion, gay 
marriage, and gay adoption, which is not very surprising (Ramos 1992; Díaz-Domínguez 
2006a).  
 
A more intriguing question to ask refers to those areas in which a conservative 
political option emerged to challenge the PRI’s one-party status quo. In such a scenario 
we might expect “leftist” bishops to call for a “wait-and-see” strategy. I argue, however, 
                                               
22 During the late 1980s, a decade of emerging political change at the local level in some states (Martínez-
Assad 1985; Lujambio 2001), 52 percent of the Catholic clergy considered that defending the true electoral 
results favored the poor among the poorest, and 67 percent of the clergy considered that the church must 
condemn electoral fraud practices (Sota and Luengo 1994: 67-69). This piece of evidence supports the 
notion of political change reception among some Church leaders, who supported political change through 
writings and sermons taking advantage of the emerging political options in places where available. 
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that progressive bishops facing an emerging conservative political option are more likely 
to support calls for political change, regardless of partisan ideologies, due to social and 
political change taking place, as “leftist” bishops did in the North and West regions 
during the middle 1980s, when notorious electoral fraud took place at the local level 
(Molinar 1987; Muro 1984; Hernández 1997; Chand 2001). 
 
Regarding anti-church policies, the combination among the significant presence 
of opposition parties, increasing levels of social change, and soft anti-church local 
regulations will increase political and social messages issued by the local churches, in 
which progressive bishops are more likely to support change, whereas some conservative 
bishops are more likely to support the status quo, due to the lack of conflicts between 
local churches and public officials.  
 
In contrast, the combination of the significant presence of opposition parties and a 
more hardline set of local anti-church regulations should trump the role of a bishop’s 
ideology in many ways, leading both progressive and at least some conservative bishops 
to join in challenges to the status quo (Moncada 1985: 40; Messmacher 1985: 258). This 
switch among conservative bishops is due to the fact that the government is scaling up 
the conflict with local churches through a stricter regulation of anti-church policies, and 
consequently, some conservative bishops could consider that the government is no longer 
an efficient protector of the church’s general interests. In this situation, then, opposition 
parties, regardless of their ideological orientation, represent a vehicle to address the 
church’s disagreement with the regime.  
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Alternatively, some conservative bishops may remain in support of the status quo, 
given the political uncertainty that arises with political competition. In this last scenario, 
some conservative bishops could perceive that the opposition would alter the political 
equilibrium in such a way that would ultimately make the church worse off with respect 
to its relations with the state, a sort of rational calculus of the Church self-interest.  
 
Though such alternatives are possible, the larger point here is that the interactions 
among local political and social change, local church-state relations, and bishops’ 
ideological leanings are critical, and under explored factors influencing variations in the 
political message of the Church within a country. It is the exploration and understanding 
of these interactions that drive this chapter. An overview of expectations derived from 
these theoretical mechanisms is shown in Table 2.1. The overall prediction is that 
political change will increase the likelihood of a local church promoting change, but this 
relationship is conditioned by the ideology of the bishop and the relationship a diocese 
has with the state. 
 
 
Bishops’ 
ideology 
Lack of political and social change Political and social change 
Low anti-church 
(I) 
High anti-church 
(II) 
Low anti-church 
(III) 
High anti-church 
(IV) 
 
Conservative 
 
status quo 
(no political 
messages) 
 
status quo 
(no political 
messages) 
 
status quo 
(political messages) 
 
change 
(political and social 
messages) 
 
Progressive 
 
status quo 
(no political 
messages) 
 
change 
(social messages) 
 
change 
(political and social 
messages) 
 
change 
(political and social 
messages) 
 
Table 2.1. Theoretical Mechanisms: Expectations 
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To recap, this chapter offers a systematic attempt to understand the local 
dynamics of what has long been considered a monolithic, unitary actor, through 
theoretical explanations of church messages issued by local churches. Additionally, this 
chapter examines theoretical differences between local church concerns and the national 
church’s agenda from a long-term perspective. Finally, this chapter also offers a 
preliminary effort to develop theoretical accounts of individual bishops’ ideology in a 
systematic way.23 The next chapter will deal with descriptive analyses of groups of 
bishops and bishops’ individual characteristics, and I then proceed to test these 
expectations through analysis of local church messages between 1968 and 1995 in the 
fourth chapter.  
                                               
23 From the specific consequences of the mechanisms, one would argue that I built my model thinking of 
bishops as Ancient Israel prophets. Nevertheless, I do not assume bishops act in any prophetic way on 
systematic basis. It is well known that among prophets and context complex links are established, which 
are not adequately explained by the metaphor of rupture or repetition. More general, a prophetic behavior 
characterizes certain religious movements in the sense that they build up around themselves a very acute 
conscience that society is in crisis and central values are in danger. Therefore, it is the time to restore them 
or replace them (Weber 1905; Walzer 1987). Although there are arguments in favor of applying that 
definition to Mexico’s church leaders (Granados 1981) from a religion and politics perspective, the 
prophetic mission deals with a far complex reality at the very local level (Camp 1997; Mackie 2003). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
MEXICO’S BISHOPS: GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS 
 
Having laid out my theoretical expectations for why, when, and where we should 
expect variations in the Church’s message across Mexico, I now turn to an empirical 
analysis of the Mexican bishops themselves. I first examine in detail the community 
structure of bishops to identify whether there are groups of bishops who arguably share 
ideological tendencies considering Papal Nuncios, and Cardinals, and second, I analyze 
descriptive statistics of the individual characteristics of bishops, such as their origins, 
seminary training in Mexico and abroad, and previous pastoral experiences. As noted in 
the previous chapter, all of these factors are essential to understanding the ideological 
leaning of the bishop. 
 
Bishops’ Ideological Tendencies 
 
Several studies have provided maps of the political positions of specific bishops 
within Mexico, outlining public profiles and pastoral actions. These studies have 
geographically divided clergy between the north and the south, finding those in the north 
more politically active, and those in the south more socially progressive (Loaeza 1985). 
Other research has focused on bishops’ views toward the central government, classifying 
them as those who support both the ruling elite and the current administration (Granados 
1981; Acuña 1989; Ramos 1992, Blancarte 1992); those who couch their support of the 
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ruling elite with critiques of the system (Granados 1981; Muro 1994; Sota and Luengo 
1994; Camp 1997), and those most critical of the government who side with the poor 
(Rubin 1987; Muro 1994; Sota and Luengo 1994).  
 
Thus, the Catholic hierarchy’s positions on different issues are not monolithic. 
Even under Catholic dogma constraints, there is still room for debate, dissent, and 
conditional obedience, and it varies from age to age, from country to country, and from 
region to region. Ideological tendencies among clergy are understood as theoretical 
constructs, in which scholars can place bishops’ sociopolitical views about the mission 
outside of the church (ad extra ecclesia), and about the inner life of the church (ad intra 
ecclesia) (Legorreta and Sota 2000: 132).  
 
In particular, from the Council of Trent (1546-1563) to Vatican II (1962-1965), 
Catholic identity entailed a clear cut organizational and hierarchical division between the 
clergy and the laity, in which the clergy played the important role in religious life and the 
laity was an simple observer when attending to rituals. After Vatican II this identity 
experienced an important transformation, in which the laity would play a more relevant 
role, getting actively involved in religious life.24  
 
Four models of this new Church emerged from Vatican II:  
                                               
24 The Council of Trent was the Catholic Church's response to challenges presented by the Protestant 
Reformation, issuing doctrinal decrees about the seven sacraments, the mass in Latin, papal authority, role 
of indulgences, veneration and intercession of the saints, promotion of rosary, Eucharistic worship, 
definitions of heaven, hell, purgatory, and Christian virtues, and mandatory seminary training for Catholic 
clergy. Trent is also known as the Council of the three “d”, doctrine, discipline, and devotion (Sota and 
Luengo 1994).  
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a) A postmodern church, in which the Catholic identity would completely 
disappear leaving room for small groups (Libanio 1986). 
b) A traditionalist church, in which the goal was the restoration of the 
Catholic identity derived from the Council of Trent (Libanio 1986; Sota 
and Luengo 1994). 
c) A neo-fundamentalist church, in which the main function of Vatican II 
was the shaping of a new identity based on strict discipline dictated by the 
highest hierarchy, i.e. Rome (Loaeza 1985; Libanio 1986; Acuña 1989; 
Blancarte 1992; Quiroz 1993; Sota and Luengo 1994; Legorreta and Sota 
2000; Mackie 2003). 
d) A liberationist church, in which Vatican II is the natural starting point 
to construct a dynamic, plural, committed, and rooted church among the 
people (Medellín 1968 and Puebla 1979 in CELAM 2004; Loaeza 1985; 
Acuña 1989; Quiroz 1993; Sota and Luengo 1994; Mackie 2003).  
 
Mexico’s Catholic Church does not fit in the first or the second models, but it 
potentially fits the neo-fundamentalist and the liberationist church models.25  Thus, there 
were two models of church during the 1970s, 1980s and middle 1990s. First, the neo-
fundamentalist church in which Mexico’s highest hierarchy tried to impose a strict 
discipline; and second, the popular church, in which progressive bishops tried to impose a 
social justice agenda. 
                                               
25 An exception is the New Jerusalem (Nueva Jerusalén), a schismatic religious affiliation, derived from a 
very traditional Catholicism and supported by Bishop Lefevebre’s followers in Mexico, who aspire to fully 
restore Trent’s dogma and practices, such as Latin mass, and clergy-centered rituals. This religious 
affiliation is actually based on Turicato, a poor municipality of the Mexican state of Michoacán (Del Val 
1986). 
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Mexico’s theological pluralism has been achieved through decentralization and an 
increasing relative autonomy of the Catholic dioceses (Camp 1997; Legorreta and Sota 
2000). Although bishops are appointed by Rome through a consultation process among 
the nuncio, cardinal, archbishops, and some relevant bishops, when evangelizing, bishops 
have greater independence. As a result, we observe an increasing participation of bishops 
in political and social issues at the state level. Similarly to Mexico’s political relations 
among the federation, states, and municipalities, in the Catholic Church there is the 
Vatican, national conferences of bishops, archdioceses, dioceses, and parishes, all highly 
connected by specific chains of command, but at the same time bishops have significant 
autonomy and “room for maneuver” in their own spheres. 
 
Along parallel lines, the politicization of ecclesiastical circles has arisen in a 
context of profound international changes, such as the end of the Cold War and the Soviet 
Bloc in the late 1980s (Legorreta and Sota 2000). Domestically as well, the Church has 
undergone watershed changes in Mexico over the past thirty years. In 1992, President 
Salinas pushed through constitutional and legal recognition of the churches after two 
centuries of unevenly enforced anticlerical policies (Blancarte 1992; Lamadrid 1994; Gill 
1999). Further, salient issues on the religious battlefield have emerged since the middle 
2000s, such as a heated debate over such issues as abortion, euthanasia, gay marriage and 
gay adoption (Magaloni and Moreno 2003; Díaz-Domínguez 2006a; 2012a). All of these 
recent factors have also shaped bishops’ ideological tendencies, in combination with the 
emergence of different ideological networks during this time.  
 
45 
 
Community Structure of Mexico’s Bishops  
 
This section employs networks analysis in order to identify specific groups of 
bishops in which papal nuncios played a relevant role actively consecrating new bishops. 
Through analysis of senior bishops who are charged with ordaining bishops as principal 
consecrators, who in turn ordain new bishops,(Sota and Luengo 1994; Legorreta and Sota 
2000; Cheney 2013), it is possible to identify the community structure of bishop networks 
in Mexico. For this analysis, I rely on an original database that maps the connections 
among 211 bishops and their principal consecrators. Network analysis provides 
appropriate tools to understand the complex nature of connections among subjects in any 
given group or set of groups.  
 
Principal consecrators ordain new bishops in line with the apostolic succession 
doctrine, in order to preserve the Catholic dogma (Sota and Luengo 1994; Cheney 2013). 
Thus, it is also plausible to assume that consecrations of new bishops are made on group 
basis, i.e. establishing groups of bishops who potentially share similar ideological 
tendencies, in which principal consecrators leave a sort of mark or impronta in the new 
bishops (Acuña 1989; Ramos 1992).  
 
One example of a bishop network in Mexico comes from Cardinal Corripio, from 
Tampico, Tamaulipas, who consecrated his fellow Tamaulipas-born Arturo Szymanski. 
Cardinal Corripio consecrated six new bishops, extending his initial influence from 
Tamaulipas to Puebla, and then, from Oaxaca to Mexico City, creating the so-called 
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“Tampico mafia” (Ramos 1992). Some scholars argue that the strength of Cardinal 
Corripio’s group was an important factor in shaping the spiritual mission of Mexico’s 
bishops during the 1970s and early 1980s (De la Rosa 1979; De la Rosa and Reilly 1985; 
Acuña 1989; Ramos 1992; Camp 1997). In sum, there are reasons to believe that these 
bishop networks are an important factor to consider when analyzing the political 
determinants of church messages. 
 
In order to analyze groups of bishops, networks analysis in general allows 
researchers to identify influential members, what connections in the network are the most 
important ones, and whether there is a concentration or whether there are disconnected 
groups in the network community. In particular, a network is broadly defined as a set of 
vertices connected by edges. The vertices are individuals or members who make 
connections and edges are represented as lines connecting the vertices (Newman 2004; 
Csardi 2013).26   
 
In order to estimate directed connections, recent approaches to network analysis 
find that a partition of the vertices represents a clear community structure, i.e. if the 
proportion of edges inside is higher than the proportion of edges between them, then it is 
possible to know the community structure estimating a measure called modularity.27 In 
                                               
26 Vertices and edges are represented by an adjacency matrix, a symmetric and square matrix, using binary 
language, in which ones represent connections between members, and zeroes the lack of. An alternative is 
the adjacency list, in which pairs of related members are listed (Csardi 2013). 
27 In order to estimate a partition usually called modularity, scholars recently have employed a walktrap 
algorithm (Pons and Latapy 2005), as implemented in my network analysis. Other four relevant measures 
in preliminary network analysis are: a) betweenness centrality: the number of shortest paths an actor is on 
(gatekeeper position, control); b) degree centrality: the number of edges a vertex has to other vertices (how 
well connected); c) closeness: the sum of geodesic distances to all other edges (how far from all other 
actors); and d) eigenvector centrality: a lambda that reflects not all connections are equal (Newman 2004). 
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the case of Mexico’s bishops, analyses of 211 bishops from 1968 to 2012 reveal a 
modularity of 0.887, which means that only eleven percent of bishops entirely belong to a 
very different community. Thus, the main divide in Mexico’s community structure of 
bishops seems to be between those bishops who consecrated more than one new bishop, 
and those bishops who consecrated only one new bishop in their lifetime. In addition, 
there is an important concentration of bishops in 15 subgroups, in which 15 principal 
consecrators emerge. An extended concentration of these groups increases the number 
from 15 to 20, as shown in Graph 3.1.28 
  
                                                                                                                                            
The last measure is especially useful when analyzing undirected connections (Csardi 2013). Traditional 
networks analysis considers different measures of “key actors” in a network that are typically assumed as 
those having undirected connections. Undirected connections refer to the fact that there is not an arrow 
head between member A and member B. We know they are connected in some way, but if the connection is 
undirected, we then do not know whether A exercises any sort of influence on B, or vice versa. 
Connections among Mexico’s bishops, however, are directed, i.e. there is an arrow head between member 
A and member B, due to the fact that relationships between new bishops and principal consecrators are part 
of the apostolic succession doctrine, in which tracing the apostolic lineage back, this line should begin with 
the apostles. Given that one function of apostolic succession is preserving Catholic doctrine, which is 
transmitted from principal consecrators to new bishops, connections among Catholic bishops are directed, 
i.e. from principal consecrators to new bishops. 
28 Due to the directed connections assumption, eigenvector centrality is not estimated in this specific 
networks analysis, estimating modularity instead. Although centrality measures are highly correlated, 
examining residuals from regressing betweenness on eigenvactor usually indicate key actors. Nevertheless, 
due to the apostolic succession doctrine, and then, the lack of eigenvactor information, the following 
networks analysis only offers graph visualization, just descriptive, of the community structure of Mexico’s 
211 bishops from 1968 to 2010. 
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Graph 3.1. Network Analysis of Mexico’s Bishops, 1968-2012. Each small circle 
represents a bishop. Arrows go from principal consecrator to new ordained bishops. 
Concentrations indicate a bishop (in the center of each concentration) who ordained all 
the connected bishops. Estimations using R 2.14 through libraries (sna) and (igraph). 
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The community structure reveals that different principal consecrators arguably 
created their own groups, in which ideological affinities potentially emerged. Although 
network analyses only allow researchers to know the community structure and groups 
formation, if one assumes that the leader of each concentration is able to transmit his 
ideological tendency to his new “disciples”, then, there are reasons to believe that bishops 
ordained by a conservative principal consecrator are more likely to remain on the 
conservative side. 
 
Interestingly, Mons Prigione, a very active principal consecrator and conservative 
papal nuncio during the 1980s and early 1990s, ordained himself 39 bishops, as shown in 
Graph 3.2. Different scholars argue that Prigione was an active papal nuncio, who 
favored a vertical church model rather than a horizontal one, trying to impose discipline 
among bishops placed on “the left side” (Sota and Luengo 1994; Aguilar 2000). In order 
to deal with the “leftist rebels”, Prigione started to consecrate new bishops, arguably in 
line with his political view and replacing the leftists, such as Archbishop Almeida and 
Bishop Talamás in Chihuahua; Bishop Méndez Arceo in Cuernavaca; and Bishop Ruiz in 
Chiapas, with his new ordained bishops. In this way, papal nuncios are an important 
factor to consider when estimating determinants of church messages, if one assumes that 
ideological leanings of principal consecrators are related with new bishops’ ideology.  
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Graph 3.2. Network Analysis of Mexico’s Bishops, Papal Nuncio Girolamo Prigione. 
Each small circle represents a bishop. Arrows go from principal consecrator to new 
ordained bishops. Concentrations indicate a bishop (in the center of each concentration) 
who ordained all the connected bishops. Mons Prigione ordained 39 new bishops 
between 1979 and 1996.  
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Interestingly, since Prigione’s administration, papal nuncios have favored the neo-
fundamentalist church model, in line with Rome’s vertical style during the reign of Popes 
John Paul II and Benedict XVI. An additional case is exemplified by Nuncio Mullor, who 
insistently tried to remove Bishop Vera, at the diocese of Saltillo, Coahuila, and 
previously at Chiapas, who openly criticizes the old church structures, current 
government migration policies, and recently, the drug war strategy.  
 
The next religious leader in creating an important group was Cardinal Rivera, 
Archbishop of Mexico City, who ordained 17 new bishops, as shown in Graph 3.3. A 
relevant distinction between Nuncio Prigione and Cardinal Rivera, besides the number of 
new bishops is the number of new principal consecrators around them. Prigione ordained 
nine bishops who years later become themselves principal consecrators too, as shown in 
Graph 3.2, whereas Rivera ordained just one new principal consecrator, Bishop Sánchez 
Espinosa, as shown in Graph 3.3.29  
 
In general, Mexico’s community structure of bishops reveals centrality. It means 
that there are 139 nodes (new bishops) adjacent to 15 influential nodes (the main 
principal consecrators with 4 or more consecrations). It also means that 66 percent of all 
new bishops were consecrated by these 15 key actors, and six of those 15 influential 
members were papal nuncios.   
                                               
29 It is worthy to note that being Archbishop of an important metropolitan area may fuel consecration of 
new bishops, in order to fulfill the pastoral needs of suffragan dioceses, rather than consecration of new 
bishops who can be considered as “rising stars”. Nevertheless, Archbishops can take different patterns, 
fortifying their own groups through new principal consecrators, as Nuncio Prigione or Cardinal Corripio 
did, or fortifying themselves, performing the role of principal consecrators for the entire group, as Cardinal 
Rivera. 
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Graph 3.3. Network Analysis of Mexico’s Bishops, Cardinal Rivera. Each small circle 
represents a bishop. Arrows go from principal consecrator to new ordained bishops. 
Concentrations indicate a bishop (in the center of each concentration) who ordained all 
the connected bishops. Cardinal Rivera ordained 17 new bishops between 1997 and 2011. 
 
Certainly nuncios and cardinals from Mexico City played an important role when 
creating solid networks, but they were not alone. Guadalajara bishops, in a very 
traditionalist region called Bajío where the Cristero War took place during the 1920s 
(Bravo 1955; Dulles 1961; Meyer 1973) three are two cardinals who also exercised an 
important influence: Cardinal Sandoval, who consecrated 14 new bishops during the 
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1990s and 2000s, and Cardinal Garibi, who consecrated eight new bishops during the 
1950s and 1960s.30  
 
Overall, networks analysis shows the effective existence of groups of bishops, in 
which papal nuncios played a relevant role actively consecrating new bishops. Arguably, 
nuncios’ activism could eventually shape not only the preservation of the Catholic dogma, 
in line with the apostolic succession doctrine, but also the interpretation and emphasis of 
specific beliefs while des-emphasizing other ones. Nuncios’ activism entailed the 
consecration of one third of all new bishops from 1957 to 2013, as shown in Graph 3.4, a 
similar percentage when only writers are considered, as shown in Table 3.1. 
 
In conclusion, previous research has detected that approximately 9 of every 10 
Mexican bishops find mentors in two places -- either through a professor-student 
relationship during seminary training (63 percent), or during their pastoral careers (25 
percent) (Camp 2002: 29). Thus, based on this research it is plausible to suppose that 
papal nuncios play a similar role to mentors, using their influence and prestige when 
creating networks among new bishops via consecration to establish a particular ideology 
                                               
30 There are additional groups among Mexico’s bishops, such as senior bishops who consecrated a new one, 
who later became cardinal. There are three examples of this, Archbishop López, who consecrated Cardinal 
Rivera; and Archbishop Márquez, who consecrated Cardinal Corripio, both Rivera and Corripio performed 
the highest role among Mexico’s bishops, the Primus Archbishop of Mexico in back to back periods, from 
1978 to 1995, and from 1995 to nowadays. The third example is Archbishop Aguiar, the President of 
Mexico’s National Conference of Bishops, ordained by Cardinal Suárez, Archbishop of Monterrey. Finally, 
among the main principal consecrators two important figures started to emerge, one is Cardinal Robles, and 
the other one is Archbishop Aguiar. Cardinal Robles who have ordained five new bishops during the 2000s, 
started as bishop of Toluca, capital city of the state of Mexico, and then he became Archbishop of 
Monterrey, then Cardinal, and nowadays, he plays the role of Archbishop of Guadalajara. Cardinal Robles 
has been identified with the “silent majority”, an unclassified group of Mexico’s bishops who do not 
release press statements or make public appearances (Acuña 1989; Ramos 1992; Sota and Luengo 1994; 
Camp 1997). Interestingly, the President of Mexico’s National Conference of Bishops, Archbishop Aguiar, 
who came from Cardinal Suárez group, has ordained four new bishops, as many as two recent nuncios, 
Mullor and Bertello. 
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among a network of bishops. This ideological affinity in turn could exercise influence on 
subsequent pastoral activities, such as preaching or writing about specific issues. 
Unfortunately, we do not know the specific ideological leaning of all papal nuncios, but 
we do know that in general, papal nuncios actively proposed an active role of bishops in 
politics (De la Rosa 1979; Camp 1997). Thus, there are preliminary reasons to believe 
that bishops who were ordained by papal nuncios will more likely to preach about politics, 
all else equal. 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3.4. Mexico’s New Bishops Consecrated by Papal Nuncios, 1957 - 2013. From 
1957 to 1992 the official figure was Apostolic Delegate, from 1992 to present Apostolic 
Nuncio.  
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Apostolic Delegate / Nuncio Starts Ends Years Principal Consecrator of Writers Percent of 212 Avg Year 
Raimondi, Luigi December 15, 1956 June 30, 1967 10.5 12 6 2.8% 1.1 
Del Mestri, Guido September 9, 1967 June 20, 1970 2.8 1 1 0.5% 0.4 
Martini, Carlo July 6, 1970 June 2, 1973 2.9 1 1 0.5% 0.3 
Gaspari, Mario Pio June 6, 1973 November 16, 1977 4.4 9 8 3.8% 2.0 
Sanz, Sotero November 24, 1977 January 17, 1978 0.1 0 0 0.0% 0.0 
Prigione, Girolamo February 7, 1978 April 2, 1997 19.2 39 39 18.4% 2.0 
Mullor, Justo April 2, 1997 February 11, 2000 2.9 4 4 1.9% 1.4 
Sandri, Leonardo March 1, 2000 September 16, 2000 0.5 0 0 0.0% 0.0 
Bertello, Giuseppe December 27, 2000 January 11, 2007 6.0 4 4 1.9% 0.7 
Pierre, Christophe March 22, 2007 July 31, 2013 6.4 5 5 2.4% 0.8 
  Average 5.6 7.5 6.8   
        
  Total   35.4% 32.1%  
 
Table 3.1. Mexico’s Bishops Consecrated by Papal Nuncios, 1957 - 2013. From 1957 to 1992 the official figure was Apostolic 
Delegate, from 1992 to present Apostolic Nuncio. Universe of bishops = 212. Writers are individual or groups of bishops who wrote 
or preach at least one piece between 1968 and 1995; and 2009 and 2010. 
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Bishops Writers, 1968 - 1995 
 
Having explored the community structure of bishops, and the influential role 
played by papal nuncios, I now turn to an analysis of bishops’ individual characteristics. 
This analysis entails a comparison between those who write church messages, and those 
who belong to a general sample. This comparison is needed because the database of 
bishops’ writings only includes those bishops who disseminate their own writings.  In 
order to identify a potential problem for a selection bias, I compare these two groups of 
bishops in order to assess the degree to which bishops who write and disseminate letters 
and other documents differ from those who do not. I find in general that these two groups 
are largely similar across important individual-level factors (see Appendix A, “Bishops 
Biographies” for specific coding rules regarding individual characteristics).  
 
Scholars classify Mexico’s bishops into five groups: 1) the “silent majority” 
comprised of 70 bishops who never make public statements (Acuña 1989; Sota and 
Luengo 1994; Camp 1997); 2) the “religion and freedom of religion” bishops, a group 
comprised of those who saw the constitutional and legal recognition of the churches as a 
useful way to create attention on religious issues in the mass media (Blancarte 1992); 3) 
the “spiritual mission” group,  currently a minority of bishops comprised of those who 
argue the main task of the church refers to evangelization and seek to avoid conflict with 
the government (Ramos 1992; Camp 1997); 4) the “effective suffrage” group, comprised 
of those whose central message is a demand for electoral transparency and democracy 
(Muro 1994; Camp 1997; Chand 2001); and 5) the “land and liberty” bishops who 
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support popular movements and typically have carried out pastoral work in the South 
Pacific region (Acuña 1989; Sota and Luengo 1994; Camp 1997). 
 
Although all the prior classifications are theoretically and somewhat empirically 
grounded, they do not take into account bishops’ academic profile and their pastoral and 
administrative careers, as recognized and emphasized by Luengo (1992); Sota and 
Luengo (1994); and Camp (1997).  In addition, previous empirical classifications restrict 
analyses to bishops’ statements in the press (Acuña 1989) or disseminated pastoral letters 
(Ramos 1992; Hernández 1997; Soriano 1999), and therefore, those bishops who belong 
to the “silent majority” remain essentially unclassified. In order to overcome these 
limitations, when analyzing 333 Mexico’s bishops writings, collected between 1968 and 
1995, 57 bishops writers biographies were also coded, in which bishops’ academic profile, 
and their previous studies and careers were taking into account. These 57 writers were the 
total of bishops who wrote the 333 analyzed messages. 
 
I begin with an analysis of bishops’ previous seminary and educational 
experiences. Here I find that over half of those bishops with publicly available writings 
started their priestly work in seminaries, whereas more than one third started their 
pastoral work in parishes, as shown in Table 3.2. These are similar proportions to those 
reported by Camp in what has long been the definitive study of bishop biographies in 
Mexico (1997: 157). The expectation is that those bishops who started to work in 
parishes are more likely to preach about social issues, and moral values (Ramos 1992), 
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due to the pastoral immediate concerns they face when starting to preach in his early 
professional life (Eckstein 1977; Peritore 1989; Stein 1995).  
 
Regarding the impact of initial job assignments, the assumption is that those 
bishops who start to work on parishes are less likely to preach about politics, due to the 
main pastoral concerns faced by the newcomer clergy: human and economic 
development (Walzer 1987; Ramos 1992), and moral values according to the Church 
teachings (Walzer 1987; Stein 1995). This assumption is in line with the role of the 
mediator played by the Catholic clergy when social or moral issues are on the rise, rather 
than political issues, as shown in Eckstein’s work regarding the mediator role played by 
clergy in Mexico’s populated cities (1977), and Camp’s extensive interviews with 
bishops who come from rural origins (1997). 
 
 
Birth Cohort Seminary Parish Mixed Total 
1900 7% 0% 0% 7% 
1910 11% 14% 4% 28% 
1920 19% 18% 4% 40% 
1930 + 16% 5% 4% 25% 
Total 53% 37% 11% 100% 
 
Table 3.2. Bishops’ Previous Experience by cohort, 57 Writers. Sources: CEM; Ramos 
(1992); Camp (1997); Dioceses and Seminaries websites (2013). 
 
Regarding the place of their initial seminary studies, 60 percent of writers come 
from five seminaries: Morelia, Guadalajara, Mexico, Puebla, and Durango. Once again, 
this confirms the conclusion of Camp (1997) that religious elites tend to be less 
concentrated in Mexico City when compared to political elites. Furthermore, as we can 
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see in Table 3.3, the distribution of initial seminary studies among those bishops for 
whom I have public writings is similar to the more general sample studied by Camp 
(1997: 160). The expectation is that bishops who studied in seminaries from the Bajío 
(located in Central West Mexico, where the Cristero war essentially took place) are more 
likely to preach about moral values, due to the conservative profile of the Morelia and 
Guadalajara Seminaries (Camp 1997), whereas bishops who studied in seminaries from 
the North are more likely to preach about politics and social issues, due to the more 
socially oriented profile of these seminaries, such as the Chihuahua Seminary run by the 
Jesuits (Chand 2001). Finally, bishops who studied in seminaries from the south are also 
more likely to preach about social issues, again due to the emphasis on social concerns 
found in the Guerrero and Oaxaca Seminaries, and the SERESURE seminary (Regional 
Seminary of the Southeast), where students received some liberation theology classes 
(Ramos 1992; Blancarte 1992).  
 
 
Seminary Studies Percent Absolute 
Morelia 16% 9 
Guadalajara 14% 8 
Mexico 11% 6 
Puebla 9% 5 
Durango 9% 5 
Xalapa 5% 3 
León 5% 3 
Others (In Mexico) 21% 12 
Others (Foreign) 11% 6 
 
Table 3.3. Bishops’ Seminary Studies, 57 Writers. Sources: CEM; Ramos (1992); Camp 
(1997); Dioceses and Seminaries websites (2013). 
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With respect to additional seminar studies, some priests who later became bishops 
were sent to Rome to attend specialized schools, such as the Pio Latinoamericano (South 
American College), the Mexican College (Colegio Mexicano), and Pontifical Gregorian 
University, whereas other priests were sent to the inter-diocesan Montezuma Seminary in 
New Mexico, U.S., as shown in Table 3.4. Those who studied in Rome were exposed to a 
curricula highly associated with scholastic views. In contrast, those studying in 
Montezuma were introduced to curricula that included some pastoral perspectives and an 
intense socialization process among Mexicans and American students (Sota and Luengo 
1994; Camp 1997).   
 
In sum, these differences may exercise an influence on what topics bishops decide 
to emphasize, and therefore it is important that my sample of bishops with writings be 
comparable in their training to those from the more general sample used in Camp’s work. 
When comparing these two samples we do in fact find similar percentages, with the 56 
percent of my sample studying in Rome and 16 percent being exposed to the more 
pastoral through their studies in Montezuma. This breakdown is roughly equivalent to 
that found by Camp (Camp 1997: 161; 169). My expectation is that bishops who studied 
in Rome are more likely emphasize moral values messages, whereas bishops who studied 
in Montezuma are more likely to focus on messages about social issues. 
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Birth Cohort Mexico Only Montezuma Rome Mixed Total 
1900 4% 0% 4% 0% 7% 
1910 2% 5% 21% 0% 28% 
1920 9% 11% 16% 7% 42% 
1930 + 7% 0% 16% 0% 23% 
Total 21% 16% 56% 7% 100% 
 
Table 3.4. Bishops’ Additional Studies, 57 Writers. Sources: CEM; Ramos (1992); Camp 
(1997); Dioceses and Seminaries websites (2013). 
 
An additional important background characteristic of bishops is their previous 
experience in historical church events at the global level. A global shift in the Church’s 
message was fueled by the Vatican II, an ecumenical council called by Pope John XXIII 
in 1962 and finalized by Pope Paul VI in 1965, in which the Catholic Church started a 
modernization process generally called aggiornamento. In order to capture the possible 
impact of Vatican II on the messages of individual bishops, I will include whether they 
attended sessions of Vatican II or not. The expectation is that bishops who attended 
Vatican II are more likely to talk about social issues and internal organization of the 
church, and less likely to talk about moral values. 
 
In addition, those priests who have prior experience as seminary rectors often 
came in contact with academia, an experience that also possibly influenced their 
subsequent views of the teachings of the Church on social issues, as revealed by social 
concerns shared among seminary rectors and seminarians in Mexico during the 1970s and 
1990s, decades in which seminarians changed the seminary dorms for apartments in 
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shanty towns, trying to live as rank and file low income parishioners (De la Rosa 1979; 
Ramos 1992; Cleary 2009). 
 
As shown in Table 3.5, the proportion of council fathers is similar across places of 
additional seminary studies. Almost two-thirds of those who attended schools in Rome 
also became both seminary rectors and council fathers, and around 14 percent of those 
who attended Montezuma also held a seminary rector position and attended Vatican II. 
 
 
Studies Seminary Rectors Absolute Council Father Absolute 
Rome 60% 9 68% 15 
Mixed 20% 3 14% 3 
Montezuma 13% 2 14% 3 
Mexico Only 7% 1 5% 1 
Total 100% 15 100% 22 
 
Table 3.5. Bishops Who Previously Were Seminary Rectors, and Bishops Who Attended 
the Second Vatican Council, 57 Writers. Sources: CEM; Camp (1997: 167); Dioceses and 
Seminaries websites (2013); Cheney (2013). 
 
A final measure to be included in the subsequent analysis concerns those bishops 
consecrated by papal nuncios in comparison to those consecrated by domestic 
consecrators. Mexico’s anticlerical tradition, which has been documented since the 1857 
and the 1917 constitutions, and particularly during the Cristero War (Meyer 1973; Gill 
1999), suggests that religious authorities from Rome have enjoyed scant opportunities to 
exercise significant influences on the Mexican Catholic Church. Thus, a useful way for 
papal nuncios to increase their potential influence in Mexico was consecrating new 
bishops, who arguably will be more likely to share ideological leanings with nuncios 
from Rome. When looking at this within my sample of writers, 32 percent were 
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consecrated by papal nuncios, as shown in Table 3.6, while the remaining 68 percent 
were consecrated by Mexican church officials.  
 
 
Seminary Studies Consecrated by Nuncio Absolute 
México 17% 3 
Xalapa 11% 2 
Morelia 11% 2 
Durango 6% 1 
León 6% 1 
Guadalajara 0% 0 
Puebla 0% 0 
Others (In Mexico) 39% 7 
Others (Foreign) 11% 2 
Total 100% 18 
 
Table 3.6. Bishops Consecrated by Nuncio per Seminary. Sources: CEM; Dioceses and 
Seminaries websites (2013); Cheney (2013). 
 
Nuncios’ influence however is not homogenous across Mexico. For instance, 
using the dataset of bishops’ writers, priests from Guadalajara and Puebla were mainly 
ordained by Mexican bishops. Thus, evidence seems to suggest that writers from less 
visible seminaries were slightly more susceptible to nuncios’ influence (39 percent of 
writers consecrated by a papal nuncio).31   
 
Overall, there are reasons to believe that writers’ individual characteristics are 
fairly similar when compared to a more comprehensive universe of bishops. A potential 
shortcoming of this comparison is that the 138 bishops included in Camp’s dataset (1997) 
                                               
31 Although one third of Mexico’s bishops consecrated by papal nuncios seem to reflect a useful measure of 
Rome’s influence on Mexico’s Catholic Church, it is noteworthy to remark that other countries could have 
higher proportions of bishops consecrated by papal nuncios. In sum, further research may compare Rome’s 
influence across countries in order to correctly place whether one third is large enough in order to asses 
such influence. 
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could eventually face similar limitations that my 57 writers’ dataset, due to the lack of 
information among the “silent majority”, a group comprised of bishops who almost never 
make public appearances, and coincidently, their biographical information is also scarce 
(Sota and Luengo 1994). The larger point however is whether the potential bias derived 
from including only writers in the dataset represents an insurmountable issue. The 
analyses derived from community networks and bishops’ biographies reveal that writers 
and a more generous sample of bishops do not substantially differ.  I therefore now move 
to the next chapter in which I describe the main characteristics of bishops’ writings and 
model their main determinants.32 
 
 
  
                                               
32 Only relying on those bishops who disseminate their own statements may not differ from other samples 
because those bishops who were also interviewed by Camp (1997), they were also preceded by previous 
fame, arguably increasing bishops’ public presence among journalists, practitioners, and academics. 
Although all these problems are possible, comparisons among different subsets derived from different and 
independent sources of information are insightful and reveal that these limitations do not bias research on 
bishop’s writings (Personal communications with Roderic Ai Camp, September 25th and 27th of 2013). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CHURCH MESSAGES AND UNEVEN POLITICAL CONTEXTS 
 
In this chapter I offer an empirical model that seeks to explain subnational 
variations in church messages as a function of ideology, the magnitude of political 
change occurring within a particular region, and development measures. This exploration 
rests on an original dataset created through content analyses of pastoral letters issued by 
Mexico’s Catholic bishops from 1968 to 1995. Along with these data that provide the 
basis for measurement of the dependent variable, the model includes measures of 
political change, development, and bishops’ individual characteristics, such as the place 
of studies in Mexico and abroad, urban origins, and previous parish or seminary rector 
experiences, in order to capture ideological tendencies.  
 
Overall, evidence suggests that after controlling for social factors in each diocese 
at the time, and bishops’ individual characteristics, political change increases the 
likelihood that bishops will talk about and promote to some extent the need for an 
opening of the Mexican political system, at least at the local level. This model, in which 
ideological tendencies are specifically considered, shows that political change exercises a 
different impact on conservative bishops depending on the ideological orientation of the 
main opposition parties in the region. When the right-of-center wing is on the rise, as one 
might expect, the conservative bishop becomes more likely to join his progressive peers 
in making calls for political change.  
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Bishops’ Writings  
 
In order to bring the local level approach back to religion and politics in Latin 
American settings, it is important to relax the conventional assumption that the Catholic 
Church uniformly, and successfully, defines its concerns as “a common order of priorities” 
(Hagopian 2009a: 259), due to the fact that there are variations across bishops’ messages. 
Identifying positions taken by the church at the diocese level, then, because it is here 
where the message of the Church is closest to the parishioners and thus has the greatest 
potential for influence. These variations at the dioceses level likely are a product of a 
combination of political change and clergy’s different ideological tendencies that differ in 
degree and intensity across dioceses. In this way, positions taken by Mexico’s bishops 
will be a function of what is happening around them, along with bishops’ individual 
characteristics (Smith 1982; Ramos 1992; Luengo 1992; Sota and Luengo 1994; Stein 
1995; 1998; Camp 1997; Aguilar 2000; Cheney 2013), and the socioeconomic and ethnic 
makeup of the population they serve (Acuña 1989; Ramos 1992; Hernández 1997; 
Soriano 1999; Smith 2008; Trejo 2009). 
 
Despite the theological and organizational commonalities across dioceses, there is 
considerable variation regarding the emphasis of topics discussed by the local churches, 
and although the Catholic Church’s positions regarding specific topics remain fairly 
similar across dioceses, there is variance with regards to which topics are prioritized. 
Some bishops may choose to focus on politics and controversial social issues of the day, 
whereas other bishops may choose to remain squarely in the traditional domain of the 
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Church, and preach about moral values or internal Church issues. In trying to understand 
the role the Church plays in national-level political and social change, then, or in how its 
message is shaped by such national-level events, we must begin by explaining why some 
bishops choose to focus their message and agenda on one of change, while others seek to 
defend the status quo.  
 
In this section, I present the results of a content analysis of 333 documents 
publicly released by 57 bishops located across distinct dioceses in Mexico during a thirty-
year time period. From these data, I am able to construct a “message” variable that 
assigns the message issued by each bishop over this thirty-year period to one of four 
categories. The messages found in the bishops’ writings are coded as either being of a 
political content; social issues; a moral content; or one that focuses on the internal 
organization of the Church. With this categorical variable, I then proceed to offer an 
empirical account of when and where we should expect to find bishops focus on one of 
these four particular messages.  
 
Messages about politics include such specific topics as the 1968 student massacre 
in Mexico City, a call for greater civic engagement, voter turnout, church-State relations, 
the Zapatista Army, free and fair elections, electoral fraud, Marxism, political corruption, 
and different electoral issues at the local and national levels. Messages about social issues 
include those that focused on external debt, economic crisis, defense of human rights, 
migration, violence and torture, refugees, humanitarian aid, natural disasters such as 
hurricanes, atypical rain, flooding and earthquakes, the drug war, alcoholism, and 
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ecology. Messages about moral values messages include explanations about the 
Humanae Vitae, a papal document; laic and religious education, birth control, 
decriminalization of abortion, use of contraceptives, defense of family values, promotion 
of Christian marriage, and decriminalization of adultery. Finally, internal organization 
messages cover such topics as regulations on church groups, catechists, Lefebvre’s 
schism, priesthood training, regulations about deacons, dissemination of the Pope's 
documents, dissemination of the CELAM’s documents, solidarity with other religious 
groups, and pastoral visits of the Pope (see Appendix B, “Messages Codebook” for 
specific coding rules).33 
 
The first step in the construction of my “message categories” is to examine the 
temporal distribution of the bishops’ writings. Here it is important that they not all be 
concentrated within too narrow of a time frame, as this will constrain my ability to assess 
the influence of political change on the messages. Fortunately, as we see from Graph 4.1, 
though somewhat concentrated during the decade of the 1980s, there is sufficient 
distribution of the messages over the period of analysis to allow for adequate assessment 
of the role distinct periods of political change played in shaping the emphasis of bishops 
across Mexico. Of the 333 messages analyzed, I coded each as belonging to one of these 
four categories: politics, social issues, moral values or the church internal organization.34 
                                               
33 Considering titles, content, main topic, and conclusions, each document was assigned to only one 
category of the four types of church messages. Although alternative classifications were possible, it is 
noteworthy to remark that classification of bishops’ documents was a slow but straightforward process, due 
to the generally monothematic nature of bishops’ documents. 
34 Bishops’ writings were collected following any vague, general or specific information or even a hint 
mentioned by a very rich range of journalists, clergy members, and scholars in order to check and double 
check all the 333 writings: Index of the Monthly Religious Magazine Actualidad Litúrgica (1971-2011); 
Weekly Magazine Proceso (1976-1988); Eckstein (1977); De la Rosa (1979; 1985); Ludlow (1984); 
Loaeza (1985); Newspaper La Jornada (1988); Acuña (1989); Ramos (1992); Blancarte (1992); Luengo 
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There were 70 authors of these 333 messages, 57 of whom were individual 
bishops, two are national-level authors (the Standing Committee of the National 
Conference of Bishops, and the National Conference of Bishops itself), and 11 were 
written by a collection of bishops from distinct pastoral regions.35  In total, these three 
groups of authors (single bishops; national conferences; and groups related to a pastoral 
region) produced 333 writings. Single bishops issued almost 60 percent of the total 
writings, with the message content of these writings focused slightly more often on 
political issues compared to social, moral values, or internal organization matters. The 
writings issued by pastoral regions represented 10 percent of all church messages, and 
tended to focus most on social issues (50 percent), politics (30 percent), and, lastly, moral 
values (20 percent). Finally, the National Conference of Bishops issued one third of all 
messages, preaching almost exclusively on politics and the internal organization of the 
church (70 percent), with the remaining messages focusing on moral values (see Graph 
4.2)  
  
                                                                                                                                            
(1992); Newspaper Uno Más Uno (1993-1995); Sota and Luengo (1994); Newspaper Reforma (1994); 
Hernández (1997); Camp (1997); Soriano (1999); Gill (1998; 1999); Legorreta and Sota (2000); Aguilar 
(2000); Chand (2001); Mackin (2003); Pacheco (2005); Trejo (2009); CEM website (2013); historical 
online archives of Dioceses websites (2013); and Library of Mexico City’s Diocesan Seminary (2012). 
Bishops’ writings previous to 1968 are hard to find on systematic basis. Alternative sources for further 
research: documents issued by the National Conference of Bishops were listed by the Theological 
Magazine Christus, number 423, page 32, issued in February of 1971, as mentioned by De la Rosa (1979). 
Additional documents prior to 1968 are also mentioned by Branderburg (1964); Turner (1971); Soriano 
(1999), and Pacheco (2005). 
35 Bishops are grouped by geographical regions and generally share pastoral concerns. For example, the 
South Pacific is comprised of two states, Oaxaca and Chiapas; Don Vasco is comprised of all dioceses in 
the state of Michoacán; the North includes the states of Chihuahua and Coahuila; and the “Veracruz group”, 
includes all dioceses in the state of Veracruz. 
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Graph 4.1. Number of Bishops’ Messages by Year in Mexico, 1968-1995. Vertical line 
indicates the 1992 constitutional provision in which the State recognized churches’ legal 
rights. 
 
Bishops in their own dioceses or grouped by pastoral regions scarcely focused on 
the church internal organization issues, as the National Conference did. In contrast, social 
issues were mainly present among pastoral regions and practically absent at the national 
level during the 1970s and 1980s. Around one third of the messages across the three 
levels were about politics, and almost 25 percent of messages across levels were about 
moral values. In sum, there is variation across levels and topics emphasized by single 
bishops, pastoral regions, and the National Conference of bishops, as shown in Graph 4.2.   
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Graph 4.2. Percent of 333 Bishops’ Messages by Level and Topic in Mexico, 1968-1995.  
 
Seeing that church messages vary across levels and topics, it is also important to 
find variation across years, in order to know whether changes in the emphasis of bishops 
is in fact related to the rise of political and social change as my theory suggests.36 
                                               
36 The general assumption extensively discussed in the second chapter is that clergy messages constitute ex 
post reactions to political and social events taking place around them rather than assuming that the church 
seeks to initiate actions. 
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Graph 4.3. Percent of Bishops’ Messages by Topic and Year in Mexico, 1968-1995. First panel shows the proportion of the church 
internal organization and social messages. Second panel shows the proportion of messages about moral and politics. 
 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
Internal Organization Social
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
Moral Politics
73 
 
During the 1970s, messages about moral values and the Church’s internal 
organization were more prevalent, whereas messages about politics and social issues 
were scarce, essentially centered on the 1968 and the 1971 students’ movements, 
employing a “wait-and-see” approach (De la Rosa 1979; Soriano 1999; Pacheco 2005), 
and against the left wing given its attempts to capture the Catholic vote (De la Rosa 1979; 
Ramos 1992; Camp 1997) during these years. Regarding moral values, bishops seemed to 
have employed a more aggressive approach when arguing against birth control and laic 
education (Granados 1981; Ramos 1992; Soriano 1999). Finally, in relation to the 
Church’s internal organization, bishops focused largely on how to implement Vatican II 
new policies, as shown in Graph 4.3.   
 
During the 1980s a new emphasis started to emerge that focused on politics and 
social issues. The impact of this shift in focus on Mexico’s democratization process has 
been analyzed at the local level by various scholars all of whom find that even though the 
initial change in focus was reactive, it ultimately did further the pace of political 
change.37 Scholars concluded that the Catholic Church had an impact on democratization 
processes at the local level, employing qualitative evidence to support their conclusions.  
 
In addition, the church activism was also prevalent at the national level, regarding 
elections and mainly fueling church-state relations (Blancarte 1992; Camp 1997; Gill 
1999; Soriano 1999). Regarding social issues, bishops discussed the economic crisis, 
                                               
37 For the North, see Moncada (1985), Messmacher (1985), Sirvent (1987), Molinar (1987), Ramos (1992), 
Muro (1994), and Chand (2001). Studies of the South include Rubin (1987), Ramos (1992), and Muro 
(1994), in the West see Ramos (1992), and Hernández (1997). Finally, for the Central region see Ramos 
(1992), and Camp (1997). 
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drug trafficking, and migration (Ramos 1992; Soriano 1999). Interestingly, during this 
period internal organization matters were scarce across levels, among single bishops, 
pastoral regions, and the National Conference of Bishops. 
 
During the 1990s however, internal organization matters and statements about 
politics practically occupy all of the bishops’ writings, whereas messages about moral 
values and social issues clearly decreased. This increased political emphasis in these 
writings echoes the findings of Klesner who concludes that “bishops have become 
increasingly willing to speak out on political positions over the past two decades, mainly 
in promoting participation and democratization” (2009: 54). In sum, there is not only 
variation about what topics bishops decided to emphasize, but also in the point in time 
when they emphasized it. I now turn to the question of the role a bishop’s social and 
political context plays in shaping the message, alongside his ideology and background 
characteristics.  
 
Church Messages and Political Change at the Local Level 
 
Variation over what messages bishops decide to emphasize can be explained by 
“the various concrete contexts” they found themselves in (Quiroz 1993: 184), as 
liberation theology states, or “may be shaped by the context of the place at present” 
(Stein 1995: 147), as religion and politics scholars also argue. At the core of this notion is 
the idea that political change at the local level will induce some type of response from the 
Catholic Church due to reactive rather than proactive nature of the church (Branderburg 
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1964; Turner 1971; Williams 1973; Ludlow 1984; Loaeza 1985; Mainwaring 1986; 
Acuña 1989; Ramos 1992; Gill 1998; Hagopian 2009a).  
 
In answering this question this chapter addresses a central concern with the role of 
religion in politics and, conversely, the role of politics in religion. What I find is indeed a 
situation where political change leads some bishops to push for more change that in turn 
lends credibility to growing opposition movements.  This chapter analyzes two main 
factors that shape the Church’s many messages -the rise of local electoral competition 
and bishops’ individual characteristics. With respect to the other variable discussed in the 
second chapter, the enforcement of anti-church policies across dioceses, I am unable to 
include that in the following analysis due to insufficient variation across time and space 
with respect to when and where the particular bishops in the data issued their writings.38   
 
I discussed in the second chapter the theoretical basis for expecting local political 
change to influence the messages of individual bishops, viewing the nature of this 
influence as in part a function of whether the political change started from the left- or 
right-of-center wing of opposition. I also put forth the very intuitive proposition that all 
else equal, a bishop’s ideology will go a long way in helping us explain the particular 
emphasis of his message, with progressive bishops likely to support messages about 
                                               
38 Certainly enforcement of anti-church policies needs to be taken into account in order to understand the 
relationship a local diocese has with the central government and the extent to which Mexico’s anticlerical 
legacy remains intact during times of political change (Bravo 1955; Meyer 1973; Gill 1998; 1999; 
Hagopian 2009a; Cleary 2009). The number of available cases at the local level however did not offer a 
useful variation, due to the lack of information when merging the church-state conflict variable, and writers’ 
dioceses. Using classical estimations, the church-state variable did not reach any statistical significance. 
Using Bayesian estimations, the church-state variable did not past convergence tests. Further research may 
take advantage of more detailed historical archives from seminaries and local newspapers in order to 
improve this measure. 
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political and social issues, while conservative bishops will likely support messages about 
moral values and internal matters of the church.  
 
In sum, I expect that conservative clergy “favor avoidance of involvement in 
temporal affairs unless vital church interests are at stake” (Tate 1990: 145), whereas 
progressive clergy “feel that the church should speak out on social injustices while 
adopting a policy of critical collaboration with the regime” (Tate 1990: 145; Muro 1994; 
Camp 1997; Gill 1998; Mainwaring and Scully 2003). Combinations among types of 
political change and bishops’ ideology will increase the likelihood the church’s message 
will include a focus on politics and social issues.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
From the theoretical chapter, three sets of hypotheses emerge, as shown in Table 
4.1. The first set concerns the impact of political change on the emphasis of bishops’ 
messages.  
 
H1: Political change should increase the probability of a message emphasis on politics 
and social issues relative to messages about moral values (status quo) or the Church’s 
internal issues (status quo). 
 
The second set of propositions deal with the influence of a bishop’s ideology on 
the content of his message. Here I expect progressive bishops, all else equal, to be more 
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inclined to talk about politics when compared to conservative bishops, and conversely, 
conservative bishops are more inclined to talk about moral values when compared to 
progressive bishops. 
 
H2: Progressive bishops are more likely to preach about politics 
H3: Conservative bishops are more likely to preach about moral values 
 
Finally, the third set addresses the combination of a context of political change, 
the ideological orientation of that change, and a bishop’s own ideology. This last variable, 
as I discuss below, is a product of a bishop’s origins (urban/rural), previous 
administrative experiences, the region in which the bishop carried out his initial seminary 
studies, and the places, if any, in which bishops studied abroad. In a context of rising 
electoral competition, progressive bishops should be more likely to talk about politics and 
social issues, regardless of the orientation of electoral competition, Conservative bishops 
in contrast, when facing political change should be more likely to continue preaching 
about moral values, except in cases when the electoral opposition represents the more 
conservative end of the ideological spectrum. If change comes from the left wing, then 
conservative bishops are more likely to emphasize moral values, whereas if change 
comes from the right-of-center wing, then conservative bishops are more likely to 
emphasize politics. The central role of ideology becomes clear when considering the 
fierce opposition of many conservative bishops to political parties that relied on 
“Marxist-Leninist” principles in the late 1970s (Ramos 1992; Camp 1997: 75), or why 
some bishops are currently opposed to leftist parties that sponsor and approve bills 
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legalizing abortion, gay marriage, and gay adoption (Ramos 1992; Díaz-Domínguez 
2006a). Thus, conservative bishops are more likely to emphasize moral values messages. 
Now, when the government is scaling up the conflict with local churches through a 
stricter regulation of anti-church policies, some conservative bishops could consider that 
the government is no longer an efficient protector of the church’s general interests. In this 
situation, then, a conservative party could represent a useful vehicle to address the 
church’s disagreement with the regime. 
 
H4: Progressive bishops who face political change are more likely to preach about 
politics and social issues. 
H5: Conservative bishops who face political change started by the left wing are more 
likely to preach about moral values. 
H6: Conservative bishops who face political change started by the right-of-center wing 
are more likely to preach about politics. 
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Bishops’ Ideology 
Political Change Started by the… 
 
 
Left 
 
 
Right-of-Center 
 
 
Conservative 
 
Moral Values 
 
Politics  
 
 
Progressive 
 
Politics and Social 
 
 
Politics and Social 
 
Table 4.1. Hypotheses Reformulated. 
 
 
My main explanatory variable of interest for understanding the particular focus of 
a bishop is political change at the local level and relies on two indicators that measure 
political change under democratic and authoritarian enclaves (Lawson 2000; Lujambio 
2000; Hiskey 2005; 2011; Hiskey and Bowler 2005; Klesner 2011). The first uses a ratio 
of left-of-center opposition party votes versus the official party at the time, the PRI, at the 
legislative, municipal and gubernatorial level in a given year. The second employs these 
same data to develop a ratio of right-of-center opposition party strength versus the PRI.  
 
Regarding the left wing, in a few states I included additional leftist political 
parties, in Veracruz and Nayarit, the PPS; in Tamaulipas, the PARM; and the PST in 
Coahuila. The remaining states these parties were largely considered “proregime” or 
“parastatal” parties (Eisenstadt 2004: 118). For the most part the independent left was 
represented by the PMT, and the PCM/PSUM/PMS, precedents of the PRD. Regarding 
the right-of-center wing, where available, the ratio considers the PAN rather than the 
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PDM due to overlapping regions among these two political parties, essentially in the 
Bajío, region in which the Cristero War took place (Meyer 1973; Molinar 1991; De 
Remes 2000b; Lujambio 2000; Eisenstadt 2004; Banamex 2004; CIDAC 2011; State 
Electoral Commissions 2011; CEDE-UAM 2012). 
 
As previously discussed, I measure bishops’ ideological tendencies through the 
use of the following indicators: (1) whether the bishop comes from an rural or urban 
background, with the latter suggesting a more progressive ideology (Camp 1997); and (2) 
the types of seminaries in which the bishop studied, classified by regions, such as the 
Bajío (West region), the North, and the Central region, in which the South is the 
reference category, with those bishops who attended Bajío seminaries more conservative 
while those who attended to seminaries in the North, and bishops who studied in the 
South more inclined to talk about social issues (De la Rosa 1979; Loaeza 1985, Acuña 
1989; Ramos 1992; Sota and Luengo 1994, Chand 2001; Mackin 2003).  
 
A third indicator focuses on where the bishop carried out additional seminary 
studies, and these are classified in four options: Montezuma Seminary in New Mexico, in 
the US; Rome, in the Gregorian; studies in Mexico only; and other places or any 
combination, which is the reference category. The expectation is that those bishops who 
attended Rome should be more conservative, while those who attended to Montezuma 
should be more progressive (Ramos 1992; Camp 1997). Finally, those who only attended 
Mexican seminaries will likely be most conservative, with a focus largely on moral 
values and the internal organization of the Church, arguably due to their rural origins 
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(Brandenburg 1964; Camp 1997), and the need of restoring “the Mexican Catholic 
essence” through piety and family values (Bravo 1955; Brandenburg 1964), in 
competition with views sponsored by those bishops who studied abroad (Brandenburg 
1964; Ramos 1992; Aguilar 2000). 
 
A final characteristic of bishops that should be important in explaining their 
ideological orientation concerns whether they began their pastoral work in a parish, 
whether they were appointed as seminary rectors, and the particular administrative 
positions they served. The expectation is that those who started in a parish will be more 
inclined to talk about moral values and social issues, whereas those who were appointed 
as seminary rectors will more likely be progressive, and therefore more inclined to talk 
about social issues (Sota and Luengo 1994; Camp 1997). To recap, bishops’ ideology is 
comprised of four characteristics: urban origins, region of the initial seminary, curricula 
of the seminary abroad, and previous priestly experience. 
 
Control variables used in the following models include the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the bishop’s state, using such items as the share of households with 
access to tap water, and the proportion of people employed in the primary and secondary 
sectors of the economy. I also control for the share of indigenous population and the 
effective number of religions. The general expectation, on average is that tap water, and 
sectors of the economy will increase the likelihood of issuing messages about moral 
values and internal organization, due to the traditional preaching of the Catholic Church, 
talking about spirituality and morality among peasants, workers, and middle classes, as 
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showed by several scholars regarding the Mexican case, such as Brandenburg (1964), 
Turner (1971), Ramos (1992) and Hernández (1997). Regarding indigenous people and 
religious diversity, the expectation is that these indicators increase the likelihood of 
issuing messages about political and social issues, due to the religious economy school, 
in which the assumption is that when the Catholic Church faces religious competition, it 
changes the discourse from moral values to politics (Gill 1998; Trejo 2009). 
 
Finally, I include two dummy variables, whether bishops were consecrated by a 
papal nuncio or not, and whether bishops were Council Fathers, meaning they attended to 
the Vatican II or not. The expectation is that Council Fathers will be more inclined to talk 
about internal organization, in order to implement and customize the new rules, and they 
will also be more inclined to talk about politics, given the new openness derived from the 
Council (Mainwaring 1986; Mackin 2003). Finally, those bishops who were consecrated 
by papal nuncios should be more likely to talk about politics, in line with the influential 
political role exercised by nuncios in Mexico, due to Mexico’s anticlerical policies 
(Ludlow 1984; Loaeza 1985; Ramos 1992; Sota and Luengo 1994; Camp 1997; Aguilar 
2000). Summary statistics are shown in Table 4.2. 
 
In order to empirically model the main determinants of church messages, I 
estimate a Bayesian multinomial logistic model, given I found some intractable issues 
using classical estimations, such as singularities, i.e. one case in some cells, higher 
standard errors, and simulations of predicted probabilities out of boundaries. To better 
deal with all these issues, Bayesian models offer a relatively simple solution modeling 
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unordered categorical variables via an independent Metropolis-Hasting sampling. 
Bayesian models deal with unobservable parameters as random, in which it is plausible to 
find the marginal and the posterior distributions from a given prior distribution and 
likelihood, through a joint distribution (Gelman, Carlin, Stern and Rubin 2003; Gelman 
and Shirley 2010). It is noteworthy to mention that uninformative priors were employed 
due to the initial nature of this research, but always assuming a multivariate normal prior 
on beta, the prior mean in this case. As a result, Bayesian models estimate a posterior 
distribution, including a credible interval and its mean, rather than a point, as a classical 
estimation does.39   
                                               
39 Bayesian multinomial logistic model was estimated using R 2.14, library (MCMCpackmnl), and the 
following parameters: burnin: 200,000 chains, which is the number of the initial MCMC iterations to be 
discarded; mcmc: one million chains, which is the number of the MCMC iterations after burning; and a 
thinning interval of 10, which is the interval for the Markov chain, in this case only every 10th draw from 
the chain was kept (Martin and Quinn 2006). At the core of these Bayesian models is the notion of 
convergence, in which variables should reach the stationary distribution. A series of tests about 
convergence were performed, such as Raftery (how long the Markov chain should run, in which defined r 
and q parameters –tolerance, and s –probability, N iterations, and M burn-ins are calculated to estimate 
dependence factors, where higher values are not good, because of influential starting values and/or poor 
mixing), Heidelberg (whether the “first part” of the Markov chain is in the stationary distribution, and 
whether the marginal can be precisely estimated, in which from 10 percent to the next 10 percent until 50 
represents half the width, and 1-alpha is the percentage of the credible interval), and Geweke (whether the 
“first window” –and also the second one- of the Markov chain are in the stationary distribution). All these 
tests were in line with advices from Raftery and Lewis (1992), and Gelman and Shirley (2010). All tests 
were performed following library (coda), and for all variables, except the church-state conflict variable, 
the non-convergence hypotheses were rejected. Due to the intractable nature of the church-state conflict 
variable (non-convergence after numerous attempts using different parameters), I finally dropped it from 
the specific hypotheses, and consequently, from the empirical model. 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Church internal organization 0.11 -- 0 1 
Moral values 0.27 -- 0 1 
Politics 0.37 -- 0 1 
Social issues 0.25 -- 0 1 
Left / PRI Ratio 0.12 0.15 0.01 1.31 
PAN / PRI Ratio 0.25 0.17 0.01 0.72 
Illiteracy Female Rates 0.20 0.11 0.06 0.47 
Tap Water 0.72 0.13 0.40 0.97 
Agricultural Sector 0.37 0.16 0.05 0.75 
Industry Sector 0.26 0.09 0.08 0.59 
Indigenous 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.52 
Effective Number of Religions 1.24 0.16 1.04 1.88 
Urban Origin 0.28 -- 0 1 
Seminary Bajío 0.38 -- 0 1 
Seminary North 0.16 -- 0 1 
Seminary Central 0.20 -- 0 1 
Studies Mexico Only 0.20 -- 0 1 
Studies Rome Only 0.71 -- 0 1 
Studies Montezuma Only 0.22 -- 0 1 
Seminary Rector 0.26 -- 0 1 
Begins Parish 0.47 -- 0 1 
Council Father 0.42 -- 0 1 
Consecrated by Nuncio 0.29 -- 0 1 
 
Table 4.2. Summary Statistics, Bishops Messages Model.  
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Main Determinants of Church Messages, 1968 - 1995 
 
When estimating four unordered categories (J), the estimated Bayesian 
multinomial logistic model uses one category as the baseline, and contrasts are defined by 
J–1, i.e. 4-1=3. As a result, all the three contrasts are plotted versus the baseline category, 
which I designate as those messages with a political focus, as shown in Graph 4.4. In all 
estimations, 90 percent credible intervals are shown, in which variables touching the zero 
line are not significant. Variables on the left side increase the likelihood of bishops’ 
messages about politics, whereas variables on the right side increase the likelihood of 
bishops’ messages about moral values, the church’s internal organization, and social 
issues, respectively. Finally, intercept and dummy years were also included but not 
shown.40 
 
 
 
                                               
40 The intercept for the first contrast was no significant (ranging from -5.1 to 22.4); the intercept for the 
second contrast, politics v social issues was significant (from 14.3 to 50.1), and the intercept for the third 
contrast was insignificant (from -6.5 to 19.3). Regarding years, it is noteworthy to remark that 1979 was 
significant for politics; 1982 for politics and social issues; 1984 for moral values and social issues; 1985 for 
politics and social issues; and 1986 and 1987 were significant for politics. 
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Graph 4.4. Determinants of Bishops’ Messages, Mexico, 1968 – 1995. Politics v Moral Values (first panel); Politics v Internal 
Organization (second panel); and Politics v Social Issues (third panel). Bayesian multinomial logistic model, lines are 90 percent 
credible intervals, using R 2.14 library (MCMCpackmnl) and (lattice). Intercepts and dummy years were estimated but not shown.  
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Overall, results derived from the empirical model show that the ratio of 
opposition votes divided by the PRI votes, a rough proxy variable of relative political 
change increases the likelihood of bishops’ messages about politics and social issues. In 
particular, the left–PRI ratio increases church messages about politics, whereas the PAN–
PRI ratio increases church messages about social issues, as shown in the first and the 
thirds contrasts, respectively. Interestingly, political change does not exercise any impact 
on the church’s internal organization messages, as shown in the second contrast.  
 
Bishops’ individual characteristics also exercise an influence on bishops’ 
messages. In particular, urban origins increase messages about politics when compared to 
moral and social issues. Regions in which bishops studied also matter, those who studied 
in the North are more inclined to talk about politics when compared to moral values and 
social issues. Bishops who studied in the Bajío and Central regions were more inclined to 
talk about politics when compared to social issues, whereas bishops who studied in the 
South were more inclined to talk about social issues, as revealed by the third contrast.   
 
Additional seminary studies reveal that bishops who studied in Rome, 
Montezuma (New Mexico), and Mexico tend to focus on organizational messages when 
compared to politics, perhaps suggesting the presence in these places of study of disputes 
about how to implement different perspectives when regulating church’s daily life. 
Seminary rectors are more prone to talk about social issues, whereas those bishops who 
started their priestly life in a parish are more prone to talk about moral values. Overall, 
measures tapping ideology generally behave in the expected way. 
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Finally, measures of development show mixed findings. In particular, the level of 
development, measured by the percentage of households in a state with access to tap 
water, does not exercise any influence on the content of bishops’ messages, whereas the 
percentage of people working in agriculture is associated with an increased focus on 
moral values. When compared to organizational issues, though, political messages tend to 
be more common in an agricultural based economy. These results may suggest those 
bishops who minister to a more rural, agricultural-based faithful tend to opt for a 
conservative message regarding moral values first, and messages about politics latter. In 
relation to the percentage of people working in industry, and places in which there are the 
higher levels of education, bishops are more likely to preach about politics. 
 
The impact of religious competition on the Church’s message, as measured by the 
percentage of indigenous population within a state, appears to result in an increased focus 
on politics, whereas the effective number of religions in a diocese slightly increases the 
same type of messages. These results suggest that the religious economy theory is 
important in explaining bishops’ messages about politics and democracy, but the effect in 
this analysis tends to be modest. Finally, attendance at the Vatican II does not appear to 
have had a significant impact on the message focus of bishops, while those bishops 
consecrated by papal nuncios are more likely to talk about politics, when compared to 
moral and social issues. 
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Graph 4.5. Effects of Political Change on Church’s Messages, Predicted Probabilities. Left – PRI Ratio (first panel), and PAN – PRI 
Ratio (second panel). Lines are 95 percent credible intervals, using R 2.14 library (Zelig). All variables set at their mode or mean 
values except the respective analyzed ratio. Simulations derived from Bayesian multinomial logistic model shown in Graph 4.4. 
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In order to know the specific impact of the main variables of interest on church 
messages, four sets of predicted probabilities were estimated: a) the two measures of 
political change, the left-PRI ratio and the PAN-PRI ratio; b) the percentage of 
indigenous population; c) the combination among left-PRI ratio and bishops’ ideology; 
and d) the combination among PAN-PRI ratio and bishops’ ideology. To recall, bishops’ 
ideology is comprised of four characteristics: urban origins, region of the initial seminary, 
curricula of the seminary abroad, and previous priestly experience. 
 
Regarding the two measures of political change, on the one hand, the left-PRI 
ratio increases the probability that bishops’ messages will be about politics, and it 
decreases the probability of a moral values message, as shown in Graph 4.5. On the other 
hand, with the PAN-PRI ratio, a stronger electoral presence of the PAN contributes to a 
greater emphasis on social issues but decreases the likelihood that messages will be about 
politics and internal organization, as shown in Graph 4.5. Results derived from the left-
PRI ratio behave in the expected way, whereas the PAN-PRI ratio runs on the unexpected 
direction, suggesting that results might be conditional on bishops’ ideology. In areas 
where the PAN was influential, ideology may have had a more important role on message 
choice.  
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Graph 4.6. Effects of Indigenous Population on Church’s Messages, Predicted 
Probabilities. Lines are 95 percent credible intervals, using R 2.14 library (Zelig). All 
variables set at their mode or mean values except the share of indigenous population. 
Simulations derived from Bayesian multinomial logistic model shown in Graph 4.4. 
 
The second set of predicted probabilities plots the effect of the percentage of 
indigenous population on messages, and we see from Graph 4.6 that the higher levels of 
indigenous presence are associated with a lower probability of messages focusing on 
moral values. This change regarding moral values messages can partially be explained by 
the religious economy school, in which those bishops who face an increasing indigenous 
presence were forced to change their discourse in an effort to prevent erosion of 
indigenous support for the Church and stop the growth in evangelical attachments. This 
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change however does not apply to politics or social issues, due to the overlapping lines 
between politics and social issues. Thus, the religious economy school finds a limited 
empirical support in these results. 
 
The third set of predicted probabilities shows the effect of political change and 
bishops’ ideology on church messages when analyzing the left-PRI ratio in combination 
with conservative and progressive bishops’ profiles, as shown in Graph 4.7. Conservative 
and progressive profiles are defined by urban origins, previous experience, geographical 
regions in which bishops made initial seminary studies, and countries in which they made 
additional seminary studies (see notes below figures that follow).  
 
When the left wing is present, comparisons between progressive and conservative 
bishops show that progressive bishops are more likely to talk about politics, whereas 
conservative bishops are more likely to talk about moral values. Thus it appears that a 
strategy of conservative bishops located in a context of strong left-of-center electoral 
opposition is to focus more on status quo issues, such as moral values, fighting the leftist 
political change taking place around them. Conversely, progressive bishops in this same 
context are more likely to preach about politics. The role of ideology becomes clear when 
considering the fierce opposition of some bishops to political parties that relied on 
“Marxist-Leninist” principles in the late 1970s (Ramos 1992; Camp 1997: 75), or when 
some bishops are currently opposed to leftist parties that sponsor abortion, gay marriage, 
and gay adoption, which is not very surprising (Ramos 1992; Diaz-Dominguez 2006a).     
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Graph 4.7. Effects of Left-PRI Ratio and Bishops’ Ideology on Church’s Messages, Predicted Probabilities. Lines are 95 percent 
credible intervals, using R 2.14 library (Zelig). All variables set at their mode or mean values except the Left - PRI ratio, and the 
following codes: Conservative: begins parish=1, Montezuma=0, Rome=1, Bajío=1, Seminary Rector=0, North=0, Central=0, Urban=0; 
and Progressive: begins parish=0, Montezuma=1, Rome=0, Bajío=0, Seminary Rector=1, North=1, Central=0, Urban=1. Simulations 
derived from Bayesian multinomial logistic model shown in Graph 4.4.  
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Finally, the last set of predicted probabilities shows the effect of political change 
and bishops’ ideology on church messages, when analyzing the PAN-PRI ratio in 
combination with conservative and progressive bishops’ profiles, as shown in Graph 4.8. 
As previously mentioned, conservative and progressive profiles are defined by urban 
origins, previous administrative experience, regions in which bishops made initial 
seminary studies, and places in which bishops made studies abroad.  
 
When the right-of-center electoral opposition is limited, comparisons between 
progressive and conservative bishops show that progressive bishops are more likely to 
talk about politics, whereas conservative bishops are more likely to talk about moral 
values. This result is similar to those found in left-leaning electoral opposition regions. 
An important contrast emerges however, when the right-of-center wing is on the rise. 
Here, conservative bishops become more likely to talk about politics, while progressive 
bishops switch from a focus on political issues to one of social issues. It is here, then, that 
we see conservative bishops overcome their ideological tendencies and begin to focus 
their messages in ways that highlight and embrace the political change taking place 
around them.41   
 
 
                                               
41 This switch among conservative bishops might be theoretically (not empirically) explained by church 
state conflict at the local level, forcing conservative bishops to consider that the government is as 
inefficient protector of the church’s general interests, and then, a rightist opposition party may represent a 
better vehicle to address the church’s disagreement with the regime. 
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Graph 4.8. Effects of PAN-PRI Ratio and Bishops’ Ideology on Church’s Messages, Predicted Probabilities. Lines are 95 percent 
credible intervals, using R 2.14 library (Zelig). All variables set at their mode or mean values except the PAN - PRI ratio, and the 
following codes: Conservative: begins parish=1, Montezuma=0, Rome=1, Bajío=1, Seminary Rector=0, North=0, Central=0, Urban=0; 
and Progressive: begins parish=0, Montezuma=1, Rome=0, Bajío=0, Seminary Rector=1, North=1, Central=0, Urban=1. Simulations 
derived from Bayesian multinomial logistic model shown in Graph 4.4. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
To attempt to understand the nature and degree of variance in bishops’ messages, 
empirical analyses were conducted on the writings of 57 individual and groups of bishops. These 
analyses belong to a broader consideration of Catholic politics, in which political change at the 
local level exercises an influential role in shaping the topic that bishops decide to emphasize.   
 
Combinations among local political change and bishops’ ideological leanings are critical 
in explaining the content and focus of bishop’s messages, highlighting variations in the political 
messages of the church across Mexico. Bayesian multinomial logistic model, using an original 
dataset of bishops’ messages and biographies, and electoral and social data at the local level, 
from 1968 to 1995, reveals that theoretical expectations are generally verified.  
 
Overall, results from the empirical model show a substantive impact of the uneven 
political change across Mexico on church messages, in combination with bishops’ ideology. In 
the model different control variables were included, such as measures of development, religious 
competition, additional bishops’ individual characteristics, and time.  After controlling for all the 
aforementioned variables, if the left wing leads political change, then progressive bishops are 
more likely to talk about politics, whereas if the right-of-center wing leads political change, then, 
conservative bishops are more likely to talk about politics. This important change may explain 
why bishops from very different ideological leanings are both talking about politics in a given 
context, in which the right-of-center wing is disputing the election (e.g. progressive bishops in 
Chihuahua, and conservative bishops in Sonora). 
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The empirical evidence provides support for the hypotheses outlined above suggesting 
that alternative rival hypotheses, such as the religious economy school have a limited role in 
explaining what makes the church politically active. The religious competition argument is 
certainly important at the national level, but the main reason why conservative bishops change 
from a moral values message to a political one is not related to the growing presence of 
Protestant and Evangelical parishioners at the subnational level. The findings here, then, support 
those of Mackin (2003), one of the few other works that looks at this question from the 
subnational level, in which the author, using the case of the state of Morelos, analyzes trends in 
the performance of the so-called “red bishop”, Mendez Arceo in Cuernavaca’s diocese. In line 
with Mackin findings, this dissertation also found limited evidence in favor of the religious 
economy school. 
 
This chapter offers one of the first comprehensive analyses of the interaction of highly 
uneven subnational political transitions on variations in the Catholic Church’s positions 
regarding politics, social issues, moral values, and the church internal organization. I found 
significant insights into both the role of the church in a nation’s democratization process at the 
subnational level as well as the degree to which the Catholic Church, once viewed as a 
monolithic, unitary actor, varies in its messages across time and space.  
 
This variation is essentially explained by the political context at the state level, where 
under specific conditions of political change the church preaches about politics. In particular, 
when the left wing leads political change the church emphasizes messages about politics when 
compared to moral values messages (H1 verified), whereas when the right-of-center wing leads 
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political change the church emphasizes social messages when compared to politics (H1, a partial 
finding).  
 
Regarding bishops’ ideology, all else equal, progressive bishops are more likely to preach 
about politics (H2 and H4 verified), whereas conservative bishops are more likely to preach 
about moral values when left wing is leading political change (H3 and H5 verified), and more 
likely to preach about politics when the right-of-center wing is leading change (H6 verified). 
Uneven political change and bishops’ ideological tendencies interact to influence local churches’ 
messages, taking our understanding of the intersection of religion and politics one step further 
from the religious economy and the spiritual mission schools of thought, while also bringing 
bishops’ individual characteristics back into the religion and politics literature in Latin America. 
 
The next chapter will further explore ideological variations across Mexico’s bishops in 
2000, the year in which the democratic alternation at the national level took place.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
IDEOLOGY OF MEXICO’S BISHOPS 
 
Extending the ideas and analyses put forth in the fourth chapter, I now turn to empirical 
analyses of variations in bishops’ ideologies around the time of the country’s watershed election 
presidential election of 2000. Relying on a unique survey of bishops conducted in 2000, I find 
striking evidence of substantial differences in the ideological orientation of the country’s bishops. 
The empirical models analyze the impact of bishops’ attitudes toward the main topics discussed 
in Mexico’s ecclesial agenda. From these models ideological leanings and their main 
determinants are derived, in which two main groups of bishops emerge, one inclined to 
emphasize pastoral messages to respond to the spiritual needs of the faithful, and other one 
inclined to respond to social justice needs among the marginalized.  
 
Overall, results from the 2000 Bishops Surveys reveal that bishops in Mexico report 
differences in pastoral perspectives and styles. Thus, ideological variations among bishops do not 
seem to depend on specific time periods or critical junctures, suggesting that differences among 
which messages Mexico’s bishops decide to emphasize are still relevant and a worthy topic to 
study.   
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Bishops’ Recent Ideological Tendencies 
 
The Catholic Church always takes a clear position on a variety of issues, but differences 
across Catholic clergy’ positions start when some bishops decide to emphasize some issues while 
de-emphasizing others. In other words, we do not see some bishops favoring abortion, or 
completely ignoring the poor. Rather, all bishops fall in line with the doctrine of the Church and, 
therefore are opposed to abortion and favor the poor. Differences, however, emerge in terms of 
the degree to which bishops choose to focus on one issue over another. As has been emphasized 
throughout this dissertation, then, the key to understanding subnational variations in the message 
of the Church is to focus on the reasons why some bishops prefer to preach about one topic, 
while others prefer to preach about a different one. It is these differing points of emphasis that I 
argue tap underlying ideological divides among bishops within Mexico.42 
 
As I mentioned in previous chapters, scholars classify Mexico’s bishops into five groups: 
1) the “silent majority” comprised of 70 bishops who never make public statements (Acuña 1989; 
Sota and Luengo 1994; Camp 1997), a group that nowadays still remains; 2) the “religion and 
freedom of religion” bishops, a group comprised of those who see the importance of legally 
acquire radio stations or even a TV station to preach the word (Blancarte 1992; Aguilar 2000); 3) 
the “spiritual mission” group, currently a minority of bishops comprised of those who argue the 
main task of the church refers to evangelization and seek to avoid conflict with the government 
(Ramos 1992; Camp 1997); 4) the “effective suffrage” group, currently a minority as well, 
                                               
42 As stated by Pope Francis “we cannot insist only on issues related to abortion, gay marriage and the use of 
contraceptive methods. This is not possible. I have not spoken much about these things, and I was reprimanded for 
that. But when we speak about these issues, we have to talk about them in a context. The teaching of the church, for 
that matter, is clear and I am a son of the church, but it is not necessary to talk about these issues all the time”. Full 
interview available at: http://www.americamagazine.org/pope-interview.  
101 
 
comprised of those whose central message is a demand for electoral transparency and democracy 
(Muro 1994; Camp 1997; Chand 2001); and 5) the “land and liberty” bishops who support 
popular movements and typically have carried out pastoral work in the South Pacific region 
(Acuña 1989; Sota and Luengo 1994; Camp 1997). The last group however started to disappear 
since the 2000s, due to generational replacement for new bishops of conservative tendencies, 
those who are being consecrated by papal nuncios and conservative cardinals. All these factors 
are leaving more room for the “religion and freedom of religion” group. Overall, these 
classifications based on qualitative research were useful through the 1980s and the 1990s, but 
unfortunately no quantitative studies were carried on Mexico’s bishops on systematic basis at the 
individual level, until the 2000 Bishops Surveys was publicly available several years ago.43 
 
In order to test whether ideological variation still exists among Mexico’s bishops, this 
section analyzes the 2000 Bishops Surveys, a unique instrument administered to 66 bishops in 
2000, during the first meetings of Mexico’s National Conference of Bishops (CEM) when 
bishops drafted the 2000 landmark document “From the Encounter with Jesus to the Solidarity 
with All” (Del Encuentro con Cristo a la Solidaridad con Todos), issued by the CEM in March 
25th of 2000.44 
                                               
43 I am indebted to Pablo Parás (DATA OPM) for pointing me out the existence of the 2000 Bishops Surveys in the 
BELA surveys databank (available at: http://mdw.ucsd.edu/webpage/bela/index.htm). There are few surveys 
conducted among clergy in Latin American settings: Smith (1982) among bishops, priests and nuns in Chile; Chea 
in Guatemala in 1985 among 90 priests (Chea 1988); Daniel Levine’s well known clergy interviews in Venezuela 
and Colombia (1986); and Bruneau’s clergy interviews in Brazil (1973); Peritore (1989) in Brazil among clergy 
from Rio de Janeiro using the q-method; Andrew Stein (1995) interviews conducted among all Nicaragua’s priests; 
the 1988-1991 study among Mexican clergy in seven states (Luengo 1992; Sota and Luengo 1994); in depth 
interviews conducted by Roderic Ai Camp among Mexico’s bishops (1997); and now, the 2000 Bishops Surveys in 
Mexico conducted by Pablo Parás. 
44 The 2000 Bishops Surveys were self administered among 66 bishops who attended to the National Conference of 
Bishops first meetings, among the 80 bishops available in Mexico at the time. The specific session in which the 
surveys were administered was not revealed in order to preserve bishops’ anonymity. The questionnaire was 
comprised of 53 questions, and at the first paragraph started with an invitation from two bishops to answer all the 
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Because the methodology of the 2000 Bishops Survey, carried out by DATA-OPM 
preserved bishops’ anonymity, it is not possible to identify the particular bishops who were 
included in the surveys or attach to respondents any of the biographical data that guided the 
analyses in the third chapter. The surveys do, however, offer preliminary insights into the wide 
ideological and policy variations that exist among bishops that in turn can help to illustrate the 
impact of pastoral preferences on what bishops define as main pastoral priorities. Though the 
survey is over ten years old, and it would be preferable to have more recent data, it is the only 
publicly available study of Mexican bishops at the individual level, and thus, represents a rich 
collection of data offering insights into views of this class of church leaders.  
 
One of the central items found in this survey concerns what bishops viewed as the most 
important topic that Mexico’s Catholic Church should emphasize. The question reads “Please 
rank from 1 to 10 the importance of the following issues to be addressed in the CEM main 
document: 
(1) new evangelization;    (6) new religious groups;  
(2) encounter with Jesus;    (7) economy;  
(3) communion in the church;   (8) politics;  
(4) solidarity;      (9) culture;  
(5) Christian unity;     (10) social issues”.  
 
Of the 66 surveyed bishops, 42 bishops selected “encounter with Jesus” as the most 
important of these ten topics, while 16 bishops selected “new evangelization”. It is important to 
                                                                                                                                                       
questions emphasizing anonymity in all answers, reason why the surveys did not include any demographics 
(available at: http://mdw.ucsd.edu/webpage/bela/index.htm). 
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recall the global and domestic context around 2000. The religious effect of the new millennium 
exercised an impact on some proportions of disillusioned Catholics who started to embrace the 
“new age” movement, in which people rediscover their divinity and find salvation through 
reincarnation (and therefore neglecting salvation through Jesus), emphasizing moral relativism 
and equalizing all religions (and therefore neglecting the role of the clergy), whereas other 
Catholics experienced a revival through spirituality and piety (Cleary 2009).  
 
In this context, the Pope John Paul II launched in November 10 of 1994 the document 
“Tertio Millennio Adveniente” in which alerted about the religious implications of the new 
millennium, proposing a “Great Jubilee of the Year 2000” (Cleary 2009), and even before, in 
1992, during the IV Latin American Conference of Bishops in Santo Domingo, Dominican 
Republic, the Pope emphasized the need of a new evangelization to restore moral values and 
spirituality, deemphasizing politics and social issues. In addition to the aforementioned papal 
document, Mexico City’s Cardinal, Norberto Rivera launched the document called “A Call to 
Vigilance” in January 7 of 1996, document in which the Cardinal specifically addressed what he 
considered the main new age challenges to the Catholic faith, as described above. This context 
helps to explain why the two topics selected by a majority of bishops were “encounter with Jesus” 
and “a new evangelization”.  
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Ranking   
 
 
Encounter 
with Jesus 
 
(%) 
 
New 
Evangelization 
 
(%) 
 
Communion 
within  
the Church 
(%) 
 
Solidarity 
 
 
(%) 
 
Christian 
Unity 
 
(%) 
 
Total (%) 
Rows 
 
I 42 64% 16 24% 1 2% 1 2% 1 2% 94% 
 
II 16 24% 24 36% 17 26% 0 0% 0 0% 86% 
 
III 0 0% 8 12% 25 38% 15 23% 5 8% 81% 
 
IV 0 0% 8 12% 5 8% 22 33% 14 21% 74% 
Total 58 88% 56 85% 48 73% 38 58% 20 30%  
 
Table 5.1. Ranking of Pastoral Concerns among Mexico’s Bishops, 2000. Source: item 33 from the 2000 Bishops Surveys. Total of 
surveyed bishops: 66. Question reads “Please rank from 1 to 10 the importance of the following issues to be addressed in the Mexico’s 
National Conference of Bishops (CEM) main document”. The ten topics were (1) new evangelization; (2) encounter with Jesus; (3) 
communion in the church; (4) solidarity; (5) Christian unity; (6) new religious groups; (7) economy; (8) politics; (9) culture; and (10) 
social issues. Only main five topics and four ranks are shown. 
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Remaining preferences among bishops show variations across priorities. 24 bishops 
selected “new evangelization” as their second best option, 17 bishops selected “communion 
within the church”, and 16 selected “encounter with Jesus”. In the third best option, 25 bishops 
selected “communion within the church”, 15 bishops selected “solidarity”, and 8 bishops 
selected “new evangelization”. Finally, 22 bishops selected “solidarity”, as their fourth best 
choice, 14 bishops selected “Christian unity”, and 8 bishops selected “new evangelization”. The 
remaining topics were chosen by very few bishops, as shown in Table 5.1.  
 
Assuming that the ten topics included in the survey capture a range of policy positions 
and their ideological underpinnings, it is plausible to estimate the preferred positions of bishops 
based on their rank ordering of these topics. In order to know whether the preferred positions of 
bishops can be meaningfully differentiated along an ideological continuum, I construct a model 
based on the assumption of one single dimension, and attempt to estimate ideal points along that 
continuum. This estimation procedure is a common tool when analyzing ideology in the US 
Congress, the US Supreme Court, and the European Parliament (Poole and Rosenhtal 1997; 
Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Poole 2005; Martin and Quinn 2006). In the Mexican case, 
scholars have estimated ideal points for electoral commissioners of the Federal Electoral Institute 
(IFE), and electoral judges of the Electoral Court (TEPJF) (Estévez, Magar and Rosas 2008; 
Estévez and Magar 2008).  
 
Usually, roll calls are coded based on a particular ideological orientation, such as left and 
right or liberal and conservative. For the sake of simplicity, I assume a single dimension of 
“spiritual needs” in order to classify those bishops who identified a spiritual needs issue as their 
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most important topic and those who did not. This estimation procedure will provide further basis 
for my contention that those Church officials, bishops, who are largely responsible for the 
propagation of the Church’s message throughout a single country, have strikingly different views 
on what dimensions of the Church message should receive the most emphasis.45 
 
I begin with an attempt to identify the extremes on the one dimension. First, I look at 
where respondents placed themselves on the following items: whether liberation theology was 
the cause of the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas (p51); whether bishops implement a prophetic 
pastoral committee in their dioceses (p30a); whether bishops’ prophetic pastoral committees 
denounce unfairness (p30a2); whether bishops in their dioceses show solidarity with all those 
who suffer using a 4-point scale (p48d); whether bishops support ecumenism in their dioceses 
(p14); and whether the causes of the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas were poverty and injustice 
(p51). Responses to all of these items should work in a similar direction in terms of assessing a 
particular bishop’s ideological leaning, and thus allow me to identify the two respondents with 
the most extreme response profiles on either side of the continuum.46 
 
  
                                               
45 Empirical analyses of bishops’ votes are essentially limited to the first two votes of the first session of Vatican II, 
in which the proportion of Catholics, Protestants, the strength of the Catholic Church, and whether Catholicism is 
the official/State religion, all at the national level, are predictors of bishops’ votes (Wilde, Geraty, Nelson and 
Bowman 2010). Essentially, Wilde et al found that bishops vote progressively when Catholicism is not the official 
religion, but the Protestant market share seems to have a limited impact on bishops’ votes. Thus, they claim that the 
religious economy should theorize more about the type of organizations or firms that the Catholic Church represents, 
rather than just center their focus on the structure of the religious market. 
46 The two respondents with the most extreme response profiles on either side of the continuum were identified as 
bishop number 13 and 15. I preserve all the labels, from b1 to b66 in order to facilitate replication of my results. 
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Graph 5.1. Bishops’ Ideology, Ideal Points, Mexico 2000. Source: Author’s estimations based on 
the 2000 Bishops Surveys, using R 2.14 and library (MCMCpackirt1d), assuming the following 
distributions: N(0,1) for ideal points, and N(0,4) for parameters. Lines are 90 percent credible 
intervals.   
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Taking advantage of the ranking of the most important issues among Mexico’s bishops in 
2000, I estimate bishops’ ideal points using an item response theory model (IRT) in order to 
estimate a latent variable, employing a matrix of four rounds of rankings considering ten topics 
among 66 surveyed bishops.   
 
As can be seen in Graph 5.1, there are indeed substantive differences across bishops 
rankings, and from these differences two main groups of bishops emerge. The first, those we 
might categorize as “social justice” bishops, whom largely recorded pro-social justice responses 
to the items listed above. The second clearly distinguishable group falls into what we might call 
the “spiritual needs” category – those bishops whose primary concern centers on fulfilling the 
spiritual needs of the people rather than ministering in the name of social justice. The remaining 
thirty-five bishops fall into what is essentially a default category of those with an ideology that 
encompasses a both social justice concerns along with spiritual needs, given that their credible 
intervals touch the zero line.47  
 
These groupings can be explained by specific perceptions and styles of pastoral work 
among church leaders. In order to estimate the main determinants of bishops’ ideology, now I 
                                               
47 Ideal points were estimated using R 2.14, library (MCMCpackirt1d), assuming the following distributions: N(0,1) 
for ideal points, and N(0,4) for parameters. I estimated ideal points using the following parameters: burnin: 50,000 
chains, which is the number of the initial MCMC iterations to be discarded; mcmc: 100,000 chains, which is the 
number of the MCMC iterations after burning; and a thinning interval of 10, which is the interval for the Markov 
chain, in this case only every 10th draw from the chain was kept (Martin and Quinn 2006). At the core of these ideal 
point models is still valid the notion of convergence, in which variables should reach the stationary distribution. A 
series of tests about convergence were performed, such as Raftery (how long the Markov chain should run, in which 
defined r and q parameters –tolerance, and s –probability, N iterations, and M burn-ins are calculated to estimate 
dependence factors, where higher values are not good, because of influential starting values and/or poor mixing), 
Heidelberg (whether the “first part” of the Markov chain is in the stationary distribution, and whether the marginal 
can be precisely estimated, in which from 10 percent to the next 10 percent until 50 represents half the width, and 1-
alpha is the percentage of the credible interval), and Geweke (whether the “first window” –and also the second one- 
of the Markov chain are in the stationary distribution). All these tests were in line with advices from Raftery and 
Lewis (1992), and Gelman and Shirley (2010). All tests were performed following library (coda), and for all cases 
the non-convergence hypotheses were rejected. 
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estimate a Bayesian linear model, as shown in Graph 5.2. Results reveal that bishops’ emphasis 
on spirituality, and interfaith collaboration increase bishops’ preference for emphasizing spiritual 
needs, whereas those bishops who believe that the church hold enough influence on the 2000 
presidential elections, those who think that injustice was the main cause of the Zapatista 
rebellion in Chiapas, and those bishops who prefer to meet with peasants increase bishops’ 
preferences for emphasizing social justice issues, as shown in Graph 5.2, confirming a social 
justice versus spiritual needs divide among Mexico church leaders around 2000. 
 
 
 
Graph 5.2. Determinants of Bishops’ Ideal Points, Mexico, 2000. Source: Author’s estimations 
based on the 2000 Bishops Surveys. Dependent variable: ideal points derived from a single 
dimension, as pictured in Graph 5.1. Estimation is a Bayesian linear model, and lines are 90 
percent credible intervals, using R 2.14, library(MCMCpack), and routine (MCMCregress). 
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In sum, Bayesian linear model from Graph 5.2 reveals two main identifiable groups 
among Mexico’s bishops, those who prefer to emphasize spiritual needs and those who prefer to 
emphasize social justice. 
 
The 2000 Bishops Document 
 
In order to make sure that there are at least two main identifiable groups among Mexico’s 
bishops, and knowing that the 2000 landmark document issued by the National Conference of 
Bishops was “From the Encounter with Jesus to Solidarity with All” (Del Encuentro con Cristo a 
la Solidaridad con Todos), it is plausible to take advantage of the 2000 Bishops Surveys to 
estimate bishops’ determinants of the main topic that was discussed in the 2000 bishops 
landmark document: the encounter with Jesus. Now, I estimate a Bayesian binary probit model, 
as shown in Graph 5.3. Results reveal that those bishops who prefer to meet with political leaders, 
those who emphasize interfaith collaboration, hold meetings with workers, and put special 
emphasis on Jesus the man, they are more likely to rank “Encounter with Jesus” as their most 
preferred Church position, as shown in Graph 5.3.  
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Graph 5.3. Determinants of Bishops’ Top Topic for the 2000 Document. Source: Author’s 
estimations based on the 2000 Bishops Surveys. Dependent variable: Encounter with Jesus as the 
main topic for the 2000 Bishops document. Estimation is a Bayesian binary probit model, and 
lines are 90 percent credible intervals, using R 2.14, library (MCMCpack), and routine 
MCMCprobit. 
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least one single dimension exists around the preferred message of the church, whether it should 
'Encounter with Jesus' as the Top Topic,
 Bayesian Probit Estimation
Church Influence on the 2000 Elections
Meetings with Peasants
Injustice in Chiapas
Meetings with Students
Good Communication between Priests and Laity
Emphasis on Values
Emphasis on Jesus the Man
Emphasis on Spirituality
Meetings with Workers
Interfaith Collaboration on Social Work
Meetings with Political Leaders
-4 -2 0 2 4
112 
 
be social justice or spiritual needs (Sota and Luengo 1994, Camp 1997). The first group however 
seems to be comprised of more than one specific group, due to the presence of “spiritual 
mission”, and “religion and freedom of religion” groups, as revealed by variables such as holding 
meetings with political leaders and workers, in line with the traditional Church’ Social 
Doctrine.48 
 
Overall, results from the three different models, the ideal points’ estimation, determinants 
of ideal points, and determinants of the main topic in the 2000 bishops’ landmark document, all 
these results suggest that there is variance across Mexico’s bishops regarding what topic should 
be emphasized.  Now, in order to know the specific impact of the main variables of interest on 
“Encounter with Jesus” as the main topic for the 2000 bishops’ landmark document, Graph 5.4 
shows predicted probabilities derived from the Bayesian binary probit model pictured in Graph 
5.3. 
 
Those bishops who prefer to meet with peasants are less likely to select “Encounter with 
Jesus” as the main topic when compared to those who prefer to meet with other groups. In the 
opposite trend, interfaith collaboration remarkably increases chances to select “Encounter with 
Jesus” from 20 percent to almost 95 percent. 
  
                                               
48 Regarding ideal points, I tested whether a second dimension is likely to emerge estimating and storing beta 
parameters. The idea is to observe whether betas are close to zero, suggesting the potential existence of a second 
dimension among Mexico’s bishops. Although there are reasons to believe that further research could deal with a 
potential new dimension due to theoretical reasons, the lack of convergence of some beta parameters did not allow 
me to conclude whether a second dimension exists, although an important proportion of betas were closed to zero. 
113 
 
 
 
 
Graph 5.4. Predicted Probabilities of Bishops’ Top Topic for the 2000 Main Document. Source: 
Author’s estimations from Graph 5.3. Lines are 95 percent credible intervals, using R 2.14, 
libraries (Zelig) and (lattice). 
 
Believing that injustice was the root cause of the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas decreases 
chances to select Encounter with Jesus from 95 to 60 percent. As expected, measures related to 
spiritual needs, such as emphasis on spirituality and Jesus the man increase the likelihood to 
select “Encounter with Jesus” as the top topic, from 20 to 95 percent. Finally, bishops’ 
perceptions about the influential role of the church during the 2000 presidential elections 
decrease the likelihood to select that topic from 95 to 10 percent. 
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In conclusion, in 2000, the year in which Mexico’ alternation at the national office took 
place, ideological tendencies among bishops still showed significant variations, in line with 
findings from the fourth chapter when analyzing church messages between 1968 and 1995. 
Overall, results from the 2000 Bishops Surveys reveal that bishops in Mexico report differences 
in pastoral perspectives and styles. Two main groups were found across models and 
specifications, one comprised of those bishops who arguably identify themselves with the 
“spiritual needs”, and a second one, comprised of those bishops who identify with “social justice” 
issues, in which continuous negotiations to reach agreements about what topics should be 
emphasized at the national level by the Catholic Church seem to be a common practice among 
Catholic bishops when issuing official documents.  
 
Now, I will turn my focus to the theoretical and empirical association between the 
Catholic Church messages and public opinion, in particular the political attitudes of Catholic 
parishioners. The sixth chapter will discuss theoretical mechanisms regarding this association. In 
the seventh chapter, I will test the association between church messages about free and fair 
elections and Catholic parishioners support for democracy during the last 25 years. In the eighth 
chapter, I will explore the association between church messages about violence and Catholic 
parishioners’ critical attitudes toward the drug war in 2010. Finally, the ninth chapter will 
explore the effects of competitive frames, considering church messages about politics, social 
issues, and moral values on Catholic parishioners’ attitudes toward democracy, gay marriage, 
and the drug war in 2010.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
FROM THE CHURCH’S MESSAGE TO THE PUBLIC’S OPINIONS 
 
I now turn to Part Two of this project in which I explore the theoretical and empirical 
influences of the Church on the political attitudes of the highly religious segment of the Mexican 
population. 
 
Although this dissertation makes no claims of offering empirical evidence of a causal 
connection between the messages of the church and citizens’ political attitudes due to the 
limitations of the data analyzed, it employs knowledge of distinct church messages in different 
areas of the country in an effort to better understand the regional and contextual dimensions to 
Mexican public opinion, and the role of the subnational church in shaping those dimensions. In 
particular, this chapter analyzes theoretical discussions about framing in general and religious 
framing in particular, and how religious frames are associated with items such as citizen political 
preferences and public policies, in order to tease out possible associations between parishioners’ 
attitudes and the types of religious messages emphasized in the country’s almost one hundred 
dioceses. 
 
This chapter starts by discussing theoretical causal mechanisms of framing in general, 
and religious framing in particular. It turns then to a discussion of the specific causal 
mechanisms that may be at work in transferring the Church’s message heard every week by 
many into political attitudes on the relevant issues of the day. Finally, the chapter ends with a 
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discussion of three factors that will influence the extent to which religious messages shape public 
opinion: 1) the size of the Catholic faithful, 2) the population’s level of exposure to the church 
messages, and 3) the degree to which parishioners are open to accepting the church guidance.  
 
Altering (or Reinforcing) Rankings of Priorities: Mechanics of Religious Framing 
 
One may argue that the church’s impact on the political attitudes of followers is not an 
automatic event; it requires religious messages and politically attentive followers who can apply 
the church messages to specific policy issues and their political attitudes more generally. This 
chapter however argues that political sophistication is not required among many church 
followers to capture and apply the church messages. In fact, it is the politically unsophisticated 
followers who will be most susceptible to the church’s influence on their views about politics, 
assuming regular exposure to that message and a willingness to accept the church guidance. 
 
There is a reasonable academic consensus about the lack of political information among 
some segments of the electorate in any democratic polity, and the role this lack of political 
information plays in the degree to which individuals can understand and receive political 
messages (Converse 1964; Luskin 1987; Zaller 1992), whether it is from the church or any other 
source (Converse 1966; Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Findings regarding 
unsophisticated citizens do not preclude a place for the church to provide its followers issue 
frames and heuristics to use in their political attitudes (Smith 2008). 
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Although the lack of political information among citizens may impede a direct and 
concrete church influence on specific policy issues, religious messages and weekly sermons offer 
an ideal vehicle for the politically uninformed to gain informational shortcuts in order to 
understand and operate in her political world.  Such framings revolve around the general 
emphasis a messenger places on particular topics, and the absence of such emphasis on other 
topics (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).49 
 
Citizens do not hold abundant information about politics and policies (Converse 1964; 
Bartels 1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), and citizens’ opinions on myriad issues do not 
remain constant across time either (Converse 1964). Actually, citizens only pay attention to a 
few issues, and generally, tend to acquire information about one or two issues that are salient to 
the groups with which an individual is involved, and it is only over these few issues that citizens’ 
opinions tend to remain stable (Converse 1964: 245).50 
 
Although large proportions of the electorate are indifferent to a myriad of issues, it is 
plausible to theorize that the lack of political information could be mitigated when one considers 
in which groups citizens are involved, such as religious groups. As Walter Lipmann suggests, 
citizens rely on others’ information in order to deal with politics, given that pictures in 
                                               
49 I center my focus on framing, rather than discussing whether priming and accessibility are required to make 
successful frames. Priming means having a vehicle to evaluate the topic already emphasized (Iyengar and Kinder 
1987), and accessibility occurs when the consideration appears immediately (Ottati et al. 1989; Banaji, Blair and 
Schwarz 1995: 357). Although both priming and accessibility are important, they are not strictly required in order to 
make successful frames (Miller and Krosnick 2000; Druckman 2001). In other words, religious considerations are 
always there, due to the fact that dogmatic definitions and beliefs do not change overnight, what it changes is the 
emphasis on specific topics. 
50 This not only relates to citizens who only care about issues that affect groups they are involved in, but also it 
relates to citizens who choose issues which are relevant to their social/political group.  
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individuals’ heads do not necessarily correspond to the real world, and consequently, information 
through symbols and perceptions could shape citizens’ opinions (Lippmann 1922).  
 
Consequently, there is a room for alternative sources of information when considering 
poorly informed citizens. In general, the nature of citizens’ systems of beliefs is “organized” by 
constraints, and these constraints bind together ideas and attitudes (Converse 1964). In this way, 
constraints bind together citizens’ configuration of ideas and citizens’ attitudes in order to deal 
with information, and then, because of constraints, citizens are more able to understand what 
issues or ideas go with what political positions and why.  
 
Constraints, roughly defined as the capacity of one political idea to control another one, 
play a key role in citizens’ system beliefs because they “organize” ideas and attitudes. Regarding 
non-informed citizens with little issue content and non-attitudes, religious frames could offer an 
alternative source of information, playing a role similar to partisan cues (Converse 1964), low-
rationality models (Popkin 1994; Lupia 1994; Prior and Lupia 2008), awareness (Zaller 1992); 
and attention to political campaigns (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; 1954; Bartels 1993; 
Moreno 1999).  
 
A reason to focus on the Church’s influence is because parishioners tend to be 
particularly open to receive religious messages under conditions of continuous exposure and a 
general disposition to accept church guidance. Preliminary evidence across Latin American 
countries suggests a church double-effect on political sophistication: getting Catholic 
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parishioners involved in politics in general, through electoral enrollment and turnout, but 
withdrawing Catholic parishioners from partisan politics (Díaz-Domínguez 2013).  
 
Mexican politics scholars have tried to explain the Church’s political role through 
analysis of religiosity and attitudinal measures at the individual level. Interestingly, there is 
specific evidence that supports the notion of religious messages as source of political information 
among non-informed citizens, with less-informed church attendees more likely to vote for the 
same political party in consecutive elections during the 1990s, supporting traditionalist options, 
when compared to sophisticated citizens who are more likely to change their vote choice, in 
which church attendance does not exercise any impact on highly informed “switchers” (Moreno 
1999: 141). There are also other studies showing the negative effect of church attendees’ 
attitudes toward death penalty (Domínguez and McCann 1996: 58); and a positive effect of 
church attendance on parishioners’ feelings toward opposition parties (Lawson 1999: 166-169). 
Additional studies have found a general religious basis of support for democracy prior to 
Mexico’s 2000 alternation (Magaloni and Moreno 2003); significant ties between religiosity and 
political preferences among the youth in Mexico City colleges (Tinoco, González and Arciga 
2006); and parishioners’ reports of political sermons and their indirect effect on vote choice 
(Díaz-Domínguez 2006a).  
 
In relation to frames as sources of information, frames increase the likelihood of citizens 
expressing opinions over specific topics, and these opinions tend to remain stable across time 
(Kinder and Sanders 1996). Although there is a debate about the size of the mass media effects 
on citizens’ political attitudes, it is well known that opinion leaders could potentially change 
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citizens’ minds when filtering their messages in the media. In other words, one compelling 
explanation for those who change their vote choice decision (also known as switchers) during 
electoral campaigns is related to framing, in which over five percent of voters change sides 
during political campaigns (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; 1954; Klapper 1960; 
McCombs and Shaw 1972).  
 
This probably means that framing during political campaigns is more likely to reinforce 
and activate prior predispositions, rather than dramatically change vote choice decisions in any 
overwhelming proportion. However, campaigns are still important vehicles of framing, because 
campaigns minimize defections among the general public (Bartels 1993), and among attentive 
voters (Zaller 1992). Additionally, intense campaigns in which there is uncertainty about the 
result lead to a greater overall awareness of and engagement with politics across all levels of 
sophistication among the public, increasing the likelihood of people “having something to say” 
about politics (Kam 2006).  
 
All of these explanations suggest that framing exercises an influence on political attitudes 
among informed and non-informed citizens (Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Valentino, Hutchings 
and White 2002; Kam 2006), in which messengers certainly do not tell people what to think, but 
“tell people what to think about” (Cohen 1963: 13).  In this way, frames “reorganize” 
information that citizens already consider relevant, given that constant exposure to frames 
increases the likelihood of citizens holding opinions, and these opinions, available for very few 
issues, tend to remain constant across time.51  
                                               
51 Prior to Nelson, Clawson and Oxley’s article (1997), the scientific community understood that the effect of 
framing was conditional on accessibility. In other words, framing requires priming, where roughly speaking, it could 
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In sum, an objective of framing is altering the importance of issues among citizens via 
specific and alternative emphasis, such as risk-aversion versus risk acceptance using money or 
lives (Tversky and Kahneman 1981); freedom of speech versus public order in the case of 
ignoble groups (Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997); and credibility of the source, such as using a 
political newspaper versus another related to show business (Druckman 2001a), in which 
respondents thought consciously about each consideration.52   
 
In order to alter or at least effectively reinforce attitudes and beliefs, religious frames rely 
on very longstanding considerations because Catholic clergy’s positions tend to remain stable 
over time across a wide range of topics (Jelen 2003). An exemplary case in which considerations 
do not depend on whether they are accessible to short-term memory are moral values 
considerations, due to the church’s previously defined corpus of beliefs. Arguably, from the 
Catholic Church’s standing point, moral values are immobile considerations, fixed by tradition 
and doctrine. Therefore, an individual’s considerations of moral values are less vulnerable to 
short-term change, but rather are a reflection of stable Catholic dogmas (e.g. abortion, see 
                                                                                                                                                       
be defined as a situation where specific considerations are more accessible to memory. In particular, in News that 
Matter, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) show how specific considerations continuously mentioned by the mass media 
were accessible to citizens’ memory, and consequently, the mass media suggested how to think about these topics, 
using thematic or episodic evaluations about political elite’s economic performance over inflation and 
unemployment. Priming also reveals that accessible considerations are used by people who are inattentive or 
unaware. For example, familiarity increases accessibility. In the particular case of familiarity, people who 
continuously received the same information can attribute fame instead of familiarity. Specifically, when respondents 
read for the very first time a list with famous and non-famous names, they can easily select only the famous names, 
but after being continuously exposed to non-famous names after several sessions, when asked to complete the same 
task (to evaluate which people are famous), respondents can attribute fame to several unknown names because these 
names now sound familiar (Jacoby, Kelley, Brown and Jasechko 1989). In sum, priming effectively works when the 
consideration appears immediately (Ottati et al. 1989; Banaji, Blair and Schwarz 1995: 357).  
52 Nelson et al argue that accessibility is not the main causal mechanism for successful frames, because beliefs, 
values, and facts also play a relevant role when influencing attitudes, independent of accessibility (1997: 568-569). 
Specifically, Nelson et al show that competitive frames have an influence on attitudes independent of the 
accessibility, because people think consciously about the consideration of the frame (Druckman 2001: 1043). In 
particular, if frames such as freedom of speech and public order in the case of ignoble groups are mediated by 
accessibility, then subjects “should respond quickly to words most consonant with the frame that they viewed”. 
However, the analysis showed that subjects did not respond more or less quickly according to the respective frame 
(Nelson et al 1997: 573). As a consequence, the effect of framing is not conditional on accessibility.  
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Catholic Catechism 1997: numbers 2270 to 2274, in which abortion is banned in all possible 
ways). Thus, Catholic dogma is previously defined and widely spread decades or even centuries 
ago, rather than being accessible for a limited period of time. 
 
The repetition of religious statements in early stages of citizens’ lives can produce deep 
religious roots, making an individual more susceptible to a particular religious appeal that is 
linked to these more durable teachings of the Church (Albertson 2011: 110). In other words, 
there is a religious effect on politics, even among those who are unaware of current religious 
messages, because they rely at a subconscious level on religious information received since 
childhood (Albertson 2011: 127).53  These findings suggest that parishioners raised as Catholic 
were continuously exposed to these immobile considerations, in which religious beliefs 
developed profound roots, and even unconsciously used religious appeals could eventually 
become persuasive in politics (Albertson 2011).  In sum, it is plausible to suppose that one goal 
of religious framing is altering the importance of the personal ranking of topics among specific 
and salient issues, or at least, reinforcing the importance of specific issues in well-known topics, 
such as abortion or attitudes toward homosexuality as part of a moral values frame, or, 
conversely, a commitment to the poor and marginalized people, as part of a social justice frame.  
 
Drawing from this theoretical discussion, one can theorize that clergy members call 
“attention to some matters while ignoring others” (Iyengar and Kinder 1987: 63) and particularly 
in religious terms, those clergy members who preach moral values messages, such as 
emphasizing individual prosperity and success or the rejection of abortion and homosexuality, 
                                               
53 Although there is an ongoing debate whether appeals in general emerge consciously or unconsciously (Valentino, 
Hutchings and White 2002), the larger point is that religious messages can operate in both ways, consciously or 
unconsciously (Smith 2008). 
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tend to reinforce parishioners’ conservative beliefs, making parishioners more likely to support 
conservative candidates or political parties that share these values. In contrast, those clergy 
members who preach social justice messages, such as commitment with the poor and 
communitarian values, tend to activate parishioners’ progressive beliefs, and consequently, 
parishioners are more likely to support progressive candidates or political parties that share 
liberal values (Jelen 2003; Magaloni and Moreno 2003; Bader and Foese 2005; Harris-Lacewell 
2007; Smith 2008; Hagopian 2009a).  
 
Framing mechanisms help us to understand why it is commonly accepted that religious 
people tend to prefer conservative political options, whereas less religious citizens tend to favor 
liberal political options. Reality however, is far richer. Knowing the ideological leaning of a 
given local faithful it is not enough to predict support for conservative or liberal political options 
among parishioners, it is also necessary to take seriously into account an individual’s willingness 
to accept the church guidance (Smith 2008). For all these reasons, one should consider a series of 
factors when analyzing religious frames, such as doctrinal interpretations, types of pastoral work, 
the church’s strength, and parishioners’ receptiveness, assimilation, and resistance to the church 
messages; all these factors explain why sometimes one observes variations in the degree to 
which religion influences the political attitudes of followers. One underexplored source of these 
variations is different emphases on church messages. Thus, church messages, which are 
comprised of religious frames represent a useful starting point of a theoretical mechanism of 
religion and politics among the public. 
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To recap, there are theoretical reasons to believe that there is an effect of religious ties on 
parishioners’ political attitudes. These religious ties can be traced to religious messages send by 
the clergy emphasizing a specific set of topics over other topics, that is, when clergy exercise 
framing. In this way, some attitudes among parishioners are in part influenced by the variations 
in church messages that I have identified and analyzed in the first part of this project. 
 
It is noteworthy to mention that this plausible causal mechanism cannot be fully verified 
through the church messages data and available public opinion surveys, even using the most 
sophisticated statistical models. The reason why there is a gap between theory and verification of 
hypotheses in daily life refers to several practicalities: survey data can tell us whether a 
respondent is Catholic and whether she is going to church on frequent basis, but they cannot tell 
us which church she is attending or what the specific focus is of the sermons she hears. And 
though we now know that bishops choose to emphasize different messages across Mexico, the 
connection remains only theoretical, albeit highly plausible, between the writings and message of 
the leader of a diocese and the weekly sermons of the individual priests within that diocese.  
Clearly more research is needed to further expand our understanding of this relationship, but as a 
first step in work on the subnational influence of the Catholic Church, this project offers 
preliminary support for the idea that it is very limited to speak of the Church’s national influence 
during times of political change. Rather, we must go beneath the veneer of a homogenous 
national Church message and examine the variations in the role and position of the Church at the 
subnational level.54 
                                               
54 Aforementioned limitations do not allow us to make an explicit and specific causal claim, due to the fact that the 
analyzed church messages belong to different levels when compared to the surveyed people, i.e. there is an 
understandable distance between bishops and rank and file citizens (Smith 2005; 2008). Despite these limitations, 
this chapter proposes theoretical reasons to believe that religious framing can alter or at least reinforce parishioners’ 
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Despite the lack of any direct empirical evidence linking the writings of bishops with the 
specific sermons of priests under his domain, we do know that when a bishop does offer a 
sermon, it is usually available on the respective diocese’s website, allowing sermons and 
homilies to represent an insightful source of pastoral information among the clergy within that 
diocese. In fact, recent surveys show that Mexico’s clergy are increasingly relying on internet 
sources as a basis for their sermons.55   
 
Additionally, there are reasons to expect bishops to exercise pastoral and doctrinal 
influence on many of diocese’s clergy members, due to bishops influence on clergy appointment 
process, and their wider margin to interpret doctrine than that available to priests and pastors 
(Luengo 1992; Camp 1997).  In this way, we have a good basis of support for the theoretical 
                                                                                                                                                       
attitudes. In order to minimize the aforementioned restrictions, this chapter assumes that the gap between theory and 
verification is conceivably filled by sermons and homilies directly delivered by bishops during respective Sunday 
masses, because in these situations there is a direct connection between bishops and the faithful, but it is not always 
the case (Smith 2008). 
55 Surveys conducted between November 15 of 2009 and February 28 of 2010, by Università della Svizzera Italiana 
(Lugano, Switzerland), in collaboration with the School of Church Communications of the Pontifical University of 
the Holy Cross (Rome), and supported by the Congregation for the Clergy (Rome) revealed a high propensity 
among Mexican clergy to use the internet services when preparing pastoral work. The survey included 4,992 
worldwide Catholic priests and 362 Mexican priests, age mean of 47 years old; 18 percent of Mexico’s surveyed 
clergy belongs to religious orders and the remaining 82 percent is diocesan clergy, with a general priesthood year 
mean of 17. The survey, only conducted among those priests who use the internet, reveals that Mexican e-priest are 
very in favor of new technologies and they are taking advantage of the internet: 92 percent of Mexican clergy have 
daily access to the internet and 7 percent reports weekly access to the web. The Mexican e-priests also hold 
additional devices “to get connected”, such as a laptop (89 percent), a desktop (75 percent), a cell phone (91 percent), 
and mp3 players (53 percent). One third of Mexico's e-priests employ the internet to prepare daily homilies, a higher 
percentage when compared to the 14 worldwide percent, and 44 percent use internet to prepare Sunday sermons, in 
line with the 46 worldwide percent. Additionally, 86 percent of e-priests in Mexico consider the internet to be a 
useful news source, and 76 percent considers the internet a useful tool to support parishes’ activities, a higher value 
than the 61 worldwide percent. Finally, 78 percent of Mexico’s e-clergy believes that new technologies help to train 
seminarians, whereas the worldwide percentage drops to 64. More interestingly, 45 percent of Mexico’s e-priests 
pray using their handheld devices once a week (loading the Liturgy of the Hours through a portable device), a higher 
proportion when compared to the 35 worldwide percent. The numbers regarding access and contacts with other 
priests through social networks, however, resemble the worldwide trend. In sum, available church resources on the 
web are widely used among Mexico's e-priests. Although this survey did not answer how many priests use the 
internet, at least among those who use the web, there are notable differences between Mexico's e-priests when 
compared to the world percentages. Thus, this evidence seems to suggest that homilies, sermons, and bishops’ 
information available at the web would be widely used by Mexico's e-priests (reports available at 
www.pictureproject.info).  
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links established in this project between bishops and the messages they wish to emphasize within 
their diocese and the sermons delivered by member priests within that diocese.  
 
The next theoretical link that I explore, then, is that which links church attendance with a 
particular set of attitudes that can plausibly be linked to the messages of the Church I have 
outlined above. It is plausible to assume that clergy members take advantage of framing when 
promoting theological positions through the church messages, because one can find similarities 
between the direction of the message, either conservative or progressive, and parishioners’ 
attitudes, also conservative or progressive, respectively. This is shown in the next three empirical 
chapters, in which this dissertation will examine variations on support for democracy from 1981 
to 2005; consequences of violence across states in 2010; and competitive religious frames issued 
by the church via bishops messages, in order to see whether specific messages exercise an impact 
on parishioners’ attitudes toward democracy, the drug war, and moral values.  
 
In conclusion, relationships between distinct subnational church messages and attitudes 
among parishioners should show associations between the distinct subnational church messages 
being promulgated by Mexico’s bishops and the political attitudes of church attendees across 
these subnational units. The stronger the association the more evidence we have that differences 
in the church messages that are sent out across subnational units within a single nation matter for 
the political attitudes of religious citizens in these units.    
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The Size of the Faithful and their Faithfulness 
 
The first step in understanding the impact of the Catholic Church on political attitudes is 
to assess the relevance of the church today as compared to its historical monopoly on religion 
that it enjoyed well into the 20th century. In recent years, other religions have begun to challenge 
this monopoly, and so, we first need to examine the standing of the Catholic Church today across 
Latin America, and particularly in Mexico.  
 
Despite long and well-established Catholic roots in Latin America (Cleary 2009), it is 
important to verify to what extent the Catholic Church is still meaningful and significant.56  
Almost half of the world’s Catholics live in the Americas (Vatican: Annuario Pontificio 2012). 
Within this region, more than 60 percent of the population is Catholic (LAPOP Surveys 2008, 
2010; and 2012).57  
 
                                               
56 Religion and politics literature in Latin America has centered its focus on two main schools of thought, the 
religious economy school and the spiritual mission school. Despite specific answers from these schools such as how 
the religious market shapes competition among Catholic and Evangelical pastoral strategies (Gill 1998; Chesnut 
2002; Trejo 2009; Levine 2010); and how it is not the market but beliefs and ideological orientations of the clergy 
what shapes pastoral actions (Mainwaring 1986; Philpott 2004; 2009; Hagopian 2008; 2009a) there are relatively 
few works that effectively examine political influences of Latin American Catholicism on attitudes toward politics at 
the individual level among parishioners (Moreno 1999; Magaloni and Moreno 2003; Patterson 2004; Tinoco, 
González and Arciga 2006; Díaz-Domínguez 2006a; 2012; 2013, Hagopian 2009a; 2009b). 
57 Considering 21 Latin American countries, the 2008 LAPOP surveys reported 68.4 percent of Catholics; the 2010 
LAPOP surveys reported 63.6 percent; and the 2012 LAPOP surveys reported 62.2 percent of Catholics in the 
following countries: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. Questions used: q5a in the 2008 LAPOP questionnaires, and q3c in the 2010 and 2012 LAPOP 
questionnaires. Averages were estimated using the routine wt among individual country data sets, and these results 
were compared to those derived from the weight1500 routine, in order to consider countries weighted equally when 
using the merged files by round. Variations however do not exceed one percent using this list of countries. 
Preliminary analytical comparisons among census and religious survey data can be found in Díaz-Domínguez 
(2009).  
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Although there are variations when measuring religious affiliations using surveys or 
census data (Díaz-Domínguez 2009), the larger point is that the very traditional Catholic 
countries in Latin America still reach more than one half of adherents. For example, in a given 
year, 2008 using LAPOP surveys data, Mexico is almost placed at the top, only behind Paraguay 
with respect to the proportion of Catholics. In the paradoxical Latin American context, Mexico, a 
traditionally anticlerical country ranks number two in absolute number of Catholics in the region 
(behind Brazil when census data are considered), and Mexico is also one of the most Catholic 
nations of the world in relative numbers (82 percent Catholic).  
 
Examining Mexico’s national mean reveals a healthy Catholicism across years even 
considering different measures, but subnational differences reveal an even more interesting story, 
because the religious landscape at the subnational level varies across Mexico – from a virtual 
Catholic monopoly in some states to a relatively competitive religious market in others. Thus, the 
strength of the Catholic Church should be analyzed considering differences in Latin America, in 
Mexico’s national mean, and in sub-national units across time. 
 
In the last century, the percentage of Catholics in Mexico at the national level has 
diminished around 15 points, from 99 percent in 1950 to 84 percent in 2010. The national 
proportion of Protestant and Evangelical parishioners has increased 10 points in a 50-year period, 
a similar pattern among those who profess no religion. The national pattern however, varies 
when other regions of Mexico are analyzed, as shown in Graph 6.1.  In the Southeast, 
Catholicism has diminished over 30 points whereas Protestant and Evangelical parishioners have 
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reached 20 points, particularly in four states: Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, and Quintana Roo 
(Casillas 1996; Trejo 2009).  
 
 
 
Graph 6.1. Catholics and Protestants in Mexico at the State Level, 1950 - 2010. Source: Díaz-
Domínguez (2012a: 14) and Census data (INEGI 2011). Each circle / diamond represents a state. 
States that have reached 20 or more points of Protestantism in 2000 and 2010 are Chiapas, 
Tabasco, Campeche, and Quintana Roo. 
 
In this way, differences among sub-national units over religious affiliations emerge when 
trends across Mexico’ states are considered. Additionally, in four Northern states, Baja 
California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, and Tamaulipas, emerging Protestant and 
Evangelical churches are gaining adherents across time. In contrast, states of the Bajío region 
reveal an overwhelming presence of Catholics, particularly in Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, 
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Jalisco and Querétaro. A final group of states, comprised of Morelos, Veracruz, Oaxaca and 
Yucatán, have also experienced a downward trend in Catholics, falling between the national 
mean and the Southeast region. The percentages of people who do not profess any religion are 
highest in states in which there is religious competition, as shown in Graph 6.2.  
 
 
 
Graph 6.2. Catholics and No Religion in Mexico at the State Level, 1950 – 2010. Sources: Díaz 
Domínguez (2012a: 14) and Census data (INEGI 2011). 
 
Interestingly, two main patterns emerge in religiously divided states. First, in Protestant 
and Evangelical states, the no religion percentage has ceased growing since 1990, such as in 
Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Veracruz. A plausible explanation for Protestant growth not only 
refers to the decline of Catholicism then, but also to the declining number of non-believers. 
Second, states in which Protestants and Evangelicals and those with no religious affiliation 
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increase similarly across years, as seen in Baja California, Baja California Sur, Campeche, 
Chihuahua, Morelos, Quintana Roo, and Tamaulipas, in these states the proportion of Protestants 
and Evangelicals scores between the national average and the Southeast region. 
 
Having found national variations across Latin American countries and variation across 
subnational units within a single country, I now turn to an analysis of the extent to which 
Catholicism is still meaningful and significant in Mexicans’ daily lives at the subnational level, 
through a look at the Effective Number of Religions across time, as shown in Graph 6.3.58 
 
The Effective Number of Religions suggests that 80 percent of Catholics is the threshold 
to have 1.5 effective religions in a given state/year, as shown in Graph 6.3, whereas around 70 
percent of Catholics is the threshold to have two effective religions. Thus, analyzing variations 
across states and years might suggest differences regarding the Catholic Church strength when 
adherents at the state level are considered.  
  
                                               
58 Following Trejo (2009), the Effective Number of Religions index is calculated dividing one by the sum of squared 
religions’ shares. Let’s imagine that Catholics in a given state are 0.84, Protestants are 0.09, and people who profess 
no religion are 0.07, then the Effective Number of Religions (ENR) is estimated as follows: ENR = 1 / [(0.84*0.84) 
+ (0.09)*(0.09) + (0.07*0.07)]. 
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Graph 6.3. Effective Number of Religions in Mexico at the State Level, 1950 – 2010. Source: 
Census data (INEGI 2011). Effective Number of Religions estimated by the author. 
 
Following the traditional debate in Latin American settings when explaining Catholic 
Church political activism among advocates of the religious economy and the spiritual mission 
schools of thought, Graph 6.4 illustrates a potential structure of the religious market in 
subnational Mexico, in which a monopolistic situation takes place in some states since 1950 and 
even today, whereas the contested monopoly stage started in the 1970s, as some scholars have 
reported (Casillas 1996; Trejo 2009). Finally, the full religious competition stage is a 20-year 
period phenomenon. 
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What this complex mosaic of state-level religious markets suggests is that the Catholic 
Church faces very different challenges depending on what part of the country we are looking at, 
offering yet another reason to suspect highly differentiated messages coming from the Church 
across these subnational contexts. 
 
 
 
Graph 6.4. A Potential Structure of the “Religious Market” in Mexico at the State Level, 1950 – 
2010. Source: Census data (INEGI 2011). Monopoly = 90 percent of Catholics; contested 
monopoly = 70 percent of Catholics; and religious competition = less than 70 percent of catholic 
population, all measures at the state level. 
 
In sum, although Mexico is considered a landmark Catholic country, regional differences 
seem to be relevant when analyzing the indirect influences of the Catholic Church in attitudes 
toward politics among the religious people. It is noteworthy then to examine the churches’ 
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messages and citizens’ opinions, because the different voices of the church across Mexico could 
potentially shape different religious beliefs and attitudes toward politics. 
 
Drawing on the scholarly literature on political communication, the first section of this 
chapter provided theoretical mechanisms of how and why local churches’ messages would 
exercise influence on parishioners’ religious attitudes and attitudes toward politics. In order to 
better understand the potential impact of the church during times of political and social turmoil, 
and knowing that over forty percent of Mexican Catholics are regularly exposed to the teachings 
of the church through religious services every week (See Graph 6.5), the next section will 
empirically explore under what conditions the hypothesized association between the churches 
messages and parishioners’ religious beliefs are influential on political attitudes, recognizing that 
the available data will limit the extent to which one can establish a connection between the two.59 
 
Church attendance represents a relevant link between parishioners and clergy, because 
such a connection allows the transmission of the church messages to the faithful, providing the 
source for a potential influence of the clergy on parishioners’ religious and political attitudes 
(Díaz Domínguez 2006a, Smith 2008).  
                                               
59 I thank Mitchell A. Seligson and LAPOP’s major supporters (the United States Agency for International 
Development, the United Nations Development Programme, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt 
University) for making the 1978, 2004, 2008, 2010 and the 2012 LAPOP surveys data available 
(www.lapopsurveys.org); Alejandro Moreno (Reforma, ITAM) for making available the 2010 ENVUD surveys 
(www.banamex.com/envud) and Este País magazine; the 1981, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2012 World Values 
Surveys (www.worldvaluessurvey.org), the 2000 and the 2006 Reforma Exit Polls and the 2007-2013 Reforma 
National Quarterly Surveys; Francisco Abundis (Parametría) for making available the 2003 Parametria Surveys 
(www.parametria.com.mx); Javier Alagón (Estadística Aplicada e Investigación de Mercados) for making available 
the 2003 Catholic National Survey (www.estadisticaaplicada.com.mx), sponsored by the pro-choice Catholic 
Women; Rafael Giménez (ARCOP) for making available the 1997 and the 2002 ARCOP Surveys; Pablo Parás 
(DATA OPM) for making available the 1990 Iglesia-Estado codebook (www.dataopm.net); the BIIACS (CIDE) for 
the 1991 and the 1992 Presidencia Surveys; León Felipe and Roy Campos (Consulta) for the 2007 Consulta Surveys 
(www.consulta.mx); Miguel Basáñez (WAPOR) for making available the 1983 National Surveys codebook at the 
ITAM (The Roper Center MXBASANEZ1983-ENPOL83); and the 1990 Iglesia-Estado surveys; and Michael 
Layton for making available the 2005 and 2008 ENAFI surveys (http://www.enafi.itam.mx/es/index.php).  
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In comparative perspective, levels of church attendance in Mexico have remained 
relatively stable during the last 50 years, as shown in this section. Religious attendance on 
weekly basis among Mexicans ranges from 40 to 50 percent or even more. According to World 
Values Surveys between 1981 and 2005, Mexico’s church attendance always reported 40 points 
or more (See Graph 6.5). Recent evidence from the 2004 and 2008 LAPOP surveys reveal a 
similar pattern regarding levels of attendance to religious services, ranging from 40 to 45 points, 
whereas Central American countries report higher levels of weekly attendance (LAPOP Surveys 
2004 and 2008). In the last years, the 2010 and 2012 LAPOP surveys reported a weekly 
attendance percentage between 45 and 50 points among Mexicans, whereas Central American 
countries reported again the higher levels of church attendance.   
 
Overall, these pieces of evidence suggest that religion still plays a significant role among 
Latin American citizens, in which attendance to the church seems to be part of daily life 
activities, even in a country with a long tradition of anticlericalism like Mexico. These data 
suggest then that a strong majority of parishioners are exposed to religious messages on a regular 
basis, and religious frames elaborated by the church leaders at least have the possibility of 
shaping their attitudes. In order to provide meaningful comparisons of levels of church 
attendance among Catholics in Mexico, Graph 6.5 shows 64 surveys in a 54 year period, in 
which I collapsed church attendance response categories in three options: weekly attendance, 
monthly attendance, and less often attendance to the church services.   
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Graph 6.5. Church Attendance among Catholics in Mexico, 1959 – 2013. Sources: see next 
footnote and Díaz Domínguez (2012a: 14).  
 
Overall, the available measures on Catholic attendance in the last sixty years in Mexico 
suggest a slight downward trend among those who attend weekly, i.e. those who attend Mass 
every Sunday or more, Despite this downward trend, this group never falls below forty percent 
of the surveyed population, indicative of the durability of the Church as a social institution in 
Mexico. In contrast, the tendency among those who rarely go to church seems to slightly 
increase, as shown in Graph 6.5.60 
                                               
60 The analyzed surveys are the 1959 Civic Culture Surveys by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba; the 1963 and 
1964 Career and Students’ Values Surveys and the 1966 Family Values Surveys by Sidney Verba; the 1969 Humane 
Vitae by Enrique Brito (Brito 1971); the 1981, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2012 World Values Surveys conducted 
by Miguel Basañez (CEOP) and Alejandro Moreno (Reforma); the 1986 National Surveys conducted by the New 
York Times; the 1988 CEOP Surveys conducted by Miguel Basáñez (CEOP); the 1989 Los Angeles Times Surveys; 
the 1990 Church-State Relations National Surveys conducted by Miguel Basañez (MORI); the 1990 Ibero-American 
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In particular, in Mexico’s case, the 1959 Civic Culture Surveys (with an urban bias given 
that the sample only included places in which there were ten thousand inhabitants or more), show 
that 70 percent of Catholics went to Mass every week, undoubtedly the highest point of the series. 
In addition, in 1981, 2000, and 2005, about 60 percent of Mexican Catholics were weekly 
churchgoers, according to the 1981 and the 2000 WVS, and the 2005 BIMSA Surveys.61   
 
It also noteworthy to mention the “effect of the millennium” around 2000, in which 
religiosity increased around the world (Moreno 2005). Mexico was not an exception, as 
suggested by the data reported between 1999 and 2003, in which weekly attendance reached or 
even exceeded the 50 percent.62 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
University Surveys by Enrique Luengo (Luengo 1993); the 1990, 1991, 1992, 1999 and 2000 Mexico-The Vatican 
Relations and the Pope Visits Surveys conducted by the Office of the President (by Ulises Beltrán); the 1997 Post-
Electoral National surveys and the 2002 National surveys conducted by Rafael Giménez (ARCOP); the 1997 and 
1998 Latinobarómetro surveys; the 2000 and 2006 Presidential Exit Polls, and the 2007-2013 Quarterly National 
Surveys conducted by Alejandro Moreno (Reforma); the 2003 Values Surveys by Este País and Banamex; the 2003 
Catholic Pro-Choice Women National Surveys conducted by Javier Alagón (Estadística Aplicada e Investigación de 
Mercados); the 2003 Omnibus National Surveys conducted by Francisco Abundis (Parametría); the 2004, 2008, 
2010, and 2012 LAPOP National Surveys coordinated by Mitchell A. Seligson (Vanderbilt University), and 
conducted by Alejandro Moreno and Jorge Buendía (2004); and Pablo Parás (Data OPM) from 2006 to 2012; the 
2005, 2008 and 2013 ENAFI Surveys (Philanthropy National Surveys) by Michael Layton (ITAM); the 2004 
National Survey, and the 2007 Religious Practices National Surveys conducted by Roy Campos (Consulta); the 
2005 and the 2006 National Surveys conducted by BIMSA; the 2009 National Surveys by IMOP; the 2010 ENVUD 
National Surveys conducted by Banamex and Este País, and coordinated by Alejandro Moreno; the 2012 Mexico 
Panel Study by Jorge I. Dominguez, Alejandro Moreno, and Chappell Lawson, conducted by Pablo Parás (Data 
OPM) in which the author served as ITAM’s technical reviewer. Sources can be found at LAPOP-Vanderbilt 
University; the Roper Center-University of Connecticut; the ICPSR-University of Michigan; Technological Institute 
Autonomous of Mexico (ITAM); Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE); the Latin American 
Surveys Data Bank (BELA); and polling firms websites and archives: Reforma, Parametría, Estadística Aplicada, 
ARCOP, Consulta, and BIMSA. 
61 The 1986 New York Times Surveys did not include a “what is your religion?” question. The percentage of church 
attendance refers to the general population. 
62 Although the 1999 and the 2000 surveys conducted by the Office of the President (Presidencia Surveys) are not 
entirely comparable to the 2000 WVS, the 2000 Reforma Exit Poll, and the 2003 Our Values Surveys (Nuestros 
Valores), due to the different number of interviews, and survey and sampling design differences, it is important to 
remark that church attendance among Catholics, using data from any survey during this period of religious boom, 
always reached 50 percent. An additional factor to be taken into account is that Pope John Paul II made two of his 
five trips to Mexico in this very period, and these pastoral visits could revive Catholic religious fervor. 
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Over the next two years, the lowest values of the series are found. The breakdown begins 
with the 2003 Pro-choice Catholic Women Surveys, conducted by Estadística Aplicada, a 
Mexican polling firm, in which only Catholics respondents were interviewed, and it was one of 
the first polls measuring the public opinion impact of newly disclosed cases of sexual abuse 
disseminated in the United States and Mexico. This context may help to explain the more general 
downward trend that appeared during this time. Additional evidence for this comes from the 
2003 Parametría Surveys conducted in November; the 2004 LAPOP Surveys conducted in 
March; and the 2004 Consulta Surveys administered in August.63 
 
Since 2005, a relative recovery began, as shown in the 2005 and the 2006 Bimsa Surveys; 
the 2005 WVS; the 2006 Reforma Exit Poll; the 2007 Consulta Surveys; and the 2008 LAPOP 
Surveys. During this period, polls reported around one half of Catholics attending to religious 
services every week, marking a recovery in attendance when compared to 2003 and 2004. 
Finally, series finalizes showing a relative increase in weekly attendance, as shown by the 2010 
LAPOP Surveys, administered during the first quarter; the 2010 ENVUD conducted in 
November; and the 2012 surveys as well. In sum, during the last 50 years the average weekly 
church attendance among Mexican Catholics is around 50 percent, and overall, the evidence may 
suggest a slight downward trend in the long term, but stable tendencies during recent times. 
 
In order to know whether church attendance in Mexico will play a relevant role as a 
vehicle for the church messages in the foreseeable future, I estimated two time series forecasts of 
the weekly church attendance quarterly interpolated data between 1981 and 2013. The first 
                                               
63 Another pioneering measurement of clergy sexual abuses during these years was the 2002 Parametría National 
Surveys conducted in July 2002 (Carta Paramétrica: “The Crisis of the Catholic Church”, 2010). 
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model is based on short term effects using the recent data points through Holt-Winters 
exponential smoothing, and the second model is an ARIMA model, as pictured in Graph 6.6.64 
 
Overall, despite different shortcomings between these two time series models, short term 
predictions suggests that on average, weekly church attendance will drop until 37 percent, as 
shown in the first panel of Graph 6.6. Interestingly, 37 percent is also the lower level of the 
forecasts from the ARIMA model, as shown in the second panel. In sum, weekly church 
attendance seems to play a relevant role as a vehicle for the church messages in the foreseeable 
future. 
                                               
64 On the one hand, the Holt-Winters exponential smoothing estimates the level, slope and seasonal component at 
the current time point. Smoothing is controlled by three parameters: alpha, beta, and gamma, which stand for the 
level, slope b of the trend component, and the seasonal component, respectively. The parameters alpha, beta, and 
gamma all have values between 0 and 1. If values are close to 1, then it means that the estimation is essentially 
based on the most recent data points to predict future values. In this case, I estimated an additive model, in which the 
alpha value was 0.89, suggesting strong short term effects when making predictions in the level, beta=0.01, little 
weight in the slope, and gamma=0.57 with relatively weight on seasonality. Nevertheless, the Box-Ljung test (20 
lags) returned a p-value of 0.005 suggesting correlation issues and the need to eventually improve the model. On the 
other hand, the ARIMA (Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average) model in this particular case is a mixed 
version of the p, d, and q parameters, in which p stands as the number of autoregressive terms, d is the number of 
non-seasonal differences, and q is the number of lagged forecast errors in the prediction equation. The typical advice 
is that only AR (Auto-Regressive) or only MA (Moving Average) terms should be estimated in ARIMA models, due 
to the over fitting of the data when including AR and MA terms at the same time. The weekly church attendance 
series however revealed both terms AR and MA as statistically significant when estimating the more appropriate p, 
d, and q parameters: AR1 0.8186 (0.0689) and MA1 -0.9742 (0.0395), [coef (std err)] with log-likelihood=278.67, 
AIC=-551.35, and BIC=-542.79. Nevertheless, the Box-Pierce test (20 lags) returned a p-value of 0.003 suggesting 
correlation issues and the need to eventually improve the model as well (Freeman 1989; Guerrero 1991; Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 1991; Hyndman and Athanasopoulos 2012). 
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Graph 6.6. Weekly Church Attendance in Mexico, Time Series Models. First panel shows predictions based on short terms effects, 
light gray area is 95 percent confidence intervals, dark gray area is 80 percent confidence intervals. Second panel shows predictions 
based on ARIMA model, dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. Weekly Church attendance series goes from the first 
quarter of 1981 to the first quarter of 2013, interpolated data from Graph 6.10. Estimations using R 2.14, and libraries (stats) and 
(forecast).  
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I now turn to the general argument of this chapter linking public opinion among these 
churchgoers with the church’s emphasis of some issues and de-emphasis of others. (Smith 2008: 
7).  This influence is more likely to occur among those parishioners who accept the church 
guidance and teachings. Therefore, the effect of the church messages on the public is not direct, 
given that “society does not provide a simple and direct medium for the implementation of 
religious values” (Levine 2009: 406). It is important to take seriously the chance of resistance 
and rejection of the church messages among parishioners, given that receiving a religious-based 
message is not equal to accepting it (Smith 2005; 2008).  Although it is hard to find any measure 
that can truly capture the concept of receptivity to the church’s message, data available for the 
Latin American region offer two proxy indicators, importance of God, and the importance of 
religion in one’s life.65 
 
In comparative perspective, there is quite a bit of variance across Latin American 
countries with respect to the “importance of God” in citizens’ lives, according to the World 
Values Surveys. Actually, Mexico was at the top in 1990, in which more than 90 percent of 
respondents considering God as important, using the three top responses categories in a 10 point 
scale (8, 9, and 10). In 1996, these top three responses categories remained high, capturing 
around 90 percent of respondents, but they oddly dropped in 2000 until 50 percent (1990; 1996; 
and 2000 World Values Surveys).    
 
                                               
65 Although trust in the church and the importance of religion are reasonable proxy variables of acceptance / 
resistance of church guidance among parishioners, a potential criticism refers to which extent the measures are 
properly tapping these concepts. In particular, trust in the church would relate to general trust in institutions, in a 
diffuse support fashion (Booth and Seligson 1984), whereas importance of religion would relate to concrete 
religious issues. In this way, the importance of religion would be preferred when estimating specific religiously 
oriented models in the next sections. From a theoretical perspective, the notion of parishioners’ acceptance of church 
messages attempts to capture the US based concept of religious orthodoxy (Layman 1997; Smith 2008), in order to 
increase our understanding of the religious nature of political attitudes in Latin America (Burdick 2010: 175). 
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“Importance of religion” can also serve as proxy for acceptance of the Church’s guidance. 
Using this item in the LAPOP Surveys, we found that 45 percent of Mexican respondents 
reported religions was “very important” and another 35 percent viewed it as “important” in 2010 
(2010 LAPOP Surveys).  Overall, all these pieces of evidence suggest that people who attend 
church on a weekly basis are more likely to receive religious messages, and if they care enough 
about it, then, it is plausible to suppose that frequent attendees who care are less likely to reject 
the church’s guidelines. That is, we have very strong, albeit circumstantial, evidence that a large 
portion of church goers in Mexico meet my two conditions for individuals likely to be affected 
attitudinally by the preachings of the Church – they attend church frequently and they consider 
church to be important in their lives, and therefore, are likely to accept the Church’s message as 
a guide for how they live their lives.66  Such a combination, in turn, should translate into a 
significant impact of the Church’s message on their political attitudes and policy preferences. 
 
Once we know that a religious framing theory can operate in religious settings in which 
parishioners attend to religious services, and they also care enough about religion, this chapter 
proposes to intuitively capture the relationship between receiving the religious messages and 
accepting them through church attendance and importance of religion.  
 
  
                                               
66 Although survey data do not allow me to know exactly who is attending which church or receiving which specific 
message, and then I have to assume that those who attend to religious services on frequent basis are more likely to 
receive the predominant religious messages in that diocese, and based on their levels of acceptance of the church 
teachings, I can make some inferences regarding their political attitudes, I emphasize again that it is a positive step 
forward in trying to figure out this difficult question of the church messages’ influence on citizens’ attitudes. 
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Graph 6.7. Importance of Religion by Church Attendance in Mexico, 2010 - 2012. Source: the 
2010 and 2012 LAPOP Surveys. Importance of religion ranges from 1 to 4 and church 
attendance ranges from 1 to 5, but I started the axis in 2.5 to help visualization. There were no 
values below the 2.5 threshold.  
 
Mexico’ subnational units reveal that on average people go to church on a monthly and 
weekly basis, and they take religion in a somewhat serious way. Thus, there are reasons to 
believe that religious framings are more likely to succeed among church attendees living in states 
at the top right when compared to parishioners living at the bottom left, as shown in Graph 6. 7.   
 
One final minimal condition is to know whether Catholic parishioners are able to 
recognize their religious leaders, and whether parishioners have a favorable opinion about them. 
Data from three surveys conducted in June of 2003, February, and July of 2013 in Mexico reveal 
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that one, three, and one percent respectively did not know who was Pope John Paul II. Regarding 
Pope Benedict XVI, in February and July of 2013, 7 and 4 percent respectively did not know him. 
In relation to Pope Francis, one percent did not know him, and regarding Cardinal Rivera, 
Mexico City Archbishop, and the primus inter pares Cardinal of Mexico, 39 and 23 percent did 
not know him, according to surveys conducted in June of 2003 and February of 2013. Thus, 
name recognition of religious leaders seems to satisfy minimal conditions. Finally, Catholic 
parishioners not only know their religious leaders but also they have an opinion about them, as 
shown in Graph 6.8, in which favorable opinions are pictured. 
 
 
 
Graph 6.8. Favorable Opinions about Three Popes and Cardinal Rivera, Mexico, 2003 - 2013. 
Sources: the 2003 Catholic Pro-Choice Women Surveys; and two Reforma Surveys conducted in 
February and July of 2013. 
 
In sum, now that we know the specific messages emphasized by bishops at the local level 
across time, as discussed in previous chapters, and that many state populations offer the minimal 
conditions under which a religious framing theory can operate, as discussed here, the next 
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chapters will turn their focus on empirical tests at the individual level of how and to what extent 
church messages are associated with Catholic parishioners’ attitudes toward democracy, the drug 
war, and moral values. The association between religiosity and democracy is discussed in the 
seventh chapter.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
RELIGIOSITY AND DEMOCRACY 
 
In this chapter I move from a discussion of the theoretical mechanisms driving the effects 
of religious messages on the political attitudes of parishioners to empirical analyses of these 
ideas through analysis of levels of support for democracy among church-goers.  Here I seek to 
examine the impact of the emerging Church emphasis within some regions on the importance of 
free and fair elections during a time in which electoral opposition to the PRI’s one-party regime 
was beginning to emerge. Through analysis of five national surveys conducted in Mexico 
between 1981 and 2005, I offer some evidence in support of the idea that those Mexicans 
attending church on a regular basis and receptive to the teachings of the Church, this 
combination is associated with a pro-democracy message emphasized by the Church in some 
regions of Mexico, arguably increasing parishioners’ support for democracy. In order to gain a 
better understanding of the relationships between citizens’ religiosity and their attitudes toward 
democracy, this section takes advantage of the World Values Surveys from 1981 to 2005 that 
allow insight into the Mexican public’s views toward political openness and democracy across 
time.   
 
Religiosity, Moral Values and Democracy 
 
The “third wave of democracy” is also known as the “Catholic wave” because three 
quarters of the new democracies emerging around the world during the 1980s and 1990s were in 
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countries with an overwhelming Catholic population, and these democratic transitions “changed 
the Catholic Church’s political perspectives” on the Church’s role in the democratization process 
(Huntington 1989: 77; Tate 1990; Philpott 2004). In order to explain the church’s changing 
preferences from authoritarianism to democracy, Latin American literature on religion and 
politics has discussed two main competing views on the emergent political activism of the 
Church. One perspective sees this change stemming from the changing religious landscape faced 
by the Church in which new competitors for parishioners were arising at the same time the 
region was beginning to reject the authoritarian political regimes of the 1970s. The second 
perspective focuses much more on the changes in the spiritual mission of the Church that took 
place during the late 1960s and 1970s.  
 
For the first perspective, the religious economy school, the church was more likely to 
support democracy when there was Protestant and Evangelical competition. In these situations, 
the Catholic Church began to promote democratic change in an attempt to retain parishioners 
(Gill 1998; 2001; Chesnut 2002).  On the other hand, the spiritual mission school of thought 
argues that the church is more likely to support democracy where there are topics related to the 
church’s ideology and pastoral activities, such as commitment to the poor, social justice, and 
progressive positions (Mainwaring 1986; Hagopian 2009; Philpott 2009). According to this 
perspective there is also a second dimension related to moral values, in which the church is more 
likely to engage in public activism when traditional moral values are in danger of being lost 
(Muro González 1994; Mainwaring and Scully 2003; Hagopian 2008; 2009). 
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These two schools of thought are mainly interested in analyzing how Catholic leaders 
reacted to a changing political environment. The assumptions behind both schools of thought are 
that a national Church uniformly mobilizes parishioners in favor of democracy when it views 
such mobilization as beneficial. These perspectives, however, fail to account for the fact that 
democracy, the degree of threat posed by rival religions, and the depth of the challenges to the 
Church’s spiritual mission all vary dramatically within a single country. So while demands for 
democracy in some nations may have been uniform and widespread across the country, and 
regime change, when it occurred, took place fairly evenly, the situation in other countries was 
different. In Mexico, not only did the country’s democratization process take place over at least a 
decade, but the rate of change within each of the country’s thirty-one states and the Federal 
District was starkly different, with some states leading the democratization process at the state 
level (e.g., Baja California) while other states remained firmly within the grip of the PRI’s one-
party regime. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, religions, even one as hierarchical as 
the Catholic Church, do not behave monolithically, and thus we can explore, and take advantage 
of these internal variations to better understand the effects of the Church adopting a pro-
democracy message on religious parishioners (Berryman 1987; Dodson 1990; O’Shaughnessy 
1990; Hagopian 2009; Cleary 2009).67 
 
 
                                               
67 This chapter will restrict empirical analyses to the Catholic respondents, given that the Catholic Church at the 
subnational level has served as the unit of analysis throughout this dissertation. Nevertheless, there are reasons to 
believe that Protestant and Evangelical churches mobilize parishioners as the Catholic Church does. Prior research 
has found similarities among Catholics and Protestants regarding political participation, turnout, and political 
mobilization, particularly in Mexico City during the 1988 presidential elections (Scott 1991) and during the time of 
Mexico’s watershed 2000 presidential election (Patterson 2004), in which the PRI lost power for the first time since 
its creation in the late 1920s. We also know that those parishioners with high levels of religiosity tend to mobilize 
against policies that run counter to Church doctrine, rather than organizing in support of pro-Church policies.  New 
legal provisions about abortion, gay marriage, and gay adoption are exemplary cases of religious reactions to public 
policies in Mexico (Díaz-Domínguez 2006a) and Latin America (Díaz-Domínguez 2012b). 
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This section proposes a mechanism in two steps. In the first one, the church spreads 
messages “calling attention to some matters while ignoring others” (Iyengar and Kinder 1987: 
63), such as free and fair elections. These messages are transmitted to parishioners by means of 
public statements, official documents, pastoral letters, services’ homilies, and diocesan bulletins 
(Luengo 1992; Sota and Luengo 1994; Soriano 1999; Smith 2008; Hagopian 2009). In addition, 
the decentralized structure of the Catholic Church reinforces dissemination of these messages at 
the state level, where Catholic bishops act in a relatively independent way from the National 
Episcopacy, and from the Vatican’s general policies (Blancarte 1992; Muro González 1994; 
Camp 1997; Chand 2001; Philpott 2004; Trejo 2009). 
 
This relative autonomy among Mexico’s bishops can be traced at least to the early 1980s, 
when Bishop Almeida became a highly visible and vocal proponent of political change in 
Chihuahua during that state’s hotly contested gubernatorial elections of 1986 (Molinar 1987; 
Muro González 1994). In his sermon of July 13 of that year he stated very clearly that as a chief 
representative of the Church in that state “we denounce the falsehood, the fraud, the slow pace of 
balloting...” (Chand 2001: 183). Another example of this growing autonomy among Mexico’s 
bishops during this time comes from the state of Chiapas, where Bishop Ruiz served as a 
somewhat outspoken mediator between the government and the EZLN (Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation) (Trejo 2009). Bishop Lona, from Oaxaca, was highly active in the conflicts 
between the Workers, Peasants, and Students’ Coalition in the Istmo (COCEI) and the state 
government (Ornelas 1983; Rubin 1987; 1997; Muro González 1994) while Bishop Méndez 
Arceo became involved in socially-oriented research institutes in Morelos during this time 
(Blancarte 1992; Camp 1997; Mackin 2003).  
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Vatican policies however have attempted to restrict bishops’ autonomy by means of 
coadjutor bishops, who are nominated by the Nuncio and appointed by the Pope, in order to 
replace bishops in the running of the diocese’s day-to-day business if deemed necessary (Camp 
1997).68  Notwithstanding these efforts by the Vatican, some elements of the Church in Mexico 
have long been vocal on such issues as elections (due likely to the many instances of electoral 
malfeasance carried out under the PRI’s one-party regime). Since the late 1960s there have been 
a dozen official statements issued by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in Mexico, in 
which they specifically demanded free and fair elections, justice, freedom, equality, rule of law, 
and democracy (Soriano 1999: 307-310). Moreover, between 2000 and 2005, there were a dozen 
more messages issued by the Mexican Episcopacy specifically related to elections (Hagopian 
2009: 318). Thus, these actions by the national Church in Mexico ran counter to the Vatican 
efforts to control Mexican bishops by sending a signal to the country’s bishops that there was at 
least some room for maneuver at the subnational level with respect to the Church’s position, and 
the degree to which it emphasized in its messages, political change. 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, 30 individual bishops wrote 47 pastoral letters promoting 
turnout and denouncing local electoral fraud practices. In addition, 11 messages were written by 
six different regional groups of bishops: South Pacific, North, Gulf of Mexico, Don Vasco (from 
the state of Michoacán), Central region, and bishops from the state of Veracruz. These 11 
regionally oriented messages emphasized the importance of civic engagement around local 
electoral years. Bishops’ political statements, at the individual, and at the regional level 
emphasized the importance of free and fair elections between 1968 and 1995 and these messages 
                                               
68 There were 15 coadjutor bishops in Mexico between 1954 and 1995, and one half of these 15 was consecrated and 
they performed duties during the 1990s. 
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represented 17 percent of all bishops writings analyzed in the fourth chapter (n=333). Thus, there 
are reasons to believe that the church messages about elections were relative important for 
specific regions, such as the North, in the emblematic case of Chihuahua, and the South, in the 
case of Oaxaca and the highly successful local political movement led by the COCEI. Bishops in 
the areas where political change was beginning to emerge increased their focus on democracy. 
Findings from the fourth chapter suggest that bishops in the north were talking about political 
change because of early success of the PAN in the region during the 1980s, for example. In sum, 
if regional variations emerge among church messages about politics, then, popular support for 
democracy among Catholic parishioners may also show variations across subnational units.69  
 
In order to explore the hypothesized association between church messages and 
parishioners’ attitudes toward democracy, Graph 7.1 shows the trend of bishops’ messages about 
politics over time, in which the 1980s and the 1990s showed an increasing trend on church 
political messages, as shown in the fourth chapter, in which evidence suggested that an 
increasing political change fueled church messages about politics among progressive and 
conservative bishops. Thus, there are reasons to believe that bishops’ messages about politics 
were associated to parishioners’ attitudes toward democracy, in which church messages were 
disseminated, and then Catholic parishioners started to change their minds.      
  
                                               
69 In addition to bishops’ statements, Mexican priests also emphasized elections. A mail survey conducted during 
1988 and 1989 among 223 Mexican priests on charge of Catholic parishes in seven states (Chihuahua, DF, 
Guanajuato, México, Querétaro, Veracruz and Zacatecas) revealed that 41 percent of the surveyed Catholic clergy 
supported the idea of promoting democracy as an effective way to promote Social Doctrine’s values (Sota and 
Luengo 1994: 69). Interestingly, 86 percent of surveyed priests believed that low turnout rates were induced by 
electoral frauds (Sota and Luengo 1994: 62). Finally, although 64 percent of priests believed that church statements 
emphasizing the poor were more important than statements emphasizing free and fair elections, 52 percent of 
Mexico’s Catholic clergy also believed that defending the popular vote was a valid way to defend the poor (Sota and 
Luengo 1994: 67). 
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Graph 7.1. Bishops’ Messages about Politics, Mexico 1968 – 1995. Vertical lines are World 
Values Surveys years, 1981 and 1990. Sources: De la Rosa and Reilly (1985); Ramos (1992); 
Camp (1997); Hernández (1997); Soriano (1999); and Archive of Diocesan Seminary Library of 
Mexico City. 
 
Church messages about elections were relatively more important during the 1980s than 
those issued during the late 2000s. During the late 2000s I found 39 bishops statements; 11 
nationally issued, 3 issued by regional groups of bishops, and 25 issued by individual bishops. 
These 39 statements were written between June of 2008 and December of 2011, and they 
represent around 12 percent of all the bishops’ writings collected between 2008 and 2011 
(n=338). From this we can posit that parishioners will be more likely to be influenced by and rely 
on church messages about elections when these messages were more prevalent. One then can 
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expect that the levels of support for political change (democracy) among parishioners who 
regularly attend church to be higher than their counterparts who do not attend on a regular basis, 
and those who live in areas where the message of the church was not as strongly focused on the 
need for political change. And assuming a relative lag between the church messages and how 
parishioners process these politically charged messages, we should see these effects most notably 
during the mid-1990s.70  
 
In order to address to some extent the restriction imposed by the diocese/state level as 
unit of analysis of the church messages, that is the aforementioned and understandable church 
message gap between any diocese and its parishes, Graph 7.2 shows a sort of association 
between the proportion of Catholic Pastors who believe that “the Church should care more about 
elections than by poverty” as found by the 1988-1991 Pastors Surveys (question 25 in the 
original questionnaire) in states in which data were available (Sota and Luengo 1994), and the 
proportion of bishops messages about politics between 1968 and 1987, that is before the Pastors 
Surveys were conducted.  
 
  
                                               
70 This research does not claim causality due to the lack of information of church messages during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s as explained in the second chapter. This study proposes a mere association instead, also due to 
additional practicalities that we only assume, but we are not entirely sure, such as the exact content of the church 
messages that parishioners received from priests when attending to religious services; whether parishioners attend to 
the same religious service; whether the sermon was preached by the same priest; and whether priests always rely on 
the exact messages issued by the respective bishop, the regional groups of bishops, or the National Episcopacy, 
among other plausible reasons.  A detailed discussion regarding limitations of this research can be found in the 
second and fifth chapters. 
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Graph 7.2. Pastors’ Opinions and Bishops’ Messages about Politics, Seven States in Mexico 
1968 – 1991. Sources: Sota and Luengo (1994: 67, Table 11) and Graph 7.1. Vertical axis: 
proportion of pastors who think that the Church should care more about elections than by 
poverty; horizontal axis: proportion of bishops messages about politics. The 1988-1991 Pastors 
Surveys were conducted by Eduardo Sota and Enrique Luengo using mail surveys between 1988 
and 1991 among 223 Catholic Pastors in seven states, as described in the fifth chapter.  
 
There is a sort of association between the proportion of pastors who believe that elections 
(politics) are more important than poverty (social), and the proportion of bishops’ messages 
about politics, when considering the seven states in which the 1988-1991 Pastors Surveys were 
conducted, as pictured in Graph 7.2. This limited evidence suggests that potentially Catholic 
Pastors echoed bishops’ emphasis on politics and elections. 
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In the second step of the empirical chain I am attempting to construct, parishioners 
receive and process the message through church attendance, and the degree to which they accept 
it and are influenced by these messages will depend on the degree to which they express a 
willingness to accept the church’s guidance.  
 
Evidence for this second step emerges in research on Protestants in the US (Wald, Owen 
and Hill 1988; Huckfeldt, Plutzer and Sprague 1993), and Catholics in the US, and Latin 
American countries (Berryman 1987; Smith 2005; 2008; Hagopian 2009; Klesner 1987; Zavala 
1991; Scott 1991; Magaloni and Moreno 2003; Patterson 2004; Smith 2008).  As stated by 
Layman “one of the main ways in which religious adherents come to understand the connections 
between their doctrinal beliefs and politics is through the messages delivered from the pulpit and 
social interaction with other parishioners” (1997: 290).  
 
Religiosity, Moral Values, and Conservatism Entail Different Concepts 
 
Before testing the impact of parishioners’ religious and moral attitudes on support for 
democracy, it is worthy to test whether religiosity is different from moral values, and whether 
both religiosity and moral values are different from economic conservatism. Testing these 
distinctions is important because one wants to make sure (as much as possible, statistically 
speaking) that the effects of religiosity on support for democracy are really due to religiosity 
rather than due to moral values or economic conservatism. If religiosity, as latent variable, stands 
alone, then one can argue that the effects of religiosity are at least partially direct (Layman 1997).  
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The three latent variables are comprised of the following items: religiosity is comprised 
of church attendance, being a religious person, importance of God, and trust in the church. Moral 
values are comprised of attitudes toward abortion, homosexuality, divorce, and euthanasia. 
Finally, economic conservatism is comprised of income inequality as individuals’ problem, 
privatization of important industries, and livelihood as individuals’ responsibility.  
 
The hypotheses of this section are four: first, church attendance and willingness to accept 
the church message will tap the latent concept of religiosity. The second hypothesis is that 
attitudes toward abortion, homosexuality, divorce, and euthanasia will tap the latent concept of 
moral values. The third hypothesis is that religiosity and moral values will not tap each other. 
Finally, the fourth hypothesis is that religiosity and moral values indicators will not tap economic 
conservatism. Data come from World Values Surveys conducted from 1981 to 2005 in Mexico.71  
 
To pursue this, confirmatory factor analysis is employed. Traditionally, factor analysis is 
used in data reduction, but in this case the goal is testing whether a set of items is functionally 
equivalent (invariant) regarding latent variables (Long 1983; Kline 2005). The main goal is not 
only to see whether a set of items taps a specific concept, but also whether religiosity and moral 
values items do not tap each other, in order to show that religiosity is truly independent from 
moral values when controlling for economic conservatism. The confirmatory factor analysis tests 
                                               
71 Mexico’s samples of the World Values Surveys are national representative samples. Detailed descriptive statistics, 
questionnaires, and datasets are available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. Finally, in this analysis, non-responses 
(‘don’t know’ and ‘don’t answer’) were considered missing values and they were imputed via EMis using Amelia II, 
with mi=10 and prior=0.1 (King, Honaker, and Scheve 2001), and all variables were rescaled from 0 to 1. 
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whether specific variables tap specific latent concepts, and whether variables that belong to one 
concept do not tap another one.72  The specific hypotheses are:  
 H1: Church attendance, being a religious person, importance of God, and trust in the church will 
tap the latent concept of religiosity. 
 H2: Attitudes toward abortion, homosexuality, divorce, and euthanasia will tap the latent concept 
of moral values.  
 
H3: Religiosity and moral values indicators will not tap each other. 
 
H4: Religiosity indicators will not tap conservatism.  
  
                                               
72 In order to test the empirical distinction between the latent concepts of religiosity, moral values, and conservatism, 
I employ confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). A reasonable CFA model’s fit shows a Comparative Fix Index (CFI) 
greater than 0.9; a Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) greater than 0.9; and a Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) lower than 0.10 (Kline 2005). 
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Latent 1981  1990  1996  2000  2005   
Parameters Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate   
 (Std Error)  (Std Error)  (Std Error)  (Std Error)  (StdError)   
 
Religiosity 
Church Attendance 0.72 * 0.66 * 0.57 * 0.48 * 0.63 * 
 (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Religious Person 0.39 * 0.65 * 0.59 * 0.48 * 0.50 * 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  
Trust in the Church 0.56 * 0.74 * 0.58 * 0.63 * 0.53 * 
 (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  
Importance of God -0.09 ++ 0.68 * 0.64 * 0.36 * 0.46 * 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Income Inequality as  0.01  0.05  0.29  -0.05  0.01  
  Individual Problem (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.56)  (0.28)  (0.05)  
 
 
Moral Traditionalism 
Reject Homosexuality 0.75 * 0.76 * 0.65 * 0.70 * 0.74 * 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Reject Abortion 0.79 * 0.73 * 0.75 * 0.67 * 0.66 * 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  
Reject Divorce 0.68 * 0.55 * 0.61 * 0.68 * 0.67 * 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Reject Euthanasia 0.44 * 0.51 * 0.56 * 0.53 * 0.51 * 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Livelihood as  0.01  -0.05  -0.04  -0.09 ++ 0.13  
Individual Responsibility (0.04  (0.18)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.24)  
 
 
Table 7.1. Religiosity, Moral Values, and Economic Conservatism in Mexico, 1981-2005, 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Source: World Values Surveys. Author’s estimations using R 
2.14, libraries (Hmisc) and (sem). * 2%; ++ 5%; + 10%. [Part 1 / 2]  
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Latent  1981 1990  1996  2000  2005  
Parameters  Estimate Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate  
  Std Error Std Error  Std Error  Std Error  Std Error  
 
Economic Conservatism 
 
Income Inequality as  0.29 ++ -0.08  1.38  1.21 + 0.40 ++ 
  Individual Problem (0.04)  (0.06)  (1.05)  (0.79)  (0.19)  
Individuals Own  0.69 * 0.29 + 0.00  -0.10  -0.10 + 
  Important Industries (0.06)  (0.19)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.07)  
Livelihood as  0.69 * 0.88 + 0.19 + 0.16 + 0.57 + 
  Individual Responsibility (0.06)  (0.58)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.34)  
Religious Person -0.03  -0.03  -0.04  0.02  0.08  
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.07)  
Church Attendance 0.01  0.01  -0.05  -0.01  -0.03  
 (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.06)  
Reject Abortion 0.03  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.06  
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.06)  
 
CFI 0.95  0.91  0.92  0.93  0.94  
TLI 0.92  0.87  0.88  0.90  0.91  
RMSEA 0.054  0.075  0.066  0.054  0.052  
RMSEA 90% CI (0.05, 0.06) (0.07, 0.08) (0.06, 0.07) (0.05, 0.06) (0.04, 0.06) 
Model Chi Square 181.13  302.04  245.63  180.2  169.55  
Adjusted Goodness-of-fit 0.95  0.91  0.93  0.95  0.95  
Respondents 1595  1377  2252  1282  1448  
 
Table 7.1. Religiosity, Moral Values, and Economic Conservatism in Mexico, 1981-2005, 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Source: World Values Surveys. Author’s estimations using R 
2.14, libraries (Hmisc) and (sem). * 2%; ++ 5%; + 10%. [Part 2 and final] 
 
Results show that church attendance, being a religious person, trust in the church, and 
importance of God tap the latent concept of religiosity, as shown in Table 7.1. In addition, 
attitudes toward abortion, homosexuality, divorce, and euthanasia tap moral values. Finally, the 
three economic variables tap economic conservatism. 
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Overall, evidence suggests that religiosity seems to be mainly comprised of church 
attendance, importance of God, being a religious person, and trust in the church, whereas moral 
values seem to be essentially comprised of attitudes toward abortion, homosexuality, divorce and 
euthanasia. Additionally, income inequality, a measure of economic conservatism does not tap 
religiosity, whereas being a religious person and church attendance do not tap economic 
conservatism. Thus, religiosity is empirically different from economic conservatism, and also, 
religiosity is theoretical and empirically different from moral values, supporting the idea of 
religiosity as a good vehicle for the church messages.73 
 
Effects of Religiosity and Moral Values on Democracy 
 
Once we know parishioners’ attitudes toward religiosity, moral values and economic 
conservatism are different each other, it is plausible hypothesize the effects of parishioners’ 
religious on support for democracy, assuming that religious citizens were continuously exposed 
to the church messages about free and fair elections, and citizens were inclined to accept the 
church’s guidance. From this mechanism one hypothesis emerge: 
 
H1: Religiosity increases support for democracy. 
 
A measure of church attendance could potentially capture the link between the church 
messages and parishioners who attend to religious services on regular basis. In addition, 
measures of personal religiosity, and importance of God could capture levels of religious beliefs. 
                                               
73 Additional confirmatory factor analyses (not shown) reveal that religiosity items do not tap the latent concept of 
moral values, employing church attendance and being a religious person. Exploratory factor analyses (not shown) 
supported these findings as well.  
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Finally, the higher levels of trust in the church could increase willingness of accepting church’s 
guidance regarding support for democracy and free and fair elections. Thus, a religiosity index 
could capture four items: church attendance; trust in the church; importance of God in one’s life; 
and whether respondents see themselves as religious persons.74  
 
The dependent variable, popular support for democracy was operationalized using 
questions extracted from the 1981-2005 World Values Surveys.75  In general, democracy 
requires three conditions: a) a real possibility of partisan alternation in office at the national level; 
b) reversible policy changes as result from the alternation, and; c) effective civilian control over 
the military (Przeworski 1992: 105). Under this definition arguably the Mexican transition took 
place at the national level until 2000.  It is plausible however to assume that there was a limited 
but significant political pluralism at the local level before the alternation at the national level (De 
Remes 2000; 2006; Lujambio 2000). In fact, around 1997 almost one quarter of the states was 
ruled by the opposition. In addition, the PRI lost the Chamber of Deputies’ majority after the 
1997 midterm elections, and then, the presidency three years later, after 70 years of ruling the 
country (Magaloni 2005: 123).  
 
Mexico’s democratic transition at the national level was so gradual that is not plausible to 
fix the exact and precise year of the authoritarian breakdown without controversy (Lawson 2000; 
                                               
74 In order to avoid that the variable trust in the church capture diffuse support (Booth and Seligson 1984) when 
standing alone, the religiosity index already includes this measure. 
75 The question wording for the World Values Surveys on support for democracy reads: in 1981, “basic kinds of 
attitudes concerning society: no reforms, society must be gradually improved by reforms, or society must be 
radically changed”; in 1990, “the political reform is moving too rapidly”; in 1996 and 2000 “democracy may have 
problems, but it is better than any other form of government”; and the 2005, “what do you think about having a 
democratic political system as a way of governing this country?”. Although the World Values Surveys questions are 
not perfectly comparable, they represent a reasonable proxy of support for democracy. During the 1980s and early 
1990s Mexican pollsters had to dismiss questions about democracy due to political and academic hostile 
environments (Basáñez 1987: 182).  
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Magaloni 2006). Although the 2000 elections clearly stand as a marker for the emergence of 
democracy in Mexico, the country’s transition began in the 1990s, culminating in the 1997 
legislative elections in which the PRI lost majority control of Congress. I therefore center my 
focus on public views of democracy around 1997.  
 
In order to test the effect of Catholic parishioners’ religiosity on support for democracy in 
Mexico, empirical models provide evidence related to one religious affiliation, only including 
Catholic respondents. Models also include a measure of moral values, in order to capture the link 
between the church messages advocating the preservation of traditional values and parishioners’ 
opposition to abortion, homosexuality, divorce, and euthanasia. Early studies found a positive 
effect of moral traditionalism on support for democracy in Mexico (Magaloni and Moreno 
2003). 76   I also include demographic controls (Booth and Seligson 1994; Domínguez and 
McCann 1996), such as gender, levels of education, income, size of town, and whether 
respondents are peasants or blue-collar workers, age cohorts, and three national regions, North, 
Center, and South (Klesner 1987).77  Regions however also map onto church messages at the 
subnational level. 
                                               
76 Nowadays, however, moral values are negatively related to public support for democracy. One explanation relies 
on the fact that protection of gay-rights, and pro-choice debates starting in Mexico City in 2000, via the so-called 
bill sociedades de convivencia among couples of the same sex (Cohabitation Society Bill in 2000, and Cohabitation 
Society Act in 2006), and the “Robles Law” regarding abortion, allowing Mexico City women to interrupt 
pregnancy on the grounds of congenital defects, and allowing district attorneys to authorize abortion for victims of 
rape. These regulations were assimilated as a liberal by-product of democracy, and arguably, morally oriented 
parishioners do not support a democracy in which “unacceptable” behaviors are tolerated. These debates started to 
become more salient the following years, as explained in the ninth chapter. 
77 I based geographical classification on the 1990 WVS sample, due to the lack of specific state markers in the 1981, 
1990, and the 1996 samples. All WVS however identify four regions. Thus, I classified states as follows: North is 
comprised of Baja California, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, 
Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas. South is comprised of Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, 
Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Yucatán. Central region is comprised of Hidalgo, México, Morelos, Puebla, 
and Tlaxcala. Finally West is comprised of Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Mexico City, Michoacán, 
Nayarit, and Querétaro. Last category is problematic because Mexico City is geographically located in the Central 
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In addition, models include cognitive variables such as political ideology (Moreno 1999; 
2003; Zechmeister 2006a; 2006b), and economic conservatism, which is an index comprised of 
three items: a) whether the government or individuals are responsible for ensuring livelihood; b) 
whether income inequality is a social or individuals’ problem; and c) whether the government or 
individuals should own the most important industries of the country,78 interest in politics, 
postmaterialism,79  and pocketbook evaluations (Poiré 1999). Finally, estimations come from 
Bayesian linear models.80  
 
The model of support for democracy includes Catholics only, and all the necessary 
interaction terms with time, as appropriate, and interaction among religiosity, time, and regions, 
in order to capture regional effects of religiosity across time. This modeling strategy heavily 
relies on Layman (1997). The interaction with time, from 1981 to 2005, and regions in the case 
                                                                                                                                                       
region, but there is no other way to design regions because of the lack of states markers (author’s emails and 
telephone interviews with Miguel Basáñez in July 8 of 2010; August 20 of 2011; and March 6 of 2012).  
78 In the WVS economic ideology ranges from 3 to 30 and includes three questions: a) whether the government or 
individuals are responsible for ensuring livelihood; b) whether income inequality is a social or individuals’ problem; 
and c) whether the government or individuals should own the most important industries of the country. 
79 Postmaterialism ranges from 1 to 3, at the bottom, respondents prefer order and price control (material values); at 
the top, respondents prefer freedom of speech and participation (postmaterial values). In the middle, number 2 
includes any combination in between (Inglehart 1990). This measure is only available for the WVS. 
80 The number of response categories varies from the 1981 to 2005 samples. In 1981 categories were 3; in 1996 and 
2000 response categories were 4; whereas in 1990 response categories were 5. From a theoretical perspective, 
categorical ordered choices are better fitted by ordered probit models estimating successive threshold parameters, in 
which the assumption is that the probability curves of choices are parallel, i.e. all the linking variables behave in 
similar fashion across choices. This concept is known as the “parallel slopes” assumption. If this assumption is 
violated the result is biased and, then, it is necessary to treat the dependent variable as nominal. However, the 
substantive difference between ordered and least squares models is that the second one losses efficiency but does not 
bias the result, whereas the former could increase efficiency only if the parallel slopes assumption remains (Imai, 
King, and Lau 2008). For the sake of simplicity, I then performed least square models using a Bayesian framework. 
Analyses performed in R version 2.14, library(MCMCpack), and simulations using library(Zelig). Parameters used 
in this Bayesian linear estimation were burnin=10000, mcmc=50000, and thin=1. Posteriors passed the convergence 
tests, as revealed by the Heildeberg diagnostics. 
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of religiosity, should provide an indication of whether the impact of religiosity has changed 
significantly across time and space, and whether its impact has increased or decreased.81  
 
Overall, model results suggest that religious Catholic parishioners have changed their 
minds about democracy across time in the North and Central region, as pictured in Graph 7.3. 
The first set of variables, in which there are no interaction terms, they essentially represent the 
impact of the initial year, in which the predicted value of any interaction term is zero, due to the 
coding of time, 0 for 1981, 1 for 1990, 2 for 1996 and so on. Thus, when time is added in the 
interaction terms, credible intervals represent the effect of years, which are pictured in the second 
set of variables. Interaction terms in Graph 7.3 are represented using a colon. 
 
In addition, other results from Graph 7.3 suggest that support for democracy decreased 
when considering the starting point, the year 1981, among Catholics who were conservative in 
economics, and Catholics living in the Central region. In contrast, those Catholics who were 
classified as postmaterialists were more likely to support democracy.  In a sequential form, when 
time goes by, modernization variables start to show their positive explanatory power, such as 
education, and urban dwellers. Cognitive variables, such as political ideology, and interest in 
politics also increase Catholic support for democracy. Finally, religiosity among Northern and 
Central Catholics increases support for democracy. The effect of religiosity among Central 
Catholics however, it only seems to be valid for the initial years, as revealed by the negative 
values of the respective credible interval.  
                                               
81 Although Layman does not always include interaction terms between non-religious variables and time when 
explaining party identification and vote choice, given that he assumes that the impact of these variables remain 
steady (1997: 295), I include interaction terms with time in order to offer a full version of this model. Previous 
models (not shown) based on regional subsamples or based on a full sample that is, including Evangelicals and those 
who do not profess any religion, showed similar results to those presented here.  
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Graph 7.3. Support for Democracy in Mexico, 1981 – 2005. Source: Author’s estimations based on WVS. Estimations are Bayesian 
linear model using R 2.14, library (MCMCpack), and routine MCMCregress. Lines are 90 percent credible intervals. Both panels 
belong to the same model. Interaction terms are pictured by a colon. 
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Overall, there are reasons to believe that there is a positive and increasing tendency of 
support for democracy among devout Catholic parishioners, arguably derived from church 
messages about politics. This tendency is particularly notorious in the North and Central region 
across years. In order to fully capture the interaction terms of the Bayesian linear model, Graph 
7.4 shows predicted values of support for democracy among Catholics considering these two 
regions across years. 
 
Predicted values from Graph 7.4 show a religiosity changing impact on support for 
democracy among Catholics, especially in the North, previous to 1996.82  As shown in the fourth 
chapter, bishops issued messages about politics when there was political change at the local level, 
almost putting moral issues on aside, and then, the church messages might play a role in 
changing religious parishioners’ attitudes toward democracy, and this association appears more 
evident during the middle 1990s, especially in the North. Interestingly, devout Catholics in the 
Central region were more likely to support democracy as well during the initial years, as pictured 
in Graph 7.4.  
                                               
82 This is a noticeable change. In the past, scholars had documented the “authoritarian role” played by religious 
citizens during the 1998 presidential elections, in which religiosity favored a strong leader (Domínguez and McCann 
1996: 42). Actually, the PRI’ strongest opposition at the time, the leftist presidential coalition (from which the PRD 
emerged), it was rejected by highly religious parishioners in the 1988 presidential elections (Domínguez and 
McCann 1996: 104), and by Catholics in general (Zavala 1991; Domínguez and McCann 1996: 138). Recent 
research has found that parishioners supported political change rather than the PRI in the 2000 presidential elections 
(Moreno 2003: 174). 
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Graph 7.4. Effects of Religiosity among Northern and Central Catholics on Support for Democracy, Mexico, 1981-2005. Author’s 
simulations from Bayesian linear model pictured in Graph 7.2, using R 2.14, library (Zelig). Dashed lines represent high religiosity. 
0 1 2 3 4
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Religiosity among Northern Catholics
Years (0=1981, 1=1990, 2=1996, 3=2000, 4=2005)
P
re
di
ct
ed
 V
al
ue
s 
of
 S
up
po
rti
ng
 D
em
oc
ra
cy
High Religiosity
Low Religiosity
0 1 2 3 4
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Religiosity among Central Catholics
Years (0=1981, 1=1990, 2=1996, 3=2000, 4=2005)
P
re
di
ct
ed
 V
al
ue
s 
of
 S
up
po
rti
ng
 D
em
oc
ra
cy
High Religiosity
Low Religiosity
168 
 
In sum, according to this evidence, there are reasons to believe that religious citizens 
were more likely to support democracy in places in which the church messages emphasized 
the importance of free and fair elections, and particularly, this evidence suggests that there 
was a change among religious citizens during Mexico’s democratization process, arguably 
due to religious leaders’ messages, and citizens’ willingness to accept church messages. 
 
These findings allow me to suppose that the church politically oriented messages are 
an important religious explanation of popular support for democracy among devout 
parishioners in places in which the church emphasized the importance of elections. Overall, 
the Bayesian linear model using the WVS seems to generally support the notion that religious 
attitudes were associated to political openness and democratic support, and particularly, 
specific regional results seem to support the notion of an association between the church 
messages and parishioners’ attitudes toward democracy at the subnational level.83   
 
 
 
                                               
83 In order to assess whether religious citizens were more or less supportive of democracy during the 1980s, I 
also analyzed the 1986 New York Times surveys, a nationally representative survey, in which findings (not 
shown) reveal that church attendance did not play a significant role on support for political competition across 
regions, but citizens living in the North were more likely to support political competition. In addition, findings 
from the 1978 Maquiladoras Surveys (not shown), conducted by Seligson and Williams (Booth and Seligson 
1984; 1994) in six Mexico’s northern states, a pioneering instrument regarding specific and diffuse support, 
reveal that attendance to religious groups increases citizens’ beliefs that elections will make politicians pay 
attention to the people. Although the 1978 sample only surveyed a very specific segment of Mexico’s 
population, it is noteworthy to remark that religious workers in the North were more inclined to favorable think 
on elections, in contrast to prior findings using the 1959 Civic Culture Surveys, in which religiosity had a 
negative impact on interest in campaigns (Domínguez and McCann 1996: 34). The 1978 Maquila Surveys 
questionnaire is available at: www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico/1978-questionnaire.pdf. Variables include in 
the maquila analysis were elections make government pays attention to the people (V186), attendance to 
religious groups (V115), gender (V1); age (V228); education (V121); income (V229); did not vote in previous 
elections (V189); ideology (V183A); whether the respondent has previously worked in the US (V109); and 
whether respondent works in a maquila (V6).  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
Church messages are more likely to find echo among church attendees who show 
willingness to accept the church teachings. Regarding democracy, there was a plethora of 
electorally charged church messages during the 1980s and 1990s that arguably fueled 
regional Catholic support for democracy one decade later. This lag between the church 
messages and parishioners’ new attitudes is explained, among other plausible reasons, by 
regional differences, in which the North played an important democratic role due to the 
church activism in places in which there was an emerging political change at the local level.  
 
Bishops from the North were labeled as panistas by political elites (Camp 1997; 
Legorreta and Sota 2000) when in fact, Chihuahua’s progressive bishops preached about 
democracy, regardless of which opposition party was leading political preferences in their 
dioceses, as analyzed in the fourth chapter. Despite political labels among bishops, empirical 
evidence at the individual level in Mexico from the early 1980s to the middle 2000s seem to 
support the notion that bishops’ messages regarding politics in general, and elections in 
particular, they were, to some extent, associated to Catholic devout parishioners’ attitudes 
regarding support for democracy.84 
                                               
84 Additional evidence of democratic tendencies among Northern Catholics is found in the 1986 Electoral 
Surveys conducted in the state of Chihuahua, in which from 20 to 50 percent of respondents supported church 
intervention on politics, depending on the electoral district they lived. In comparison, in 1983, according to the 
1983 Political Parties Surveys (conducted by Miguel Basáñez), only 10 percent of respondents at the national 
level supported church intervention on politics (Díaz-Domínguez 2012a). The 1986 Electoral Surveys were 
conducted in the state of Chihuahua between April 20 and May 23 of 1986, month and half before the 
gubernatorial election day. The religious question wording reads “Do you think that the church and clergy 
participation in politics is desirable?” using two response categories: yes and no. Question wording in Spanish 
reads “¿Opina que la participación de la iglesia y del clero en la política es deseable?” giving respondents two 
options “sí o no”. The original survey design included 16 Northern electoral districts drawn from 54 highly 
competitive districts at the national level considering four states: Coahuila (2), Chihuahua (6), Sonora (3) and 
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In this chapter, I addressed the theoretical background of the spiritual mission school 
of thought in order to explain religious support for democracy during Mexico’s transition. I 
argued that religious factors related to the spiritual mission, such as church messages 
regarding democracy and elections, and religious factors at the individual level such as 
Church attendance, personal religious beliefs, and willingness to accept Church’s guidance, 
these religious factors are associated to public opinion’s changes on support for democracy 
across years. 
 
Research design and empirical operationalization however have three main 
limitations: a) the lack of local geographical units to place the interaction between Catholics 
and the proportion of Protestants, in line with the religious economy school; b) the lack of 
more accurate evidence regarding the existence of parish level religious messages delivered 
in effective ways to parishioners during Mexico’s long transition to democracy; and c) the 
lack of formal tests regarding the impact on popular support for democracy of the 1992 
constitutional provision that restored Church-State relations, formally broken since the 1917 
Constitution, and informally managed after the Cristero war (Meyer 1973; Monsiváis 1992; 
Blancarte 1992; Lamadrid 1994; Camp 1997; Gill 1999). The only available evidence at the 
individual level suggests that popular knowledge of the 1992 constitutional provision was 
very gradual.85  
                                                                                                                                                 
Nuevo León (5). The 1986 surveys were conducted by the Autonomous University of Ciudad Juárez (UACJ), 
and the National University of Mexico (UNAM) among 6,000 citizens, using face-to-face interviews on the 
streets. The questionnaire included 11 items, such as demographics, vote choice, and attitudes toward the 
church, and entrepreneurs (Sirvent 1987).  
85 47 percent of the public did not hear about the constitutional provision when passed, as asked in December of 
1991 (Lamadrid 1994: Table 2). Interestingly, one year later, in September of 1992, this proportion increased 
until 67 percent (Lamadrid 1994: Table 1).  In addition, 47 percent of the public did not know about the new 
relations between Mexico and the Vatican based on the new regulation Surveys conducted by the Mexican 
Presidency during October and November of 1991, and September of 1992. Material available at: 
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Finally, it is important to qualify any conclusion, given that one could argue that even 
a little competition after many years of Catholic hegemony might cause change, and one 
could also argue that even if both Evangelicals and Catholics favored democracy, Catholics 
could be trying to preempt Evangelicals. Thus, these two dynamics were possible, i.e. an 
effect of religious competition, and Catholic obstruction to Evangelicalism. Therefore, 
evidence already presented only suggests that the religious competition hypothesis is not the 
only one that theoretically explains and empirically associates support for democracy and 
devout Catholics.  In fact, the evidence seems to support the idea that bishops’ messages 
about free and fair elections in specific regions were plausible associated to Catholic devout 
parishioners’ attitudes toward democracy.86 
 
The next chapter will deal with parishioners’ attitudes toward the drug war strategy 
taking into account the recent church messages about violence derived from the war on drugs 
and organized crime, in order to explore whether there is an association between the church 
messages about social issues, such as violence, and Catholic devout parishioners’ attitudes 
toward the drug war strategy.  
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.biiacs.cide.edu/. Arguably, the main effects of this constitutional reform could be related to 
particular partisan affinities rather than to support for democracy in general, given that one plausible hypothesis 
is that the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) emerged as the owner of this issue over time (Monsiváis 1992; 
Camp 1997). 
86 Additional models (not shown) using one wave at the time revealed similar results to those reported here. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
RELIGIOSITY AND VIOLENCE 
 
Mexico’s recent war on drug trafficking over the past six years has brought with it an 
unprecedented level of violence in certain areas of the country. Since 2007 over 70,000 drug-
related homicides have occurred, with the vast majority of these occurring in a dozen of the 
country’s thirty-one states. In addition to the violence associated with the drug war, the past 
six years have also witnessed a dramatic increase in kidnappings and extortion in several 
states.87  
 
The Catholic Church has not escaped the drug war either, with increasing reports of 
Church officials receiving threats from various drug cartel members. In some parts of the 
country the Church now stands as the sole voice from society that can speak out against the 
cartels while in other parts that have been less affected by the drug war, the Church has 
remained relatively silent with respect to the war.  
 
In this context, then, I now turn to an analysis of the impact the Church’s position on 
the drug war has on those parishioners who attend mass on a regular basis. Here again, the 
spatial unevenness of the Church’s message with respect to the drug war will allow for some 
analytical leverage in assessing the degree to which the Church influences the political and 
                                               
87 Most recently, the state of Michoacán has approached a “failed state” status, with Mexican finance minister 
(far away from security forces officials) declaring that the rule of law in that state “threatened” and representing 
“one of the biggest challenges facing the nation” (http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2013/en-riesgo-
estado-de-derecho-en-michoacan-videgaray--969026.html). 
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social attitudes of the highly religious. These critical attitudes are associated to the church 
messages, in which some bishops have expressed concerns in relation to victims, collateral 
damages, and social disintegration derived from the drug war and violence in general. 
 
The analysis takes advantage of a unique series of survey data collected in November 
of 2010 that interviewed over 15,910 Mexicans in an effort to provide survey samples that 
were representative at the state level. The 2010 ENVUD surveys, then, allows for 
hierarchical statistical analyses of the views towards the drug war of Mexicans, taking into 
account the distinct state-level contextual factors such as the degree of drug-related crime 
and violence (and variations in the Church’s message concerning the drug war). This chapter 
tests whether prevalent Catholic Church messages about violence are associated to religious 
Catholic parishioners’ low levels of support for the drug war strategy, defined as whether the 
government or the drug traffickers are leading the war.  
 
To begin, I first must identify those parishioners most likely to be influenced by the 
Church’s position on the government’s drug war – the highly religious. Using items from the 
ENVUD survey, I therefore try to distinguish those respondents who attend church most 
frequently This measure taps the degree to which an individual accepts the Church’s 
guidance and thus is important in identifying those most likely to accept the Church’s 
position on the government’s war on drugs. 
 
Again, I am simply approaching the same basic question of does the church influence 
attitudes, in this case through a look at attitudes on the drug war. To the extent that one can 
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make a plausible claim to knowing what the church’s message is and how it varies across 
states/regions, then one should find the highly religious consistently in line with the message 
of the Church in that particular state/region. In other words, we should find the highly 
religious having attitudes on the drug war that are consistent with the church’s message. 
 
The alternative rival hypothesis states that the working hypothesis may be false if 
devotional links with the sacred world explain parishioners’ attitudes toward the drug war, in 
which church messages do not play any role. The religious measure that plays the role of 
alternative rival is those who report the higher levels of devotion to the Virgin of Guadalupe, 
as devotional link, in which individuals establish a personal relationship with sacred entities, 
such as the Virgin. This devotional link entails that the church does not play any role in the 
mediation between individuals and sacred entities. Consequently, if devotional links, such as 
the importance of the Virgin explain attitudes toward the drug war, the main hypothesis of 
this chapter would be false, because devotional links do not convey any church message, due 
to the lack of any clergy intervention.  
 
In sum, in order to falsify the effect of church attendance and violent environments on 
attitudes toward the drug war, devotional links between individuals and sacred entities, such 
as the Virgin of Guadalupe, should increase support for the drug war, due to the fact that 
people usually ask for divine protection when everything else essentially fails (Ribeiro de 
Oliveira 1970, Velázquez 1975; Chesnut 2002). I will discuss alternative rival hypothesis 
results later on.  
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The Drug War 
 
Regarding the drug war, although is an emergent topic, scholars have found very 
different and even contrasting explanations about the drug war causes, and most importantly, 
from this dissertation perspective, different explanations about the type of consequences 
caused by the drug war. Some scholars argue that drug cartels were forced to find new routes 
when the government started the war (Del 2011), and then, violence among cartels started to 
rise, in combination with military presence in drug war states (Merino 2011), decreasing 
investment and employment (Dell 2011), whereas other scholars argue that violence is 
episodic, and then past violence matters, thus, government’s actions are not the cause of 
additional violence (Poiré and Martínez 2011).  
 
Other views argue that the process of the drug war should be analyzed as a regional 
and multidimensional phenomenon, in which the new ways of getting organized among drug 
cartels, and the structural conditions of the police forces at the municipal level should be 
taken into account (Campbell 2009). Additional studies suggest that citizens’ reactions over 
the drug war can be comprised on different levels of fear. In this way, citizens overestimate 
fear when they hold low levels of education, when they are overexposed to the mass media, 
and when citizens live in low violence settings (Romero, Magaloni, and Díaz-Cayeros 2012).  
 
The main goal of this chapter however, it is to analyze the association between devout 
parishioners’ attitudes toward the drug war and how these resemble church messages. The 
recent literature on the drug war serves the purpose of modeling citizens’ attitudes toward 
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this public policy, tapping that concept using a question which refers to whether the public 
perceives the government is leading the drug war or the drug traffickers, as measured by the 
2010 ENVUD surveys, in combination with available measures of the drug war homicides. 
 
Across years, excepting President De la Madrid’s administration, government 
messages about the drug war decreased each presidency until the last sexenio.  This is when 
President Felipe Calderón launched the drug war strategy, essentially deploying Mexico’s 
National Army and Navy in drug states to fight organized crime and drug trafficking (Poiré 
and Martínez 2011).  Pictured in Graph 8.1 are the total homicides per 100,000 inhabitants 
from 1970 to 2011. Since 2007, the rate of homicides is clearly on the rise, presumably 
derived from organized crime and the drug war. These numbers are high, even after 
considering presumable narco executions, as shown in Graph 8.1.88  In short, the drug war 
across time shows a change in the government’s functioning since 2007, mainly centering its 
focus on the drug war (Poiré and Martínez 2011).    
  
                                               
88 The Office of the President collected and centralized all the drug war homicides information at the municipal 
level from December of 2006 to December of 2010. Sources were Mexico’s Army (SEDENA), Mexico’s Navy 
(SEMAR), Secretariat of Public Security (SSP), Secretariat of Governance (SEGOB), the National Security and 
Intelligence Agency (CISEN), and the Office of the Attorney General (PGR). Dataset “officially available” at: 
http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/base-de-datos-de-fallecimientos/  but a mirror site it might be more effective:  
http://200.23.123.5/  
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Graph 8.1. Homicides Related to Organized Crime and the Drug War, 1970-2010.  Sources: 
Author’s compilations based on INEGI 1970-1973, 1977-1978, and 1990-2006; SINAIS 
(Secretariat of Health) 1979-1996; PAHO (PanAmerican Health Office) 1974-1976; the 
Office of the President 2006-2010, and Aguirre’s Mexicomaxico.org website.89  
 
When analyzing the relationship between the drug war homicides and visible and 
invisible victims of crime at the state level during 2010,90 the number also increases. In 
                                               
89 I was no able to compare INEGI and SINAIS (National Health Information System or Sistema National de 
Información en Salud) data at the subnational level due to dissimilar formats, but at the national level I found 
some similarities. Aguirre (2012) argues that SINAIS and INEGI are similar, because INEGI counts on defunct 
official records, whereas SINAIS on medical official records, but I did not find the same numbers at the 
subnational level. I did not use data from the Executive Secretariat of the National System of Public Security 
(SE-SNSP) because are not homogenous and it varies from month to month. Data from December to December 
reveal similarities with other sources, but I did not find many similarities in 2008 and 2009, two critical years 
regarding the drug war. In order to deal with all disparities, I follow Aguirre’s advice regarding presumable 
narco executions (only reported by the Office of the President), in which dropping executions might offer a 
more comparable data, but there are no executions in a separate way before 2006. Aguirre’s compilation at the 
national level uncovers 80 years, from 1931 to 2011, and it is available at: 
http://www.mexicomaxico.org/Voto/Homicidios100M.htm   
90 The Visible and Invisible Crime Victims Index include consequences of violence among the people through 
an analysis of households’ victims of crime, such as homicides, robbery, kidnapping, express kidnapping, and 
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particular the numbers were concentrated in that states of Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa, 
Morelos, Baja California, Guerrero, Michoacán, and Tamaulipas, as shown in Graph 8.2. 
 
 
 
Graph 8.2. Drug War Homicides and the Visible and Invisible Victims of Crime Index, 2010. 
Sources: Office of the President (2011) and México Evalúa (2011). 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
rape among other violent crimes, in which relatives in the household were indirectly affected, as estimated by a 
Mexican think tank, México Evalúa (2011).  
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The Church Messages 
 
Regarding church messages, between 2009 and 2010 there were a dozen of national 
press releases issued by the Mexico’s National Conference of Bishops, in which violence was 
widely mentioned. These included mentions such as the murders of seminarians and priests 
in Guerrero; disruption of federal forces searching suspects during the celebration of mass in 
Michoacán; attacks over a migrants’ refugee in Coahuila; murder of a Mexico City priest and 
attacks to other priest in Oaxaca; migrants mass gravesites in San Fernando, Tamaulipas; and 
writings about the 2010 local elections facing fear and suffering. 
 
Some of the most relevant press releases issued by the CEM during 2009 were June 
15, two seminarians and a priest murdered in Arcelia, Guerrero; July 6, low turnout and 
violence; August 3 and 5, a suspects’ searching during the celebration of Mass in Apatzingán, 
Michoacán; and November 4, attacks over a migrants’ refugee in Saltillo, Coahuila. During 
2010 the CEM also issued new press releases, February 15, the emblematic national pastoral 
letter “In Christ our peace, Mexico will hold a dignified life” (Que en Cristo nuestra paz, 
México tenga vida digna); February 19, a priest murder in Mexico City; March 9, on the 
national peace; March 26, attacks to a priest in Puerto Escondido, Oaxaca; June 30 and 
August 26, the San Fernando migrants’ murders in Tamaulipas; July 8, elections under fear 
and suffering; and August 17 about the Bicentennial festivities, Independence and Revolution 
emphasizing the need of peace and justice. 
 
180 
 
Considering the 338 church messages collected between 2008 and 2011, there were 
133 messages about social issues, that is 39 percent, and one half of these socially oriented 
messages were explicitly related to the violence derived from the drug war. Bishops also 
have issued local messages disseminated in Coahuila, Durango and State of Mexico 
explicitly claiming that the government should take a different strategy to the drug war, 
without mentioning any policy in specific.   
 
In these places, bishops explicitly supported previous mobilizations against the drug 
war strategy, and particularly, in favor of the Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity 
(MPJD).91  Explicit critical reviews of the drug war strategy and support for the MPJD 
among bishops from Estado de México were found in The Messenger (El Mensajero), a 
regional Catholic biweekly magazine (Number 47, March of 2010; Number 54 June of 2010; 
Numbers 55 and 56, July of 2010; and Number 74, April of 2011). Additionally, between 
2007 and 2011, there were 12 priests and 2 seminarians murdered in violence related events 
(Excélsior, July 14 of 2011, front page), whereas between 2000 and 2006, “only” four priests 
were killed (Catholic Multimedia Center 2012).92   
 
 
 
                                               
91 Additional information about the MPJD and some MPJD leaders, such as Javier Sicilia, a poet who lost his 
son; and Julián Lebarón from Chihuahua’s Mormon community, who lost his brother, available at: 
http://movimientoporlapaz.mx/  
92 The Catholic Multimedia Center states that Mexico is 160 percent more dangerous place for priest to work in 
2011 when compared to 2006. Between 1990 and 2012, 36 percent of attacks took place inside of parishes, 27 
percent on the street, and 24 percent were kidnappings in which religious personnel were clearly identified, and 
13 percent unrelated to religious functions. Reports available at: 
http://www.ccm.org.mx/principal/portal/noticia.php?id=2848  
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Graph 8.3. Bishops Messages by Quarter, Mexico 2008 – 2011. 
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In sum, although there are variations on what messages the church decide to 
emphasize, the church messages about the drug war, violence, and migration related events 
were much more prevalent in Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Durango, Guanajuato, Michoacán, 
Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas when compared to other states. The quarterly distribution of 
the church messages is pictured in Graph 8.3.  
 
The Religious Links 
 
There are two main links between the sacred world and Catholic parishioners. First, 
frequent church attendance, in which the Catholic Church plays the role of mediator through 
clergy within the community. Thus, parishioners meet each other, and they meet the clergy 
when attending to religious services.  Second, the devotional linking individuals and sacred 
entities, such as God, the Virgin, and saints, in which people pray and ask for protection and 
benefits (Ribeiro de Oliveira 1970; Velázquez 1975; Hagopian 2009). Both links church 
attendance and the devotional link are deeply rooted among popular expressions of religiosity 
across Latin America (Quiroz 1993), especially in countries in which the Catholic Church 
has experienced different forms of syncretism through the indigenous way of “doing and 
being” a local church (Sobrino 2008).93  
Church attendance and devotional links are important because these linkages could 
help people cope with adverse events, essentially encouraging them, giving new perspectives, 
                                               
93 This chapter only analyzes Catholic parishioners due to the novel nature of the church messages about the 
drug war. Although it is plausible to hypothesize about other religions, I have no evidence about what specific 
messages were disseminated among Protestant and Evangelical churches. Drawing from informal 
communications with the Minister of the Interior (SEGOB), who was also in charge of church-state relations 
(personal communications with Alejandro Poiré in April 22, May 20, and June 18 of 2012), it seems that some 
Protestant churches were in favor of the drug war strategy. Actually, in preliminary models (not shown) those 
who belong to Evangelical churches were in fact more likely to positively evaluate the drug war results. My 
research in this dissertation however is not able to elaborate specific hypotheses regarding other religions. 
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hope, and support during difficult times (Mainwaring 1986; Scheve and Stasavage 2006a; 
2006b; Daniels and von der Ruhr 2005; Hagopian 2008).  At the core of this perspective is 
the notion that religious factors, such as religious links can provide a type of new 
understanding when people are facing hard times.  
 
Different religious teachings prepare people for a variety of ways to face challenging 
times. On the one hand, this research evaluates whether the church’s anti-violence messages 
are associated to religious parishioners’ attitudes toward the drug war. This is particularly 
acute when taking into account variation among violent environments across states. 
Therefore, if church attendance does provide parishioners’ critical views when coping with 
violence, we then should find all else equal that those who participate in religious life should 
be less supportive (i.e. in a critical way) of the drug war than those who do not.  
 
In addition, church attendance is in line with the casual mechanisms previously 
discussed, due to the fact that attendance to religious services is a vehicle to receive the 
church messages, and then, church attendance may reflect the effect of the church messages 
among parishioners. Empirical analyses however, only can assume associations between 
messages and parishioners’ attitudes, rather than causality, as explained in previous chapters.  
 
Hypotheses and Methods 
 
Regarding church attendance, if church messages about the drug war are prevalent, 
and the faithful regularly attend to religious services, then one should find that religious 
parishioners’ attitudes and the Catholic Church critical messages about violence might be 
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associated. In particular, it is plausible to suppose that religious Catholics parishioners who 
attend mass on regular basis are less likely to support the drug war. In other words, those 
who receive church messages about violence are more likely to express their dissent 
regarding the drug war. These critical attitudes are associated to the church messages, in 
which some bishops have expressed concerns in relation to the dismantled social fabric, lack 
of victims’ protection, collateral damages, and social disintegration in general (CEM 2009; 
2010).94  
 
In addition, when violent contexts are considered, those parishioners who weekly 
attend to church and face violent contexts are less likely to support the drug war, in 
comparison to those who do not attend church and also face violent contexts. From the 
theoretical discussion three hypotheses for Catholic parishioners emerge: 
 
H1: Those who regularly attend church are less likely to support results from the drug war.  
H2: Those who face violent contexts are less likely to support results from the drug war. 
H3: Those who regularly attend church and face violent contexts are less likely to support 
results from the drug war. 
 
The ENVUD survey provides me an opportunity to measure religious attitudes 
toward evaluations of the drug war.  The surveys were conducted in November of 2010 using 
                                               
94 When doing research in the library of Mexico City Diocesan Seminary, an important adviser of Cardinal 
Rivera explained to me “we do not know whether the government should fight drug trafficking in some specific 
ways, all we know is that this way is not the way to do it”, unofficial and unrecorded comment, September 21st 
of 2012. 
185 
 
a representative sampling design at the state level. The survey, designed to capture citizens’ 
values, beliefs, and social attitudes included 15,910 face-to-face interviews.95  
 
In order to understand factors underlying citizens’ religious attitudes toward the drug 
war, I model citizens’ answers the following question: “How much success is having the 
government in the fight about drug trafficking?” measured using a 10-point scale.  This 
answer is used in the models as the dependent variable to examine religious, demographic, 
ideological, and contextual predictors of perceptions over the drug war among Catholic 
respondents. 
 
The main variables of interest are church attendance, and a contextual measure at the 
state level, the number of homicides presumably related to the drug war, standardized by 
100,000 inhabitants (Office of the President 2011). . In addition, there are other relevant 
religious variables, such as the importance of the Virgin of Guadalupe, the importance of 
God, and trust in the church. Demographic variables such as gender, urban dwellers, years of 
schooling, age in years, unemployed, self-reported class, regions,96 and whether respondents 
                                               
95 The 2010 ENVUD surveys come from a collective effort among different polling firms, Banamex, Fundación 
Este País, and private sponsors. Principal investigators: Alberto Gómez, Federico Reyes Heroles and Alejandro 
Moreno. The ENVUD Executive Board: Albo, Beltrán, Berumen, Bohórquez, Estévez, Iglesias, Ruvalcaba, and 
Zavala. Polling firms: IPSOS-BIMSA in Baja California, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Colima, Distrito 
Federal, Durango, Guerrero and Oaxaca; MERCAEI in Nayarit, Nuevo León, Querétaro, Sinaloa, Sonora, 
Tabasco, Tamaulipas and Veracruz; NODO-WMC in Campeche, Chiapas, Estado de México, Hidalgo, Jalisco, 
San Luis Potosí, Tlaxcala and Zacatecas; and PEARSON in Aguascalientes, Chihuahua, Guanajuato, 
Michoacán, Morelia, Puebla, Quintana Roo and Yucatán.  BERUMEN dealt with sampling design and data 
validation. Survey information available at: 
http://www.banamex.com/en/conoce_banamex/quienes_somos/prensa/2011/29_septiembre.htm  and 
http://estepais.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Banamex.pdf  
96 Regions are defined as follows: North is comprised of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Sonora, Baja 
California, Baja California Sur, Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosí, Durango, Sinaloa and Zacatecas. South is 
comprised of Campeche, Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Yucatán, Oaxaca, Guerrero and Veracruz. West is 
comprised of Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nayarit, Colima, Aguascalientes, and Michoacán, whereas the Central region 
is comprised of Hidalgo, México, Morelos, Puebla, Querétaro, Tlaxcala, and Mexico City. The Central region 
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have relatives in the US are included as control variables (Dell 2011; Romero, Magaloni and 
Díaz-Cayeros 2012). 
 
The model also includes variables that represent ideology, TV news consumption, 
Internet usage, trust in the Army, and the amount of interpersonal trust (Romero, Magaloni 
and Díaz-Cayeros 2012). There are also three variables that measure predicted vote choice: 
null/blank vote, voting for the National Action Party (PAN), and voting for the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), in which voting for the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) is 
the reference category.97   In order to take into account the different effects of covariance 
between levels, states and Catholic respondents, I estimated hierarchical linear models. 
 
Religiosity and Violence: Empirical Associations 
 
In order to assess the impact of religious variables on the support for the drug war, 
this section analyzes results from hierarchical linear models explaining evaluations about the 
drug war among Catholics. There are three models. The first one is a baseline model, as 
shown in Graph 8.4. The second one is a baseline model with random effects, as shown in 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the North are the only regions in which the mean value of the dependent variable is statistically different: 
Central 5.5 (5.4-5.6) and North 5.8 (5.7-5.9). 
97 Due to endogenous covariates, in which demographics and cognitive variables explain vote choice, I 
estimated logistic vote choice models in order to obtain predicted values, and I used these predicted values as 
vote choice variables in the following hierarchical models, which are a sort of second stage. The main challenge 
when estimating an instrumental variable regression in two separated stages is that standard errors tend to be 
higher than those standard errors estimated in a joint two stages model. For the sake of simplicity, I ran this 
conservative and simpler way of instrumented vote choice at the individual level, using the predicted values in 
the following hierarchical models. Instruments were partisanship, sociotropic and idiotropic evaluations of the 
economy, interest in politics, interest in elections, and perceptions over income inequality, state ownership, and 
attitudes toward gay marriage. Correlations among voting for the PAN, and the PRI and Null/Blank and their 
predicted values were 0.14, 0.17, and 0.16 respectively. 
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Graph 8.5, and the third model is an interactive model between the two main variables of 
interest, church attendance and homicides related to the drug war, as shown in Graph 8.6. 
 
Results from the baseline model, pictured in Graph 8.4 suggest that church attendance 
decreases support for the drug war, arguably due to the association between church critical 
messages about violence and frequent exposure of these messages through attendance to 
religious services.   
 
 
  
188 
 
 
 
 
Graph 8.4. Government Leads the Drug War, 2010, Baseline Model. Source: Author’s 
estimations based on the 2010 ENVUD surveys. Hierarchical linear model, first level: 10,791 
Catholic respondents, and second level: drug war homicides in 32 states. Variance intercept 
0.089 (0.025), and variance residual 0.896 (0.012). Log-likelihood=-14847.5. Vote choice 
variables are predicted values. Model estimated using R 2.14 via library (lme4). Dependent 
variable is who’s leading the war, the government or drug traffickers, using a 10 point scale. 
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Regarding citizens’ positive evaluations about the drug war, respondents who live in 
rural places, belong to the wealthy, trust in the TV,98 those who are ideologically placed on 
the right-of-center, and vote for the PAN (predicted values) are more likely to support the 
drug war. In contrast, urban dwellers, educated respondents, those who vote in blank or 
nullify their vote (predicted values), those who support the PRI (predicted values), and those 
who live in states in which there is a higher number of drug war related homicides, all those 
respondents are less likely to report the federal government leads the war. 
 
It is noteworthy to mention that church attendance is the only religious variable 
negatively related to Catholic parishioners’ perceptions about the drug war.99 This finding is 
associated to the church messages, in which clergy alert about some immediate negative 
consequences of the drug war strategy.  Although further examination is required in order to 
fully verify all the possible reasons behind this effect, one plausible explanation refers to the 
socialization of clergy messages among Catholic parishioners through church attendance, and 
preliminary evidence seems to support this notion.  Thus, there are reasons to believe that 
                                               
98 Due to informal changes in how TV, radio, and newspapers uncovered the drug war in 2010, and the 
formalization of these changes through the “Agreement to Uncover Violence” signed by the government and 
more than 50 mass media companies, such as TV channels, radio broadcasters, newspapers, and magazines in 
March 24 of 2011, it is plausible to expect that TV news consumption increases positive perceptions over the 
drug war. The aforementioned agreement formalized practices widely observed since the early 2010, such as 
neither making the narco leaders victims nor heroes; avoiding to become unintended spokespersons of the drug 
cartels; establishing precise criteria to define whether the mass media should disseminate violent images; 
avoiding easy judgments over people under arrest due to presumption of innocence, a principle in which people 
are innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt; avoiding reporters’ presence in highly violent regions; 
and maintaining confidentially of all victims’ personal identity, especially minors (as defined by Mexico’s laws, 
the age of majority is 18). All the aforementioned points arguably diminish the TV negative impact.  
99 Preliminary models (not shown) included respondents’ opinions about whether religion unites people, and 
whether God will provide. These variables were positively and significantly related to the drug war support 
among Catholics, and God will provide was particularly significant among Protestants.  
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such association between church messages against the drug war and parishioners’ continuous 
exposition to the message is likely to exist.100 
 
In order to test whether church attendance varies from state to state, a new 
hierarchical linear model was estimated replicating the baseline model, just adding random 
effects. In particular, church attendance, ideology, and the vote choice variables were 
modeled as random. Results suggests that only null/blank vote choice shows significant 
variation across states, then vote for the PAN, and for the PRI, whereas the variance of 
random coefficients for church attendance and ideology was narrow, as shown in Graph 8.5. 
 
This little variance suggests that the effect of the variables modeled as random on 
support for the drug war is reasonably similar across states and little is gained by modeling 
random coefficients for these variables (Hill and Gelman 2006).101  In other words, church 
attendance behaves in similar ways across states, suggesting that religious Catholic 
parishioners are relatively equally exposed to religious frames. 
 
  
                                               
100 Additional models (not shown) included an alternative contextual measure, the index of visible and invisible 
victims of crime (IVVI), which is a weighted index of the number of crimes and felonies standardized by state 
population and households’ size. Felonies and crimes are comprised of homicides, kidnappings, extortion, and 
violent robbery (México Evalúa 2011: 90-91). The IVVI effects are similar to the impact of the drug war 
homicides, a more intuitive measure of violence at the state level. Alternative models (not shown) also included 
the percentage of Evangelical adherents at the state level (INEGI 2011), inequality measures, such as the Gini 
coefficient at the state level, which comes from the 2008 household surveys as estimated by CONEVAL (2010); 
and the poverty index based on possession of goods from 2005 (CONEVAL 2010). These contextual 
socioeconomic measures were statistically unrelated to citizens’ attitudes toward the drug war in 2010.  
101 Additional models included several random coefficients, such as importance of the Virgin (0.004) and trust 
in TV (0.025). The variance of these random slopes was too narrow to keep modeling in that way. 
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Graph 8.5. Government Leads the Drug War, 2010, Baseline Model with Random Effects.  
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The third model tests whether violent contexts across states increase or mitigate the 
impact of religious variables, and then interaction terms between the drug war homicides and 
church attendance were included in a new model, as shown in Graph 8.6.  The interaction 
term between church attendance and homicides related to the drug war is statistically 
significant. 
 
Findings from Graph 8.6 suggest that those Catholics who attend church and live in 
violent states are less likely to support the drug war when compared to those Catholics who 
do not go to church and also live in violent states. This finding refers to a relationship 
between violence levels and variations in the Church’s message –in high violence states 
where the church and/or its faithful was threatened its message was much more negative 
toward the government- suggesting that those who attend church were following the church’s 
message. 
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Graph 8.6. Government Leads the Drug War, 2010, Interactive Model. Author’s estimations 
based on the 2010 ENVUD surveys. Hierarchical linear model, first level: 10,791 Catholic 
respondents, and second level: drug war homicides in 32 states. Log-likelihood=-14845.7. 
Variance intercept 0.089 (0.025), and variance residual 0.896 (0.012). Vote choice variables 
are predicted values. Model estimated using R 2.14 via library (lme4). Dependent variable is 
who’s leading the war, the government or drug traffickers, using a 10 point scale. 
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One plausible reason behind this finding is related to the critical tone of the church 
messages regarding the drug war, messages received by parishioners who are continuously 
exposed to these messages and fueled by the rate of homicides. Overall, these results suggest 
religious variables play a different role when analyzing the support for the drug war. The 
devotional link through spiritual needs among the faithful, that is, the importance of the 
Virgin has no effect on support for the drug war, whereas church attendance (arguably in 
association with the church message) is associated with a lower public’ support for the drug 
war, even in violent contexts, as shown in Graph 8.7.  In other words, the violent context and 
church attendance seem to be related to the church message.  
 
Finally, church attendance among Catholics seems to capture the notion of vehicle for 
the church messages as hypothesized in this research, in which attendance to religious 
services is negatively associated to support for the drug war. This difference seems to 
reinforce the claim that attendance is a vehicle for messages rather than just being a religious 
dimension in the vacuum (Harris-Lacewell 2007; Smith 2008). 
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Graph 8.7. Government Leads the Drug War, 2010, Predicted Values. Source Graph 8.7, 
lines are 95 percent confidence intervals among Catholic respondents. Simulations estimated 
using R 2.14 through library (Zelig), version 3.5 (Imai, King, and Lau 2008). Dependent 
variable is who’s leading the war, the government or drug traffickers, using a 10 point scale. 
 
In sum, it is noteworthy to remark that the statistical differences between the high 
church attendance group in high and low violence contexts, as shown in Graph 8.7. This 
suggests that highly religious people arguably differ in their views on the drug war depending 
on the violence context/message they are receiving.    
Effects of Religiosity and Drug War Homicides, 
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Alternative Rival Hypothesis 
 
Regarding devotional links between parishioners and sacred entities, generally 
speaking, Protestant and Evangelical churches do not provide ties to specific sacred entities, 
such as the different Catholic representations of the Virgin and saints do. Thus, a central 
difference between Catholics and non-Catholics around the globe is the popular devotion to 
the Virgin, particularly in Mexico the popular devotion to the Virgin of Guadalupe.  Religion 
and politics literature states that the Virgin is the main distinction in any market segmentation 
strategy among the Catholic (Charismatic) and the Evangelical (Pentecostal) churches when 
competing for the religious market in the poorest neighbors of Latin America (Chesnut 2002).  
In this way, those individuals who belong to the Evangelical churches do not consider the 
Virgin as an important sacred entity when compared to Catholics.102  
 
In the Catholic context, the Virgin of Guadalupe or also called Lady of Guadalupe 
represents a protector of the Mexican people. People believe that she played this role over the 
indigenous people during the colonial period, when the majority of Catholic evangelization 
took place.  This exploitation of converts was due to encomiendas, in which indigenous 
people were entrusted to a Spanish Lord who, in exchange for work, supposedly evangelized 
the natives. The Lady of Guadalupe played a similar role during Mexico’s independence war, 
                                               
102 In the Mexican context, the Virgin of Guadalupe is an important sacred entity. Old and new records state that 
she appear on December 12 of 1531, on Tepeyac Hill, just ten years later the Spaniards came to Mexico, 
according to the Nahuatl chronicle titled Nican Mopohua and the official version of the Catholic Church, in 
which twenty-five Popes have directly or indirectly approved the apparitions (Liederbach 1977: 36). As Fr. 
Francisco de Florencia first and Pope Benedict XIV latter said “She has not done this for any other nation” (Non 
fecit taliter omni nationi, Ps 147, 20). Thus, the Virgin of Guadalupe seems to represent a crucial element 
among Mexican Catholic believers even today. Actually, the Virgin of Guadalupe holds the title of Mexico’s 
Saint Patron and Empress of the Americas, titles granted through continuous intercession of Fathers Juan 
Francisco López in 1754, and Esteban Antícoli in 1894, and Pontiffs Benedict XIV, Leo XIII, and Pio XII 
(Velázquez 1975; Liederbach 1977). 
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particularly as the symbol of the Mexican essence and identity. She reappeared again during 
the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917) and the Cristero war, a popular uprising against 
President Calles’ anti-church policies (1926-1929), and still represents an important national 
identity role among Mexicans in the US (Velázquez 1975; Moreno 2005).103  In sum, it is 
reasonable to assume that many Catholics in Mexico perceive the Virgin as a protector, not 
exactly because she protects the people from the powerful, but because she offers support, 
comfort, and hope during hard times, even across social classes (Paz 1950; Fuentes 1992).104  
 
Although doctrinally the importance of the Virgin should be the same for all Catholic 
believers, the mediation role of the Virgin in her role of Guadalupe is also related to 
Mexicans’ collective imagination. The popular role assigned to the Virgin by the people 
entails asking for divine protection through standard and miraculous actions of the sacred 
entities, i.e. asking for the Virgin’s intercession in times of trouble (Ribeiro de Oliveira 1970, 
Velázquez 1975; Chesnut 2002).105  In short, devotional links between parishioners and 
sacred entities, such as the Virgin of Guadalupe, are associated to attitudes among Catholics 
                                               
103 In order to enforce the anti-church policies, Calles expelled bishops and priests, such as Bishop Manríquez, 
because he called “unconstitutional” all these policies in his pastoral letter issued in March 10 of 1926. Calles 
imposed an anticlerical law, and sponsored a “Mexican Catholic Church” using federal funding. Mexico’s 
bishops however did not take any leading role when compared to other actors, such as the National League in 
Defense of Freedom of Religion, or peasants, workers, and the rank and file citizens from the Bajío and other 
states, who fought the federal government because the high clergy went on strike, closing churches, and then, 
provoking the impossibility of getting confessions, communions or a simply celebration of mass. These 
peasants, in name of Christ the King (that’s why people called them cristeros) fought the federal forces from 
1926 to 1929, when the concordat between the government and the church finally took place (Meyer 1973). 
104 The exemplary lines of the Nican Mopohua in this regard are widely cited “For am I not here, I, your mother? 
Are you not in the cool of my shadow? in the breeziness of my shade?” (Nican Mopohua 1565: num. 119). 
105 From a Catholic theoretical and theological account, the Virgin is the Mother of God who intercedes for her 
children, and expressed her preference for the Mexican people with the special appearance of Guadalupe, 
whereas from an empirical account (not shown) employing indicators linking people and the sacred world 
reveal that church attendees, those who believe that God will provide, and those who trust in the church are 
positively related to the importance of the Virgin, whereas secularization measures have a negative effect, such 
as education levels, urban dwellers, and those who hold access to digital technology, such as cell phones, 
internet, and web-based social networks as facebook and twitter, as revealed by the 2010 ENVUD surveys. 
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toward the drug war, due to Virgin’s protection rather than associated to church critical 
messages about violence derived from the drug war.  
 
In sum, if church attendance does not explain Catholic parishioners’ attitudes toward 
the drug war, then, one could find that the devotional link, through the relationships between 
parishioners and sacred entities may explain attitudes among Catholics toward the drug war, 
due to the divine protection asked by the faithful to the Virgin. In this scenario, there are no 
church messages that explain opposition to the drug war, just the potential cushion or coping 
effect, in which people ask for divine protection, trying to find support when everything else 
falls apart (Scheve and Stasavage 2006a; 2006b). 
 
Verifying that the positive effect of the devotional link on support for the drug war 
only takes place when parishioners attend to church on frequent basis, (and then, they are 
more exposed to the church critical messages about violence), it requires a different 
specification. A series of robustness checks emerge from hierarchical models. The first one 
refers to the interaction term between importance of the Virgin and the drug war homicides, 
as shown in Graph 8.8. Results suggest that the devotional link (the importance of the Virgin) 
has no effect on support for the drug war, whereas church attendance in association with the 
church message decreases support for the drug war even in violent contexts.    
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Graph 8.8. Government Leads the Drug War, 2010, Virgin of Guadalupe Model. Author’s 
estimations based on the 2010 ENVUD surveys. Hierarchical linear model, first level: 10,791 
Catholic respondents, and second level: drug war homicides in 32 states. Log-likelihood=-
14847.0 Variance intercept 0.089 (0.025), and variance residual 0.895 (0.012). Vote choice 
variables are predicted values. Models estimated using R 2.14 via library (lme4). Dependent 
variable is who’s leading the war, the government or drug traffickers, using a 10 point scale. 
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The second robustness check refers to the impact of the importance of the Virgin on 
attitudes toward the drug war across five different subsamples of levels of church attendance, 
as shown in Table 8.1. In particular, among those parishioners who almost never or not very 
often go to church, the importance of the Virgin of Guadalupe increases support for the drug 
war, as shown in the first two rows of Table 8.1, whereas among parishioners who attend on 
regular basis, the importance of the Virgin is negative.  
 
This suggests that for those parishioners who are less likely to receive the church 
critical messages about violence, due to their almost null attendance to religious services, 
their support for the drug war comes from the devotional link: the divine protection of the 
Virgin. In contrast, those parishioners who are more likely to receive the church messages 
because their weekly attendance to religious services, they are less likely to support the drug 
war precisely because of church attendance. Finally, it is noteworthy to mention that among 
parishioners who attend to church on monthly and weekly bases, there is no impact of the 
importance of the Virgin.  
 
 
Church Attendance  
(Subsamples) 
 
Importance of the Virgin 
            Coeff               Std Err 
 
N 
 
Log-likelihood 
 
Almost never 0.16 0.06 *** 624 -1473 
Less often 0.07 0.03 ** 2605 -5931 
Month 0.02 0.03  2333 -5178 
Week -0.03 0.03  4434 -10107 
Week + -0.20 0.07 *** 795 -1831 
 
Table 8.1. Importance of the Virgin on Support for the Drug War, among Catholics by Levels 
of Church Attendance, 2010. Source: Author’s estimations of subsamples using hierarchical 
lineal models, full models not shown. Dependent variable is who’s leading the drug war. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
During these violent times, several academic explanations about popular perceptions 
about government’ security policies deal with the role played by the social context, and the 
effects of the mass media on citizens’ perceptions. In particular, scholars have suggested that 
these explanations are primarily contextual, such as where people live, demographic 
characteristics, and now, individual religious values. This chapter examined how religious 
attitudes at the individual level and contextual measures of violence at the state level are 
associated to devout parishioners’ attitudes toward the current drug war.  
 
Overall, religious factors play a relevant role when explaining attitudes toward the 
drug war strategy. These findings suggest that religious people are less supportive of 
government’s actions over the drug war. Religious attitudes are particularly remarkable 
among those who frequently attend to church when considering violent states, whereas 
people seeking for Virgin’s protection during violent times are unrelated to support for the 
drug war.106  
 
Further theoretical and empirical work is required in order to fully explain all the 
reasons behind different effects of some religious variables regarding drug war perceptions. 
This research proposes a plausible explanation, in which religious socialization through 
                                               
106 It should be noted that importance of the Virgin does not explain support for additional public policies, such 
as whether government should fight unemployment as the top priority, perceptions over income inequality at the 
state, and at the municipal levels, and support for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) when 
estimating hierarchical models (not shown) using the 2005 poverty index and the 2008 Gini index. Importance 
of the Virgin in fact is statistically unrelated to these policies but it is highly related to citizens’ attitudes toward 
the drug war in one specific way: whether the drug war should be at the top of the national agenda (model not 
shown). 
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church attendance explains the negative effect of attendance to religious services on support 
for the drug war. It might be fueled by bishops and clergy messages through pastoral letters 
and sermons, in which particularly Catholic clergy alert about the immediate negative 
consequences of this federal security policy, such as Catholic Church critical messages and 
some Catholic bishops’ endorsement of Javier Sicilia’s movement (MPJD) can exemplify. 
 
Additional examination is also definitively required in order to refine explanations 
about mechanisms of socialization among Protestant and Evangelical parishioners, such as 
church attendance, and mechanisms of personal religiosity, in particular personal 
relationships between religious individuals’ attitudes and sacred entities. In this regard, this 
research suggests that results derived from Catholics may be applied to Evangelical and 
Protestant churches when church attendance is associated to parishioners’ attitudes toward 
the drug war. 
 
There are however other views about the role of the Catholic Church during the drug 
war, such as the so-called church-narco ties, when from unexplained sources presumable 
narco parishioners make generous donations, as a myriad of journalists have elsewhere 
reported regarding Juárez and Tijuana cartels. Thus, the church opposition to the drug war 
strategy, some may argue, comes from the impossibility of getting these donations if the 
federal government defeats cartels.107  
 
                                               
107 One among many examples can be found at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-churchs-
ambiguous-role-in-mexico-drug-violence  
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Although there are reasons to believe that in some specific and particular situations 
this would be the case, this argument does not explain why there is a church’s opposition to 
the drug war when there are no generous narco donations. The underlying assumption in this 
chapter is that religious attitudes in violent environments are insightful variables to explain 
parishioners’ attitudes toward the drug war, such as whether the government or the drug 
traffickers are leading the war. 
 
In sum, one view is that people can become submissive when religion takes place, 
and then, religious people are more likely to support public policies carry out by the national 
government, even when different political elites negatively evaluate such policies, 
particularly drug war policies. In contrast, an opposite view could propose that religious 
factors increase citizens’ feelings of disenfranchisement during violent times, and religious 
factors help people to critically evaluate some of the negative consequences of violent times 
through clergy criticism within their communities of faith.  
 
Although either view requires further theoretical and empirical analyses, a 
preliminary conclusion from this research suggests that Mexico’s Catholic parishioners 
employ their religious communities, in order to critically evaluate the drug war via Catholic 
clergy. In sum, the so-called religious submissiveness is not necessarily the best mechanism 
in order to explain support for the drug war, due to the critical religious attitudes arguably 
derived from the church critiques regarding the consequences of the drug war, captured by 
the association between the church critical messages about violence and parishioners’ 
attendance to religious services.      
204 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
RELIGIOSITY, DEMOCRACY, MORAL VALUES, AND THE DRUG WAR 
 
In this final empirical chapter, I look next at the role of the Church in shaping 
attitudes toward gay marriage, support for democracy, and Mexico’s drug war. I find 
evidence that supports those findings of the eighth chapter that highlight an important role for 
the Church, and its various subnational messages, in influencing the political and social 
attitudes of the highly religious. Using data from an entirely different research project, as 
well as slightly different measures of my key concepts, the fact that I find parallel findings to 
those of the seventh and eighth chapters further bolsters my claim that subnational variations 
in the Church’s message are meaningful and have an impact on the ways that Mexicans think 
about political issues and interact with their political system. Though still not conclusive, 
cross-sectional research can rarely achieve that status, the combination of these results at a 
minimum gives impetus for further pursuit of the question of the Church’s role in politics at 
the subnational level. With this final section I complete the chain of theoretical connections 
between the subnational messages of bishops across Mexico to the ultimate effect these 
different messages may have on Mexicans who attend church on a regular basis and view the 
Catholic faith as an integral part of their spiritual and social lives.   
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The Church Messages 
 
Religious frames, which are roughly defined as bishops’ emphasis on one topic while 
de-emphasizing another one, are relevant from a public opinion perspective because 
“theological understandings are not simply private opinions, they represent potentially 
influential public opinions as well” (Harris-Lacewell 2007: 157). In this way, the detailed 
mechanism that this chapter will test, using the 2010 AmericasBarometer data, may offer 
better insights into these effects, employing three categories of church messages, about 
politics, moral values, and violence, and three individual level attitudes toward democracy, 
gay marriage, and the drug war, respectively, always considering that church messages are 
more likely to influence those parishioners who attend services frequently and accept the 
church teachings (Smith 2008: 25). 
 
During recent years, there is variance across Mexico regarding what topics bishops 
decide to emphasize in their own dioceses, meaning that there are variations about the 
messages that the Catholic Church decide to emphasize: messages about politics, moral 
values, or social issues (violence). In fact, from 2008 to 2011, 12 percent of church messages 
were about politics, 7 percent about moral issues, and 39 percent of church messages were 
about social issues.108  I analyze the subnational impact of three types of church messages, as 
shown in Graph 9.1.109 
                                               
108 The remaining 42 percent of messages were about the church internal organization. 
109 List of states in which bishops preached about democracy between 2008 and the first quarter of 2010, prior 
to the 2010 AmericasBarometer Surveys were administered: Baja California (2), Chiapas (7), Coahuila (5), 
Federal District (9), Guanajuato (11), Jalisco (14), México (15), Oaxaca (20), Sinaloa (25), and Sonora (26). 
States in which bishops preached about moral values: Aguascalientes (1), Baja California, Baja California Sur 
(3), Campeche (4), Chiapas, Federal District, Durango (10), Jalisco, Nayarit (18, not surveyed), Oaxaca, Puebla 
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Graph 9.1. Bishops Messages across States, Mexico 2008 – 2010.  
                                                                                                                                                 
(21), Veracruz (30), Yucatán (31), and Zacatecas (32). States in which bishops preached about social issues: 
Baja California, Chiapas, Chihuahua (8), Coahuila, Federal District, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero (12), 
Jalisco, México, Michoacán (16), Nuevo León (19), Oaxaca, Puebla, Querétaro (22), Quintana Roo (23), 
Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tamaulipas (28). Other states are Colima (6), Hidalgo (13), Morelos (17), San Luis Potosí 
(24), Tabasco (27), Tlaxcala (29) 
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In the fourth and seventh chapters, I detailed church messages about politics, and in 
the fourth and eight chapters, I discussed church messages about social issues, such as 
violence. Now, I will briefly discuss church messages about moral values during recent years. 
The Conference of Mexican Bishops issued eight collective documents between 1968 and 
1995 about birth control and abortion (Soriano 1999: 307-310), whereas in five years, 
between 2000 and 2005, the Mexican episcopacy issued the same number of collective 
documents about abortion and gay marriage (Hagopian 2009a: 318). Moreover, just 
considering gay-rights debates, there were around 15 documents issued by different Bishops 
in their own dioceses during the 2003 midterm elections (Díaz-Domínguez 2006a). 
 
Religious leaders, in particular Catholic bishops, expressed their full opposition to 
abortion and gay rights in Sunday sermons and public official statements.110  Regarding the 
2009-2010 recent debate about gay rights, Mexico City’s Cardinal continuously expressed 
his rejection to gay marriage and gay adoption during Sunday masses celebrated in Mexico 
City Cathedral.111  The clearest example was his sermon delivered in December 27 of 2009 
                                               
110 A previous moral values debate among political and church leaders also started in Mexico City during March 
and April of 2007 regarding abortion rights, in which the leftist PRD passed a bill in April 24 of 2007 
decriminalizing abortion for the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. One and half year later, the Mexican Supreme 
Court upheld Mexico City’s law in August 28 of 2008. Political reactions came from one half of Mexico’s 
states, in which 17 states amended their constitutions to explicitly protect the right of life from the very 
conception and actively enforce the law persecuting women who had abortions, besides some exemptions, such 
as rape, pregnant woman at risk, and product at risk. The explicit pro-life states that amended state constitutions 
were Baja California, Morelos, and Sonora in 2008; in 2009 Campeche, Chiapas, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, 
Jalisco, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Puebla, Querétaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosí, and Yucatán, a state in which 
women living in poverty with three or more kids are not persecuted when having abortions; and Tamaulipas in 
2010 (GIRE 2011). In sum, moral values debates in Mexico such as abortion and gay rights arguably became 
salient and relevant for political and church leaders. 
111 In recent years, Mexico has been involved in a vibrant moral values debate, in which the Mexican Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of abortion rights and gay marriage and adoption legislation that had been passed in 
Mexico City in 2007 and 2009 (court cases 146 and 147/2007 and 2/2010). Prior to the Supreme Court 2008 
and 2010 decisions, debates among political leaders, journalists, and churches’ leaders dominated discourse on 
the issues of abortion and gay marriage and gay adoption. The debate among political leaders was centered 
between the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD), a leftist party that supported abortion and gay rights, and the 
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(New York Times, February 6, 2010). Another example was his sermon preached in August 8 
of 2010 (New York Times, August 10, 2010). Actually, during January and February of 2010 
different bishops expressed their rejection, such as Guadalajara’s Cardinal and Ecatepec’s 
Bishop, and finally, the Conference of Mexican Bishops also expressed its rejection in two 
official press releases issued in December 24 of 2009, and January 19 of 2010. In sum, 
relevant factions of the Catholic Church in Mexico, and arguably across Latin America 
(Hagopian 2009; Díaz-Domínguez 2013) have preferred to emphasize moral values 
messages.112 
 
Mexico has never been a country where progressive attitudes toward homosexuality 
have been prominent. But since 1981, popular attitudes toward homosexuality steadily 
improved until 2005, as shown in Graph 9.2. In 1981, the percentage of respondents’ 
completely rejecting homosexuality was around 70 percent, while in 2005 that percentage 
had fallen to 35 points. In 2012 however, the percentage of strong opponents had risen to 40 
points, a trend that is echoed in data from the 2010 and 2012 Mexican samples of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
National Action Party (PAN), a right-of-center party that rejected abortion and gay rights. A mixed position was 
presented by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), arguably placed on the right-of-center, which 
supported gay marriage but did not define a clear position regarding abortion and gay adoption (Mexican 
Supreme Court 2010: 75). 
112 Prevalence of moral values messages does not mean that the church is only preaching against abortion or 
gay rights, this means that relevant factions of the Church in Mexico, from Cardinals to new bishops among 
other important segments of the Catholic clergy spent time emphasizing a moral values agenda at the national 
and at the subnational level over other topics, in line with a conservative taste that emerged during the last 20 
years from the church’s relevant factions in Rome (Peritore 1989; Boff 1996; Grassi 2003, Cleary 2009; 
Hagopian 2009a). It should be noted that the general effect of religion on politics could be dated to the late 
1970s, in which attendance to religious groups was positively associated to citizens’ democratic voice in the 
North of Mexico. Particularly during the 1980s the church messages about turnout and electoral frauds were 
highly important for the Catholic Church (Molinar 1987, Chand 2001). Actually, during the 1980s the Mexican 
church’s concerns were mainly related to economic crisis and free and fair elections (Camp 1997; Soriano 1999; 
Chand 2001). In contrast, a moral values agenda started to gain some strength at the local and at the national 
level during the 1990s, especially during the first years of president Salinas’s administration (1988-1994), in 
which churches received constitutional and legal recognition (Lamadrid 1994; Gill 1999). Indeed, during the 
first years of Salinas’ sexenio, one half of the Catholic clergy believed that Bishops should make additional 
efforts in order to promote moral values in opposition to government’s policies (Luengo 1992: 227). 
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AmericasBarometer surveys.113 The question here, however, is the role the Church has 
played in shaping this attitudinal profile of Mexicans and whether this role varies across 
Mexico. 
 
Though difficult to fully establish a causal connection between the Church’s 
messages and Mexicans’ attitudes toward homosexuality, there are good reasons to believe 
that the Church’s recent long-running campaign against gay rights has at least reinforced 
popular attitudes toward homosexuality among some segments of the religious public.  The 
aforementioned trend becomes relevant because one may argue that the baseline of 
homosexuality’s rejection was declining across time, and then, the argument would go, 
religious messages help very little when shaping parishioners attitudes toward homosexuality, 
due to citizens’ openness and secularization, gradually ignoring religious principles. The 
general trend however suggests a different story.  
 
Across time, a decreasing “never justifiable” category certainly suggests growing 
levels of tolerance among Mexico’s citizens and the ineffectiveness of the Church’s message 
as Mexico became more and more open to the influx of more cosmopolitan values (at least 
regarding homosexuality) from the U.S. and Europe. The recent rise in anti-homosexual 
                                               
113 Using question V197 of the 1981 WVS; question F118 of the 1990, 1996 and 2000 WVS; and question P202 
of the 2005 WVS reveals a downward overall trend that stopped in 2010, given that the 2012 WVS shows a 40 
percent of respondents placed on the “never justifiable” category. Using two more questions available in the 
2010 and 2012 Americas Barometer surveys, D5, which refers to homosexual political rights, and D6, which 
refers to support for gay-marriage, a similar pattern emerges. Thus, there are preliminary reasons to believe that 
homosexuality-related topics became issue specific across time. Actually, D5 which highly correlates with D6 
(correlation coefficient is equal to 0.602, and Cronbach’s alpha is equal to 0.75) also captures a somewhat 
different concept (the mean value of D6 -gay marriage- is equal to 4.4, interval ranges from 4.24 to 4.59; and 
the mean value of D5 -homosexual political rights- is equal to 5.12, interval ranges from 4.95 to 5.28). In sum, 
D5 and D6 LAPOP questions share some empirical similarities but at the same time both D5 and D6 questions 
are barely different, leading us to a preliminary conclusion: homosexuality became salient and relevant when 
the topic itself became issue-specific, i.e. when the issue (homosexuality) was closely related, from the Catholic 
Church’s standing point, to negative family values (in particular gay marriage). 
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attitudes, however, coincides with a documented increase over the past several years of direct 
attacks by the Church against such issues as gay marriage.114  In order to test these ideas we 
first must identify, as we did in the previous chapter, those respondents who will be most 
susceptible to the Church’s influence – the highly religious. Here again I use the frequency of 
attendance at religious services and one’s willingness to accept the church guidance as 
measures of one’s religiosity. And as I have shown in previous chapters, religiosity is both 
theoretically and empirically distinct from one’s position on moral value issues, such as gay 
rights. Both of these attitudinal characteristics, in turn, are also distinct from the idea of 
conservatism that carries with it a much wider range of policy issue areas.   
 
 
 
Graph 9.2. Homosexuality Never Justified, Mexico, 1981 - 2012. Source: the 1981 – 2012 
World Values Surveys. 
                                               
114 Connections between moral values and political preferences are not addressed in this dissertation. However, 
there are several examples of connections between moral values and political preferences in Mexico, such as 
support for capital punishment did not affect vote choice during the 1988 and 1991 elections (Domínguez and 
McCann 1996), but sexual freedom increased identification with the PRD during 1997 (Magaloni and Moreno 
2003), and rejection of homosexuality increased support for the PRI and the PAN during the 1997 (Magaloni 
and Moreno 2003), and during the 2003 midterms elections (Diaz-Dominguez 2006). 
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Religiosity, Moral Values, and Conservatism Entail Different Concepts Again 
 
As I previously did in the seventh chapter using the World Values Surveys, now I will 
carry out the same confirmatory factor analysis (Long 1983; Kline 2005) using a different 
survey project and a different year, the 2010 AmericasBarometer surveys, in order to test 
whether the latent concepts of religiosity, moral values, and economic conservatism are 
different each other, that is, verifying that differences among concepts are not data 
dependent.115 
 
Results from Table 9.1 show three findings: first, attitudes toward gay marriage do 
not tap the latent concept of religiosity; second, church attendance does not tap the latent 
concept of moral values; and third, church attendance does not tap the latent concept of 
economic conservatism. In sum, there are reasons to believe that religiosity is different from 
moral values and economic conservatism, supporting the idea of religiosity as a natural 
vehicle for the church messages.  
 
  
                                               
115 I thank Mitchell A. Seligson and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major 
supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development 
Programme, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available. 
The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP is available at: www.lapopsurveys.org.  
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Latent Variable Estimate Std.Err. Pr(>|z|) 
Religiosity Church attendance 0.647 0.055 0.00 
 Importance of religion 0.816 0.052 0.00 
 Trust Catholic Church 0.354 0.036 0.00 
 Trust Evangelical Church 0.157 0.039 0.00 
 Inequality individuals responsibility -0.074 0.037 0.05 
 Reject gay marriage 0.001 0.221 0.99 
     
Moral Values Reject homosexuals’ rights 0.675 0.205 0.00 
 Reject gay marriage 0.886 0.346 0.01 
 Inequality individuals responsibility -0.038 0.036 0.29 
 Church attendance 0.053 0.049 0.28 
     
Economics Inequality individuals responsibility 0.631 0.035 0.00 
 Privatization important industries 0.344 0.036 0.00 
 Well-being individuals responsibility 0.686 0.034 0.00 
 Creating jobs individuals responsibility 0.746 0.034 0.00 
 Church attendance -0.006 0.032 0.85 
 Reject gay marriage -0.033 0.056 0.55 
 
 Model Chi-square,  Df: 26 49.866   
 Model  Pr(>Chi-sq)   0.003   
 Chi-square (null model),  Df : 45 1746.30   
 Goodness-of-fit index 0.990   
 Adjusted goodness-of-fit index 0.979   
 RMSEA index [90% CI] 0.030  [0.017, 0.043] 
 Bentler-Bonnett NFI 0.971   
 Tucker-Lewis NNFI 0.976   
 Bentler CFI 0.986   
 SRMR 0.023   
 Respondents 1243   
 
Table 9.1. Religiosity, Moral Values, and Economic Conservatism in Mexico, 2010, 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis.  Source: The 2010 LAPOP Surveys. Author’s estimations 
using R 2.14 libraries (Hmisc) and (sem).  
 
Once we know that religiosity, moral values, and conservatism are theoretically and 
empirically different, using individual level data from 2010, the next section will test whether 
being exposed to religious messages about moral values through church attendance increases 
rejection of gay marriage; whether exposure to religious messages about politics increases 
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support for democracy; and whether being exposed to religious messages about social issues 
(violence) increases rejection of the Army patrolling the streets. 
 
Religious Competitive Frames and Parishioners’ Attitudes 
 
The three following hypotheses assume that the effects of specific church messages 
are more likely to exercise an influence on parishioners’ attitudes when they are exposed to 
the messages through church attendance and when they accept the Church teachings.  
 
H1: In areas where bishops have emphasized messages about moral values, Catholic 
churchgoers will be more likely to express rejection of gay marriage when compared to those 
who do not receive that specific message. 
 
H2: In areas where bishops have emphasized messages about politics, Catholic churchgoers 
will be more likely to express support for democracy when compared to those who do not 
receive that specific message. 
 
H3: In areas where bishops have emphasized messages about social issues (violence), 
Catholic churchgoers will be more likely to express rejection of the Army patrolling the 
streets when compared to those who do not receive that specific message. 
 
In order to capture these effects I estimate three interactive models that highlight the 
distinct subnational messages that I have uncovered in previous chapters. All models include 
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an interaction term between church attendance and each message category, in which rejection 
of gay marriage; support for democracy; and support for the Army patrolling the streets are 
the independent variables.  
 
All models include three religious variables at the individual level: a) attendance to 
religious services; b) importance of religion; and c) attendance to church groups. Due to 
singularities found in classical models, I put remedy estimating Bayesian linear models, 
picturing these models using credible intervals of the marginal posterior distributions.116  In 
all these models among Catholic respondents, three categories of church messages are 
analyzed: about moral values, politics, and violence. I expect that church messages about 
moral values will increase parishioners’ rejection of gay marriage; church messages about 
politics will increase parishioners’ support for democracy; and church messages about 
violence will increase parishioners’ rejection of the Army patrolling the streets.   
 
Models also consider demographic controls, such as gender, wealth, age, education, 
urbanization, peasants, and blue-collar workers, in the same theoretical and empirical way 
that models reported in the eighth chapter. Models also include ideology in politics, that is 
left-right self-identification, and ideology in economics, an index comprised of state 
responsible for well-being of the people, creating jobs, and reducing inequality.117  I also 
                                               
116 All Bayesian linear models of this chapter are Bayesian normal models using the inverse gamma as prior 
distribution via library (MCMCpack), and routine (MCMCregress), and the following parameters: 
burnin=100,000, mcmc= 200,000, and thin=1, discarding one half of chains, following Hill and Gelman (2006). 
Additional thinning intervals (1 or 5) did not differ from the marginal posterior distributions shown here. 
Convergence was reached in all cases using Raftery, Heidelberg, and Geweke tests, as explained in Raftery and 
Lewis (1992). 
117 The economic conservatism index reports a Cronbach’s alpha value equals to 0.717, a highly accepted value 
(Manheim et al. 2006). 
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include perceptions about crime, and crime victimization, evaluations of the national 
economy, interpersonal trust, levels of news consumption and political knowledge.118 
 
Church Messages and Rejection of Gay Marriage 
 
In order to know the impact of church messages about moral values on Catholic 
parishioners’ attitudes toward gay marriage, I estimated an interactive model, expecting that 
church messages about moral values will increase parishioners’ rejection of gay marriage.  
                                               
118 Previous models (not shown) included regions, such as North, Central, and the South, in which the West 
region was the reference category. Other control variables were party identification with the PRI, the PAN and 
the PRD, respectively, in which independents were the reference category (those who did not identify with any 
political party), and a dummy variable indicating drug states, using one whether a given state exceeds the 
national average of drug war related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and zero otherwise. Data come from 
the Office of the President’s database (2010). Average was estimated considering one year before the surveys 
were conducted, i.e. from February 2009 to February 2010. Drug war states are Baja California, Coahuila, 
Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Michoacán, Morelos, Nayarit, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tamaulipas.  
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Graph 9.3. Church Messages and Rejection of Gay Marriage, 2010. Lines are 90 percent 
credible intervals.   
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The model pictured in Graph 9.3 includes an interaction term between church 
attendance and each message category, and I will center my focus on church messages about 
moral values.  Results from the Bayesian linear model show that the interaction term between 
bishops’ messages about moral values and church attendance have an impact on rejection of 
gay marriage.  
 
The impact of church attendance and bishops messages about moral values on 
rejection of gay marriage varies depending on whether bishops preach or write about moral 
values or not in a given state, always considering Catholic parishioners who frequently attend 
church.  Those parishioners who frequently attend church, and are exposed to a moral values 
message, they are one point more likely to reject gay marriage, in a 10 point scale, when 
compared to those parishioners who also frequently attend church, but they are not exposed 
to any moral values message, as shown in Graph 9.4, in which predicted values are pictured.  
 
Thus, among parishioners who are frequent churchgoers, being exposed to a moral 
values message by religious leaders seems to increase their gay marriage rejection. In this 
church attendance model, interaction terms between attendance and church messages about 
politics and social issues have no influence on attitudes toward gay marriage. 
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Graph 9.4. Rejection of Gay Marriage, Predicted Values. Estimations come from Graph 9.3. 
Lines are 95 percent intervals. 
 
In sum, there are reasons to believe that there is an association between church 
messages about moral values and frequent Catholic parishioners’ attitudes toward gay 
marriage. In particular, those parishioners who attend mass on regular basis report different 
levels of rejection of gay marriage depending on whether they are exposed to the church 
messages about moral values. Those who are exposed to church messages are more likely to 
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reject gay marriage that those who are not. Although an association seems highly plausible, 
there is no claim about causality. 
 
Church Messages and Support for Democracy 
 
In order to know the impact of church messages about politics on Catholic 
parishioners’ attitudes toward democracy, I also estimated a new model, expecting that 
church messages about politics among churchgoers will increase parishioners’ support for 
democracy. The model includes an interaction term between church attendance and each 
message category, and I will center my focus on church messages about politics.  
 
Results from the Bayesian linear model pictured in Graph 9.5 show that the 
interaction term between bishops’ messages about politics and church attendance have an 
impact on support for democracy.  Those Catholic parishioners who frequently attend church 
and are exposed to political messages, they are almost one point more likely to support 
democracy, in a 7 point scale, when compared to those parishioners who also frequently 
attend church but are not exposed to church messages about politics, as shown in Graph 9.6, 
in which predicted values are pictured. Thus, being exposed to church messages about 
politics among frequent parishioners increases their support for democracy. In this model 
however, interaction terms between attendance and other church messages (moral values and 
social issues) have no influence on attitudes toward democracy.   
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Graph 9.5. Church Messages and Support for Democracy, 2010. Lines are 90 percent 
credible intervals. 
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Those very frequent Catholic parishioners who are exposed to messages about 
politics are almost one point more likely to support democracy when compared to those with 
the same religious fervor but do not receive any political message, as pictured in Graph 9.6.  
Messages about politics also increase weekly parishioners’ support for democracy around 
half point when compare to those who do not receive political messages. Thus, church 
messages about politics among frequent Catholic parishioners are associated to a greater 
increase of support for democracy among the faithful, but again there is no claim of causality.  
 
 
 
Graph 9.6. Support for Democracy, Predicted Values. Estimations come from Graph 9.5. 
Lines are 95 percent intervals.  
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Church Messages and Support for the Army Patrolling the Streets 
 
In order to know the impact of church messages about social issues on Catholic 
parishioners’ attitudes toward the Army patrolling the streets in a drug war context, I 
estimated a similar model, expecting that church messages about social issues will decrease 
parishioners’ support for the Army patrolling the streets. The model includes an interaction 
term between church attendance and each message category, and I will center my focus on 
church messages about social issues first (and political issues latter).  
 
Results from the Bayesian linear model pictured in Graph 9.7 show that the 
interaction term between messages about politics and church attendance has an impact on 
support for the Army patrolling the streets, rather than social messages.  Those Catholic 
parishioners who frequently attend church and are exposed to political messages, they are 
almost one point more likely to support the Army patrolling the streets, in a 7 point scale, 
when compared to those parishioners who also frequently attend church but are not exposed 
to messages about politics, as shown in Graph 9.8, in which predicted values are pictured. It 
is important to remark that social messages do not have an impact on this model. 
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Graph 9.7. Church Messages and Support for the Army Patrolling the Streets, 2010. Lines are 
90 percent credible intervals.   
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Graph 9.8. Support for the Army on the Streets, Predicted Values. Estimations come from 
Graph 9.7. Lines are 90 percent intervals. 
 
In sum, although several interaction terms and their components do not always 
explain their respective dependent variables such as the support for the Army model, in 
general, church messages about moral values explain parishioners’ increasing rejection of 
gay marriage; church messages about politics explain parishioners’ increasing support for 
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democracy, and church messages about political issues rather than social messages explain 
parishioners’ support for the Army when patrolling the streets.119 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Although Mexico’s bishops preach about a myriad of topics, ranging from social 
justice to moral values, and from ritual requirements to free and fair elections, there are 
reasons to believe that the specific emphasis bishops have accentuated when dealing, for 
example, with moral values, suggest a consistent moral values frame, while precluding or de-
emphasizing other topics.120  A similar pattern is found when the church messages about 
                                               
119 Regarding potential collinearity issues, which essentially are defined as independent variables explain more 
variance each other than they explain the variance of the dependent variable (Achen 1982; Gujarati 2004). 
There are specific econometric techniques to deal with collinearity in linear models. In a classical framework, a 
ridge regression is a useful way to deal with collinearity, among other techniques, such as LASSO, OSCAR or 
elastic net (Gujarati 2004; McKay and Ghosh 2011). Ridge regression, the most popular technique, is a 
penalized regression method that places a penalty of the L2-norm of beta. It is important to note that estimates 
are biased, but they have smaller variance, which means that some coefficients divided by lower standard errors 
could reach statistical significance (McKay and Ghosh 2011).  In a Bayesian context “the ridge regression 
approach is closely related to a version of the standard posterior Bayes regression estimate, but with an 
exchangeable prior distribution on the elements of the regression vector” (Congdon 2006: 121). In order to 
“introduce an exchangeable prior on the B in linear models, it is frequently assumed a Gamma distribution” 
(Congdon 2006: 123). The gamma distribution has mu=a, and var=B, whereas the inverse or also called 
“inverted gamma” distribution has mu=aB and var=B2. After “normalizing” the inverted gamma, the posterior 
distribution gets a very simple form, which is reciprocal to the gamma distribution. In short, an exchangeable 
prior distribution from gamma to inverted gamma could meet the assumptions needed for a ridge regression in 
classical framework, because at the end “the elements of B in a ridge regression are drawn from a common 
normal density” (Congdon 2006: 121). Thus, the semi-conjugate priors used in all models reported in the ninth 
chapter are normal and inverted gamma distributions, in line with the normal density and an exchangeable prior 
in a ridge regression. In other words, the inverted gamma used in the Bayesian models arguably deal with 
collinearity issues, because the unobservables are estimated using the aforementioned distributions.  In addition, 
“unlike other methods, the Bayesian analysis automatically gives multiple cluster configurations with an 
estimated posterior” (McKay and Ghosh 2011: 729). Although McKay and Ghosh incorporate a Dirichlet 
distribution, the exchangeable prior approach introduced by Congdon (2006) also seems to address collinearity 
issues. In sum, interactive linear Bayesian models estimated in this chapter ninth seem to address collinearity, 
while collinearity is not a real matter of concern, as shown in table A3.1, in Appendix C. 
120 Original hypotheses regarding moral values stated a positive influence of moral values on support for 
democracy, based on previous research (Magaloni and Moreno 2003). Nowadays however there is a negative 
effect of moral values on support for democracy, support that has declined across the 2000s in Mexico (Parás 
and Romero 2012). Interestingly, moral values undermine democratic support, arguably fueled by the church 
morally charged messages during the 2003 midterm elections (Díaz-Domínguez 2006a), the 2007 public debate 
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politics are analyzed. During recent years, bishops’ messages about social issues have 
centered their focus on violence, whereas during the 1980s the focus was centered on the 
economic crisis of the so-called lost decade.  
 
These effects also suggest that churches are not only places in which parishioners 
come into contact with resources, mobilizing opportunities, or civic skills (Verba, Schlozman 
and Brady 1995), but also, churches are “places in which people come into contact with ideas” 
(Harris-Lacewell 2007: 157). In this way, messages promoted by religious leaders seem to 
have an impact on parishioners’ beliefs, and then, these beliefs could influence attitudes 
toward policy issues among highly religious parishioners. In this case, arguably the church 
opposition to gay marriage, support for democracy, and rejection to the Army on the streets 
were translated into pastoral messages, and the promotion of these theological positions 
seemed to influence parishioners’ beliefs, and consequently, parishioners’ attitudes toward 
these policy issues. This plausible association seems to exist but no causation is claimed. 
 
Although an important limitation of this dissertation refers to plausible tests of 
competitive religious frames due to the reasonable gap between bishops’ messages and the 
rank and file parishioners, there are reasons to believe that the church messages may have an 
impact on parishioners’ attitudes, as revealed by the three sets of models analyzed in this 
                                                                                                                                                 
over abortion, and the recent 2009-2010 public debate over gay marriage and gay adoption. Thus, moral values 
constitute a relevant piece of information in order to explain partisan politics, democratization process, and 
churches activities, and this is a specific feature of the spiritual mission school of thought that is generally 
overlooked by the religion and politics literature in Latin America, as Hagopian argues (2009b: 452-453). One 
consequence of this political translation from the religious to the public sphere might be polarization among 
elites and sorting among voters (Hetherington 2001), arguably due to the new political role of public debates 
about the Catholic Church participation in politics, religiosity, and moral values, which are becoming salient 
topics in Mexican politics. An extension of the effects of church messages is the impact of religion in general on 
support for political parties, given parties’ specific ideological orientation (Layman 1997; 2001; Magaloni and 
Moreno 2003) and the translation of these debates into the political arena (Lipset and Rokkan 1967[1990]). 
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chapter. For now, it is suffice to say that an association between specific church messages 
and parishioners’ attitudes is likely to exist using these model specifications.121 
 
Religion seems to matter in Mexican politics, and there is an indirect way in which 
specific the Catholic Church could influence faithful public’s preferences: through messages. 
In this way, worship attendance represents a vehicle for the church messages, increasing 
exposure and reinforcing these messages, conditional on willingness to accept the church 
guidance and teachings at the theoretical level.  Empirically, there is a plausible association 
showed in the models reported in this chapter. 
 
These mechanisms and empirics could be insightful in order to improve our 
understanding of religion and politics in overwhelming Catholic settings, in which the 
Church does not play a direct role in politics, but as this research suggests, there is an indirect 
influence through the church messages and parishioners’ worship attendance.  This 
dissertation is not making a causal claim.  The claim however refers to what extent there is a 
sort of association between the church messages and parishioners’ social, moral, and political 
attitudes. From that specific perspective the proposed mechanisms in this dissertation seem to 
find some empirical support.     
                                               
121 In order to address concerns regarding the rule of three or ART (Achen 2002) see Appendix D. 
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CHAPTER X 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The research and design of this dissertation served two main purposes. First, drawing 
on the traditional scholarly literature on theology, and religion and politics in Latin America, 
I proposed a theory of how and why political context at the local level exercise an influence 
on local churches’ messages in Mexico about four main topics: politics, moral values, social 
issues, and the church internal organization. Then, I empirically tested the impact of political 
change on the Catholic Church messages, analyzing bishops’ writings.  Second, drawing on 
the scholarly literature on political communication, I provided a theoretical mechanism of 
how and why local churches’ messages would exercise direct religious influence, and 
indirect political influence on parishioners’ religious and political attitudes. I also tested this 
mechanism using public opinion surveys administered in Mexico, in which I assume an 
association between church messages and parishioners’ attitudes. 
 
The theoretical reasons and empirical models used in this research regarding what 
determines the particular emphasis allow then verifying previous hypotheses and developing 
new ones for future empirical research, such as greater understanding of the cleavages that 
divide Mexico’s bishops between “spiritual needs” and “social justice” dimensions, the role 
of social media in preaching, writing, and emphasizing different topics regarding clergy, 
diocese websites, and Mexico’s e-priests profiles.122 
                                               
122 Although theology for a Latin American perspective is an ongoing task, it is possible to draw some general 
conclusions from Mexico’s main theological tendencies, their determinants, and the impact of these theological 
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An additional contribution of this research is the specific construction of bishops’ 
ideologies, derived from theoretical considerations and taking advantage of bishops’ 
biographies. I then find the effect of these ideologies on shaping subnational church 
messages is conditional on political change at the local level, in which progressive bishops 
are more likely to support messages about politics and social issues when political change 
comes from any side of the political spectrum. In contrast, conservative bishops are more 
likely to support messages about moral values, and the church’s internal organization when 
the left wing was leading change. Conservative bishops however start to talk about politics, 
while de-emphasizing messages about moral values when political change comes from the 
right-of-center wing.   
 
This dissertation has incorporated an important variable in any democratization 
process: political change. This external variable has an impact on church messages, 
increasing political and social issues, depending on whether political change started from the 
left, or started from the right-of-center wing.  The effects of political change on church 
                                                                                                                                                 
positions via church messages on Catholic parishioners’ attitudes. Taking advantage of Vatican II eight 
definitions of the Catholic Church (Lumen Gentium num. 8), some of the Latin American theologians and 
bishops have adopted one definition of the church as “the people of God”, in contrast to “the mystic body of 
Christ” adopted by Rome since John Paul II until Francis, who abandoned that definition in his pastoral 
activities. The mystical body of Christ as church model underlines the role of Catholic clergy, leading the flock 
rather than playing a companion role, in which organization and structure seem to play a more important role 
than the people, as the division of ministries may reveal in a functional view, where eyes, hands, or brain have 
different functions. Although both definitions are theologically valid, the consequences of adopting one of these 
definitions have an impact on what topics bishops decide to emphasize. The church as the people of God 
underlines that “the church is not only structure and organization, but also the convocation of the poor and the 
oppressed” (Quiroz 1993: 186), in which “a vertical and pyramidal structure fails to adopt the basic content of 
the biblical category of the people of God” (Quiroz 1993: 187). In the Latin American context, and the Mexican 
context in particular, the people of God is “these people” in “this historical time”, the people of Latin America, 
and the Mexican people in particular. In this way, this model identifies people with the poor, and then, peasants, 
and shanty towns dwellers. In order to reach, from this perspective, the goals of a Christian community, such as 
justice and peace, the masses should take action and became people of God.  For all these reasons, in order to 
empirically estimate what model of church bishops are thinking of and talking about, this research included 
tangible and concrete measures of the social context in which the church develop its pastoral activities, such as 
peasants, indigenous population, and the poor, through measures of development, such as illiteracy rates, access 
to tap water, and sectors of the economy. 
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messages were estimated after controlling for different variables that arguably tap empirical 
measures used by the religious economy school, the spiritual mission school, and scholars 
who study the impact of Vatican II, explicitly incorporating these variables into the empirical 
models.123  After taking into account factors put forth by other scholars, this research found 
considerable power explanation in contextual factors, explicitly in political change at the 
local level. 
 
Now, turning to the second part of the dissertation, I offer evidence for the 
proposition that these variations in Church messages ultimately influence the political 
attitudes of the highly religious among Catholic parishioners. This research included three 
main topics that relate in meaningful ways to the Catholic Church messages I highlight in 
part one of the dissertation: democracy, moral values, and the drug war-related violence. The 
theoretical mechanism proposed in this dissertation involved two steps. In the first, church 
messages were more likely to influence those parishioners who attend frequently to religious 
services and accept church teachings. In the second step, these highly religious parishioners 
were more likely to match the church’s preferred position when analyzing support for 
democracy, gay marriage, and the drug war. 
 
It is important to recall however the empirical constraints faced in trying to establish 
these theoretical links between the subnational Catholic Church messages, church attendance 
                                               
123 The religious economy school states that the structure of the religious market is what matter the most, in 
which different religions compete for parishioners, despite doctrine and beliefs. I the included measures tapping 
that concept, such as the effective number of religions and the proportion of indigenous population, always 
targeted by different churches in the Latin American context. Regarding the spiritual mission and the impact of 
Vatican II I included measures related to bishops’ networks, such as groups created by papal nuncios, and 
bishops’ biographies, extracting individuals characteristics such as type of seminary, place of seminary studies, 
initial work assignment and urban origins. All this information allows me to model bishops’ ideological 
tendencies. 
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and willingness to accept church teachings, and the attitudinal profiles of these highly 
religious individuals. I argued an association instead, in order to consider that even frequent 
parishioners do not always attend the same mass, masses are not always celebrated by the 
same priest, and sermons by local priests do not always match exactly the focus on their 
dioceses’ bishop. Thus, without direct analysis of these local sermons, and verification that 
the “highly religious” actually attended them, I could never move beyond the types of 
indirect tests I carried out above.  Nevertheless, despite these restrictions, evidence derived 
from empirical models seems to support theoretical explanations regarding a sort of 
association between the church messages and parishioners’ attitudes. 
 
Overall, results from the public opinion chapters are essentially consistent with 
previous hypotheses, in which prevalent church messages seem to exercise a sort of influence 
on Catholic parishioners, or at least there is an association between church messages and 
parishioners’ attitudes. Further research however can take advantage of competitive frames 
separating those who receive a political message from those who receive a moral values 
message, or a social issues message, in order to disentangle what church messages, issued at 
the same time are exercising a more effective influence on Catholic parishioners on more 
controlled environments..124  
 
In order to empirically test the mechanisms proposed in this project beyond the case 
of subnational Mexico, one should know whether other places meet the three minimal 
                                               
124 Although public opinion chapters of this dissertation employed randomly selected citizens through surveys 
instruments, and a series of appropriate controls, a laboratory experiment, for example, could offer additional 
insights regarding religious competitive frames among frequent parishioners, religious undergrads, or Theology 
and Divinity School students as respondents. For now, it is suffice to say that assumptions regarding how 
prevalent the church message is, and how frequently parishioners attend to religious services seem to be in line 
with empirical associations between church messages and religious behaving. 
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conditions analyzed in the sixth chapter: the size of the Catholic faithful, frequency of mass 
attendance, and whether parishioners are likely to follow the Church teachings. In several 
Latin American countries the Catholic Church seems to enjoy a good standing, in which 60 
percent of the population reports to belong to the Catholic Church (LAPOP Surveys 2008, 
2010; and 2012) as shown in Graph 10.1.125   
 
Though certainly Latin America is a region with a wide variation in the dominance of 
the Catholic Church, it still remains the religious affiliation of the majority of citizens in the 
region.126      
                                               
125 Considering 21 Latin American countries, the 2008 LAPOP surveys reported 68.4 percent of Catholics; the 
2010 LAPOP surveys reported 63.6 percent; and the 2012 LAPOP surveys reported 62.2 percent of Catholics in 
the following countries: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Questions used: q5a in the 2008 LAPOP questionnaires, and q3c in the 2010 and 2012 
LAPOP questionnaires. Averages were estimated using the routine wt among individual country data sets, and 
these results were compared to those derived from the weight1500 routine, in order to consider countries 
weighted equally when using the merged files by round. Variations however do not exceed one percent using 
this list of countries. Preliminary analytical comparisons among census and religious survey data can be found 
in Díaz-Domínguez (2009).  
126 Notable changes across years in Panama, Honduras and Uruguay might be related to question wording 
differences: “What is your religion?” in the 2008 questionnaire and “What is your religion, if any?” in the 
subsequent questionnaires. Comparison of means revealed no statistical differences except in these three 
countries. One explanation refers to the question wording’s effects in sensitive settings, in which literature have 
found similar results when asking for party identification, e.g. explicitly mentioning political parties’ names or 
leaving room to report oneself as independent (Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau and Nevitte 2001). 
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Graph 10.1. Proportion of Catholics in Latin America, 2008 - 2012. Sources: the 2008, 2010 
and 2012 LAPOP Surveys, and Díaz-Domínguez (2009: 11). 
 
Although variations across years are important, the larger point is that the traditional 
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adherents, except in Belize and Jamaica, as shown in Graph 10.1, in which Mainline 
Protestants and Evangelicals are the most prominent religious affiliations.  
 
The second condition is whether the church still has audience, because mass 
attendance allows the transmission of the church messages to the faithful. In looking at data 
from the World Values Surveys, collected in waves over the past forty years, one finds that 
one half of the surveyed population reported monthly attendance during the 1980s and 1990s. 
In comparative perspective, levels of weekly church attendance in Latin America show 
variance, whereas monthly attendance reaches one half of the surveyed population, except in 
very few South Cone countries. Recent data from the 2004 to the 2012 Americas Barometer 
Surveys also reveal a similar pattern. 
 
I now turn to the chance of resistance of the church messages among parishioners, 
using two proxy indicators, levels of importance of God, and the importance of religion in 
one’s life. In comparative perspective there is variance across Latin America with respect to 
the “importance of God”, but essentially 40 percent of Catholics in the region still think that 
God is “very important”. Additionally, “importance of religion” can also serve as proxy for 
acceptance of the Church’s guidance, in which one half of surveyed population in almost 
every single country care about religion as “very important” when analyzing the 2010 
Americas Barometer Surveys. 
 
In order to know whether other places meet the minimal conditions to test the causal 
mechanisms proposed in this dissertation, the proportions of weekly church attendance and 
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religion as “very important” among Catholic respondents are pictured in Graph 10.2 using 
120 subnational units extracted from the 2010 Americas Barometer Surveys.  
 
 
 
Graph 10.2. Weekly Church Attendance and Religion as “Very Important” among Catholics 
in 120 Latin American Subnational Units, 2010. Source: the 2010 Americas Barometer 
Surveys. 
 
I divided the graph in four segments, considering 40 percent of weekly attendance 
and 40 percent of religion as “very important”, in which this 40 percent resembles Mexico’ 
subnational religious data. Using this division, Catholics placed at the bottom right corner of 
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the graph are more likely to being exposed to the clergy message because in these 
subnational units, 40 percent or even more of Catholic parishioners attend mass every 
Sunday, and also, they are more likely to accept the church teachings, because 40 percent or 
even more care enough about religion to take into account church messages. The richness of 
subnational religious variations across the region suggests that clergy messages can meet the 
Catholic audience in Guatemala City, and other regions of Guatemala as well, in Santa Cruz 
in Bolivia, or Morazán in El Salvador, in the Costa Rican country side, the Mexican Bajío or 
the North, or even in Guyana, in which Catholics are a religious minority.  
 
Subnational variations also show that some South American capitals are less religious 
than their Central American counterparts for example, as shown in Graph 10.2. In Buenos 
Aires, Montevideo, and Lima around one quarter of Catholics attend mass every Sunday 
suggesting than clergy messages are less likely to reach a Catholic majority. In addition, in 
places such as Middlesex in Jamaica, a county located in the central region of the island, the 
Catholic minority reports lower levels of weekly attendance but they seriously care about 
religion, arguably, “in their own way” (Hagopian 2009). 
 
In sum, religion at the subnational level still plays a significant role among Latin 
American citizens, in which church attendance seems to be part of daily life activities. These 
data suggest then that a majority of parishioners are exposed to religious messages on a 
regular basis, and religious frames elaborated by the church leaders have the possibility of 
shaping their attitudes. 
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Overall, all these pieces of evidence suggest that there the proportion of Catholics is 
still important, they attend mass on regular basis and they arguably care enough about 
religion, then, it is plausible to suppose that frequent attendees who care are more likely to 
accept the church’s messages in other places, at least when Latin American settings are 
analyzed. These initial conditions at the subnational level are likely to remain over time in 
combination with the church messages and the strength of the Catholic Church, such as some 
scholars have found in Nicaragua (Stein 1995), Brazil (Bruneau 1973; Peritore 1989), 
Venezuela and Colombia (Levine 1986); Mexico (Sota and Luengo 1994; Casillas 1996; 
Díaz-Domínguez 2006a; Trejo 2009), and more generally in Latin America (Díaz-
Domínguez 2013). 
 
Finally, this dissertation, beyond the attempt to connect the Church’s messages with 
the attitudes of parishioners, it also tried to show that political change does indeed shape the 
Catholic Church’s interventions in the public space, and, conversely, the Catholic Church 
influences subsequent political and social change taking place throughout the country by 
shifting the emphasis in the messages emerging from Mexico’s dioceses.  In sum, this 
dissertation offers one of the first comprehensive analyses of the interaction of highly uneven 
subnational political transitions and dramatic social change on variations in the Catholic 
Church’s positions regarding the promotion of democracy, moral values, and social issues. I 
offered significant insights into both the subnational role of the Church in a nation’s 
democratization process as well as the degree to which the Catholic Church, once viewed as 
a monolithic, unitary actor, varies in its emphasized messages across time and space.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
BIOGRAPHIES OF BISHOPS CODEBOOK (1968-2011)  
 
Name of the bishop 
[name] 
 
Diocesan seminary or religious order/congregation 
1.- Diocesan    2.- Religious order / Congregation 
 
[For religious bishops] Religious order/congregation 
[name] 
 
Date of birth 
[date] 
 
Year of ordination 
[year] 
 
Born in Mexico 
1.- Yes      2.- No 
 
[For bishops born in Mexico]  
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[state] 
Secular studies 
1.- No    2.- Yes, some college    3.- Yes, complete college    4.- Yes, master/doctoral degree  
 
State/country of seminary studies 
1.- [state]   2.- [other country, name]    
 
Type of seminary of seminary studies 
1.- Diocese’ seminary    2.- Religious order’ seminary 
 
Additional seminary studies (Master or doctoral degree) 
1.- No, no additional studies     2.- Yes, Rome    3.- Yes, Latin America   4.- Yes, 
USA/Canada    5.- Yes, Europe (no Rome)   6.- Yes, Mexico    7.- Yes, other [name] 
 
Initial career assignment 
1.- Seminary (prefect, full-time teacher)    2.- Parish   3.- Other 
 
Years active in seminary work (prefect, full-time teacher) 
0.- No assigned to seminary      Yes, assigned [number of years] 
 
Years active in pastoral work in a parish 
0.- No assigned to parish           Yes, assigned [number of years] 
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Principal Consecrator 
[name] 
 
Co-consecrators 
[name(s), fill all that apply] 
 
Diocese of first appointment 
[name] 
 
Date of first diocese’ appointment 
[date] 
 
Diocese of second appointment 
[name] 
 
Date of second diocese’ appointment 
[date] 
 
Diocese of third appointment 
[name] 
 
Date of third diocese’ appointment 
[date] 
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Diocese of fourth appointment 
[name] 
 
Date of fourth diocese’ appointment 
[date] 
 
Social and political networks  
0.- None  1.- Left wing  2.- PAN  3.- PRI   4.- Social groups  5.- Other [indicate]  
 
Source 
[name] 
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APPENDIX B  
 
PASTORAL LETTERS CODEBOOK (1968-1995, 2008-2011)  
 
Document title 
[title] 
 
Date 
[Month, day, year] 
 
Subscribers 
1.- CEM    2.- CEM committee    3.- Pastoral Region    4.- Independent Group of Bishops     
5.- Single Bishop   6.- Other [name] 
 
For CEM Committees  
1.- Prophetic   2.- Liturgy   3.- Social   4.- Vocations   5.- Family   6.- Ecumenism    
7.- Communication   8.- Internal Organization 
 
For Pastoral Regions (old classification) 
1.- North East   2.- North West   3.- Central   4.- South Pacific   5.- South   6.- Gulf    
7.- Don Vasco   8.- Other [name] 
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Geographic Markers (Ecclesiastical Provinces / Dioceses / States) 
1.- National   2.- Acapulco   3.- Baja California   4.- Bajío   5.- Chiapas   6.- Chihuahua    
7.- Durango   8.- Guadalajara   9.- Hermosillo   10.- Hidalgo   11.- México   12.- Monterrey    
13.- Morelia   14.- Oaxaca   15.- Puebla   16.- San Luis Potosí   17.- Tlalnepantla   18.- 
Xalapa   19.- Yucatán   20.- Single state [state] 
(Several Columns; mark all that apply) 
 
Topic 
1.- Birth Programs   2.- Education   3.- Elections   4.- Economy   5.- Violence   6.- 
Democracy   7.- Poverty   8.- Internal Organization   9.- Abortion   10.- Homosexuality   
11.- Indigenous   12.- Other [topic]   13.- Political Change    14.- Church-State 
(Several Columns; mark all that apply) 
 
Relevance of the Topic 
0.- Not mentioned   1.- Mentioned but it is not a key feature   3.- Secondary feature    
4.- Primary feature 
(Several Columns; mark all that apply) 
 
Source  
1.- CEM   2.- Diocese   3.- Diocesan Seminary Library   4.- Scholar [book, article]  
5.- Other [name] 
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APPENDIX C  
 
COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS  
 
In order to address potential concerns regarding collinearity due to closely related 
variables in models reported in the ninth chapter, such as regions, church messages at the 
state level, and multiple interaction terms with church attendance and other religious 
variables at the individual level, this appendix shows three collinearity diagnostics: variance 
inflating factor (VIF), the squared root of VIF, and tolerance. Collinearity means that some 
independent variables are so closely related that they explain more variance each other than 
the variance of the dependent variable, showing larger standard errors, and then, explanatory 
variables do not reach statistical significance (Gujarati 2004).  
 
A similar but less dramatic explanation is given by Achen “multicollinearity violates 
no regression assumptions. Unbiased, consistent estimates will occur, and their standard 
errors will be correctly estimated. The only effect of multicollinearity is to make it hard to 
get coefficient estimates with small standard error. But having a small number of 
observations also has that effect, as does having independent variables with small variances. 
In fact, at a theoretical level, multicollinearity, few observations and small variances on the 
independent variables are essentially all the same problem” (Achen 1982: 82-83). Although 
this statement is theoretical correct under repeated samples, this says nothing specific about 
the properties of estimators in any given sample, while the model certainly remains as the 
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Best Linear Unbiased Estimation (BLUE) (Gujarati 2004: 349). In any case, it is noteworthy 
to explore collinearity diagnostics. 
 
Collinearity entails higher linear relations between independent variables and larger 
variances and covariances, and then, larger standard errors, which make difficult to find a 
statistical impact. The speed with which variances and covariances increase can be estimated 
using the variance inflating factor (VIF), which is defined as 1 / (1 - the coefficient of 
correlation between independent variables). Thus, VIF shows how the variance is inflated by 
the presence of collinearity. In other words, if correlation approaches to one, then VIF 
approaches to infinite (Gujarati 2004: 351). It is important to mention that VIF and tolerance 
are not free of criticism, because a higher value of VIF could not lead to higher standard 
errors due to lower variances for example. These critiques however do not involve lower 
values of VIF, that is, VIF does not seem to overlook collinearity, and therefore, it is a safe 
and very intuitive diagnostic to explore. 
 
In the ninth chapter there were three sets of interactive models: a) interaction terms 
between church attendance and the three types of church messages; b) interaction terms 
among church attendance, importance of religion and the church messages; and c) interaction 
terms among church attendance, importance of religion, attendance to church groups, and the 
three types of church messages. The last two specifications were eliminated from the ninth 
chapter due to higher levels of collinearity among interaction and constitutive terms. Thus, 
this appendix will primarily deal with collinearity in the first set of interactive models, that is, 
interaction terms between church attendance and the three types of church messages. 
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Regarding the interactive model, in which there is an interaction term between church 
attendance and the three types of church messages, table A3.1 reports four columns: the 
baseline list of variables without regions, baseline with regions, interactions terms with 
regions, and interactions terms without regions. The three diagnostics indicate low degrees of 
collinearity. In particular, VIF values greater than 10 suggest some collinearity; the VIF 
squared root, values greater than 3 suggest some collinearity, and tolerance, which is the 
inverse of VIF, should show values lower than 0.1 to suggest some collinearity.  
 
The first two sets of variables, the baseline lists with or without regions do not show 
important levels of collinearity, due to VIF values lower than 10, VIF squared root values 
lower than 3, and tolerance greater than 0.1, as shown in table A3.1. The last two sets of 
variables, interactions with and without regions show VIF values greater than 10 in the three 
types of church messages and the corresponding interaction terms. From collinearity 
diagnostics two conclusions emerge: a) regions do not show important levels of collinearity; 
and b) collinearity increases when interaction terms are added to the model. 
 
Presence of collinearity when estimating models with interaction terms is not a matter 
of concern because “coefficients in interaction models no longer indicate the average effect 
of a variable as they do in an additive models” (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006: 70). Due to 
my theoretical expectations are conditional in nature, interaction terms are appropriate to test 
this conditional association. In other words, those Catholic parishioners who live in states in 
which the church is issuing specific types of messages, and parishioners who are frequently 
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exposed to messages through church attendance, this combination arguably shape 
parishioners’ attitudes toward democracy, gay marriage, and the Army patrolling the streets.  
 
Solutions to collinearity range from doing nothing to collect additional data, but in 
this case, when dealing with surveys researchers may not have much control to add 
additional survey data. Centering the relevant variables has been also proposed as a potential 
solution to deal with collinearity. Thus technique however “alters nothing important 
statistically and nothing at all substantively” (Kam and Franzese 2003: 3), as showed by 
Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006: 71). Consequently, I did not center any variable.  
 
Regarding constitutive terms in interactive models, the presence of increasing 
collinearity does not should encourage researchers to drop constitutive terms, because 
dropping constitutive terms could lead to a greater bias than keeping them in the interactive 
model (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006: 70). This is due to the correct interpretation of a 
given interacted variable, because now, this variable plays a “dual role”, “alone” and 
“interacted”. To illustrate, estimating the effect of church attendance through simulations 
should consider attendance “alone” and “interacted” with each type of message, given that 
church attendance is no longer “alone” in these interactive models. 
 
Even in the case of estimating the effect of church attendance “alone”, it is necessary 
to keep in “zero” all types of church messages, in order to “nullify” the effect of interaction 
terms. In other words, the coefficient of church attendance “alone” is multiplied by a specific 
value, let’s say 4, weekly attendance, and interaction terms in which church attendance is 
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included should be multiplied by zero, then coefficients from interaction terms will be zero. 
In short, in interactive models, collinearity is not a matter of concern, interactions are 
appropriate when testing expectations which are conditional in nature, and keeping all 
constitutive terms prevent us to greater bias. 
 
In order to address concerns regarding the impact of regions on interactive models, 
table A3.2 shows classical linear estimations in which support for democracy is the 
dependent variable. In short, keeping or dropping regions does not substantially change signs 
or results. Actually, church messages about politics reach statistical significance, arguably 
due to some overlap between regions and this type of messages at the state level. In short, 
variables which are statistically significant do not vary across specifications, after adding or 
dropping dummy regions, party identification variables, or variables which are statistically 
insignificant, as shown in the last column. 
 
In relation to the impact of regions on interactive models, table A3.3 shows classical 
linear estimations in which support for rejection of gay marriage is the dependent variable. 
Finally, table A3.4 shows classical linear estimations in which support for the Army 
patrolling the streets is the dependent variable. Across specifications, variables which are 
statistically significant remain significant. The only noticeable change is urban, which 
reaches significance but it is important to keep in mind that dropping the central regions 
means to drop Mexico City, a place in which any activity related to the drug war was highly 
questioned. In sum, all models are stable across different specifications.   
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Baseline No 
Regions 
 
Baseline 
Regions 
 
Interactions 
Regions 
 
Interact No 
Regions 
Variable VIF SqVIF Tol 
 
VIF SqVIF Tol 
 
VIF SqVIF Tol 
 
VIF SqVIF Tol 
Attendance 1.6 1.2 0.6 
 
1.6 1.3 0.6 
 
5.7 2.4 0.2 
 
5.6 2.4 0.2 
Imp. of religion 1.3 1.1 0.8 
 
1.3 1.2 0.7 
 
1.3 1.2 0.7 
 
1.3 1.1 0.8 
Church groups 1.3 1.2 0.8 
 
1.4 1.2 0.7 
 
1.4 1.2 0.7 
 
1.3 1.2 0.8 
Age 1.4 1.2 0.7 
 
1.4 1.2 0.7 
 
1.4 1.2 0.7 
 
1.4 1.2 0.7 
Wealth 1.3 1.2 0.7 
 
1.4 1.2 0.7 
 
1.4 1.2 0.7 
 
1.3 1.2 0.7 
Education 1.9 1.4 0.5 
 
1.9 1.4 0.5 
 
2.0 1.4 0.5 
 
1.9 1.4 0.5 
Urban 1.5 1.2 0.7 
 
1.7 1.3 0.6 
 
1.7 1.3 0.6 
 
1.5 1.2 0.7 
Female 1.3 1.1 0.8 
 
1.3 1.1 0.8 
 
1.3 1.2 0.8 
 
1.3 1.1 0.8 
Peasant 1.2 1.1 0.8 
 
1.3 1.1 0.8 
 
1.3 1.1 0.8 
 
1.2 1.1 0.8 
Worker 1.2 1.1 0.9 
 
1.2 1.1 0.9 
 
1.2 1.1 0.9 
 
1.2 1.1 0.9 
Nat. Economy 1.1 1.0 0.9 
 
1.1 1.0 0.9 
 
1.1 1.0 0.9 
 
1.1 1.0 0.9 
Percep crime 1.3 1.1 0.8 
 
1.3 1.1 0.8 
 
1.3 1.1 0.8 
 
1.3 1.1 0.8 
Victim crime 1.2 1.1 0.9 
 
1.2 1.1 0.9 
 
1.2 1.1 0.9 
 
1.2 1.1 0.9 
Ideology (pol) 1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
Ideology (econ) 1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
News 1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
Interpers trust 1.3 1.1 0.8 
 
1.3 1.1 0.8 
 
1.3 1.1 0.8 
 
1.3 1.1 0.8 
Pol Knowledge 1.5 1.2 0.7 
 
1.5 1.2 0.7 
 
1.6 1.2 0.6 
 
1.5 1.2 0.7 
PID PRI 1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.2 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
PID PAN 1.1 1.0 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
 
1.1 1.1 0.9 
PID PRD 1.1 1.0 1.0 
 
1.1 1.0 0.9 
 
1.1 1.0 0.9 
 
1.1 1.0 0.9 
Moral messag 1.1 1.0 0.9 
 
1.4 1.2 0.7 
 
10.7 3.3 0.1 
 
10.6 3.3 0.1 
Social messag 1.9 1.4 0.5 
 
2.1 1.4 0.5 
 
19.3 4.4 0.1 
 
18.9 4.4 0.1 
Pol messag 1.9 1.4 0.5 
 
2.3 1.5 0.4 
 
18.2 4.3 0.1 
 
17.7 4.2 0.1 
North 
    
3.7 1.9 0.3 
 
3.7 1.9 0.3 
    Central 
    
1.9 1.4 0.5 
 
1.9 1.4 0.5 
    South 
    
1.7 1.3 0.6 
 
1.7 1.3 0.6 
    Drug state 
    
4.0 2.0 0.3 
 
4.0 2.0 0.3 
    Att : Moral mess 
        
12.2 3.5 0.1 
 
12.2 3.5 0.1 
Att : Social mess 
        
22.7 4.8 0.1 
 
22.5 4.8 0.1 
Att : Pol mess 
        
18.8 4.3 0.1 
 
18.7 4.3 0.1 
 
Table A3.1. Collinearity Diagnostics, Models from the Chapter Ninth.  VIF= Variance 
inflating factor; Sq(VIF)= squared root of VIF; Tolerance=1/VIF. 
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Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. 
Attendance -0.07 0.10 -0.06 0.10 -0.06 0.10 -0.06 0.09 
Imp. religion 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.12 
Church groups -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 
Age 0.10 0.04 ** 0.10 0.04 ** 0.10 0.04 *** 0.11 0.03 *** 
Wealth 0.13 0.04 *** 0.16 0.04 *** 0.16 0.04 *** 0.17 0.03 *** 
Education 0.03 0.02 * 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 * 
Urban -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.05 
Female 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 
Peasant 0.12 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.07 0.29 
Worker -0.11 0.18 -0.09 0.18 -0.08 0.18 
Nat. Economy 0.13 0.07 * 0.14 0.07 * 0.14 0.07 * 0.14 0.07 * 
Percep crime -0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 
Victim crime -0.23 0.10 ** -0.23 0.10 ** -0.23 0.10 ** -0.24 0.10 ** 
Ideology (pol) 0.06 0.02 *** 0.07 0.02 *** 0.07 0.02 *** 0.08 0.02 *** 
Ideology (eco) 0.05 0.02 *** 0.04 0.02 *** 0.05 0.02 *** 0.05 0.02 *** 
News -0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.07 
Interpers trust 0.09 0.06 * 0.12 0.06 ** 0.12 0.06 ** 0.14 0.06 *** 
Pol knowledge 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.07 
PID PRI 0.02 0.23 0.05 0.22 
PID PAN 0.02 0.20 0.10 0.23 
PID PRD 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.30 
Moral mess -0.17 0.33 -0.23 0.35 -0.22 0.35 -0.24 0.34 
Social mess 0.22 0.40 0.45 0.36 0.43 0.36 0.31 0.36 
Pol mess -0.57 0.40 -0.71 0.32 ** -0.72 0.31 ** -0.68 0.30 ** 
North 0.16 0.25 
Central -0.23 0.20 
South -0.19 0.28 
Drug state 0.20 0.23 
Att : Pol mess 0.22 0.12 * 0.22 0.11 ** 0.23 0.11 ** 0.20 0.10 ** 
Att : Mor mess 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.09 -0.16 0.12 -0.13 0.12 
Att : Soc mess -0.14 0.13 -0.16 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 
Intercept 2.49 0.54 *** 2.34 0.58 *** 2.32 0.59 *** 2.29 0.42 *** 
 Respondents 971 971 971 977 
R-sq 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 
Root MSE 1.60 1.59 1.59 1.59 
F-test 4.21 4.25 4.67 6.89 
 
Table A3.2. Additional Specifications, Support for Democracy, Models from the Chapter 
Ninth. Linear models, robust corrected standard errors.  
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Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. 
Attendance -0.11 0.14 -0.10 0.13 -0.10 0.14 -0.08 0.12 
Imp. religion 0.42 0.13 *** 0.44 0.12 *** 0.44 0.12 *** 0.40 0.10 *** 
Church groups -0.06 0.07 -0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.07 
Age 0.55 0.08 *** 0.55 0.08 *** 0.54 0.07 *** 0.50 0.06 *** 
Wealth -0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.08 
Education -0.07 0.02 *** -0.06 0.02 *** -0.06 0.02 *** -0.09 0.02 *** 
Urban -0.23 0.09 *** -0.29 0.08 *** -0.28 0.08 *** -0.37 0.08 *** 
Female -0.48 0.18 *** -0.47 0.18 *** -0.47 0.18 *** -0.51 0.16 *** 
Peasant 0.36 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.30 0.49 
Worker 0.64 0.31 ** 0.65 0.29 ** 0.67 0.29 ** 0.47 0.28 * 
Nat. Economy -0.23 0.14 * -0.23 0.14 * -0.23 0.14 * -0.21 0.11 * 
Percep crime 0.33 0.11 ** 0.33 0.11 *** 0.32 0.11 *** 0.16 0.09 * 
Victim crime -0.26 0.28 -0.28 0.27 -0.29 0.27 
Ideology (pol) 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 
Ideology (eco) 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
News 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.13 
Interpers trust 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Pol Know. -0.08 0.11 -0.11 0.11 -0.11 0.12 
PID PRI -0.36 0.28 -0.32 0.27 
PID PAN 0.09 0.46 0.13 0.45 
PID PRD -0.49 0.49 -0.43 0.52 
Moral messag -1.23 0.51 ** -1.17 0.52 ** -1.16 0.52 ** -0.96 0.46 ** 
Social messag -1.26 0.88 -1.06 0.93 -1.00 0.92 -0.69 0.82 
Pol messag -0.25 0.76 -0.41 0.75 -0.43 0.77 -0.65 0.80 
North 0.29 0.47 
Central -0.36 0.19 * 
South 0.36 0.24 
Drug state -0.13 0.37 
Att : Pol mess 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.24 0.10 0.24 0.18 0.26 
Att : Mor mess 0.35 0.15 ** 0.37 0.15 ** 0.36 0.15 ** 0.32 0.16 ** 
Att : Soc mess 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.21 0.26 0.16 0.24 
Intercept 4.95 1.12 *** 4.68 1.14 *** 4.67 1.14 *** 6.40 0.72 *** 
 Respondents 976 976 976 1205 
R-sq 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.18 
Root MSE 3.13 3.13 3.13 3.11 
F-test 9.47 10.44 11.71 21.63 
 
Table A3.3. Additional Specifications, Rejection of Gay Marriage, Models from the Chapter 
Ninth. Linear models, robust corrected standard errors.  
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Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. Coef. St. Er. 
Attendance -0.09 0.07 -0.08 0.08 -0.08 0.07 -0.06 0.07 
Imp. religion 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.09 
Ch. groups 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.07 
Age -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 
Wealth -0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 
Education -0.03 0.02 * -0.03 0.02 * -0.03 0.02 * -0.03 0.01 *** 
Urban -0.04 0.04 -0.08 0.04 ** -0.07 0.03 ** -0.09 0.04 ** 
Female -0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.10 
Peasant 0.12 0.29 0.07 0.29 0.05 0.28 
Worker 0.06 0.21 0.08 0.21 0.09 0.22 
Nat. Eco. -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 
Percep crime -0.06 0.08 -0.05 0.09 -0.06 0.09 
Victim crime -0.04 0.15 -0.05 0.15 -0.06 0.15 
Ideo. (pol) 0.04 0.02 * 0.05 0.02 * 0.05 0.02 ** 0.05 0.02 *** 
Ideo. (eco) 0.04 0.01 ** 0.04 0.01 ** 0.04 0.01 ** 0.03 0.01 ** 
News 0.13 0.07 * 0.14 0.07 * 0.14 0.07 ** 0.13 0.07 ** 
Trust -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04 
Pol know. -0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.07 
PID PRI -0.32 0.23 -0.30 0.23 
PID PAN 0.24 0.22 0.30 0.23 
PID PRD 0.07 0.49 0.09 0.49 
Moral mess -0.23 0.28 -0.26 0.34 -0.22 0.33 -0.28 0.31 
Social mess 0.31 0.38 0.52 0.42 0.54 0.42 0.50 0.40 
Pol mess -0.90 0.36 *** -1.06 0.38 *** -1.09 0.38 *** -1.09 0.35 *** 
North 0.13 0.24 
Central -0.26 0.16 * 
South 0.01 0.17 
Drug state 0.14 0.26 
Att : Pol  0.27 0.10 *** 0.28 0.09 *** 0.30 0.09 *** 0.30 0.08 *** 
Att : Mor  0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.08 0.01 0.07 
Att : Soc  -0.11 0.11 -0.14 0.11 -0.16 0.11 -0.14 0.10 
Intercept 5.38 0.66 *** 5.20 0.64 *** 5.16 0.66 *** 5.33 0.46 *** 
 Respondents 991 991 991 1014 
R-sq 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Root MSE 1.66 1.67 1.67 1.66 
F-test 2.83 2.66 2.51 5.13 
 
Table A3.4. Additional Specifications, Support for the Army Patrolling the Streets, Models 
from the Chapter Ninth. Linear models, robust corrected standard errors.  
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APPENDIX D  
 
RULE OF THREE (ART)  
 
In order to address concerns regarding the rule of three or ART (Achen 2002), it is 
noteworthy to recall the essentials of this formulation: “a Rule of Three (ART) is a statistical 
speciﬁcation in which more than three explanatory variables is meaningless”.  Achen’s piece 
fueled the creation of the National Science Foundation’s Empirical Implications of 
Theoretical Models (EITM) task force in the discipline (Lavertu and Moynihan 2012), 
increasing our understanding of relationships between formal models and their empirical 
implications.127   
 
It is fair to say that ART recommendations are due to causal heterogeneity, a 
reasonable concern when estimating models that compare heterogeneous groups. Achen’s 
recommendations seem related to control variables only, but he argues that statistical models 
should only include three variables, because “controls” can be added by stratification or 
subsamples. Although Achen recommendations are certainly important as guidance to 
researchers when testing theoretical models, not all academics agree with Achen’s proposed 
remedies.    
 
Models reported in the ninth chapter of this dissertation include more variables than 
ART recommends to researchers, but there are two main reasons to keep the initial 
                                               
127 Consequently, those scholars who promote the development of formal models evaluate whether empirical 
analysis is fruitful and they extend EITM certifications to other researchers, in order to improve the state of the 
discipline (http://www.eitminstitute.org/index.html). 
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interactive model in the way is reported: a) Achen himself prevents us to use the ART 
approach under specific conditions; and b) proposed remedies could lead to greater bias.  
Nevertheless, my solution to address ART recommendations was dropping two of the three 
sets of original models that could be problematic, due to higher levels of collinearity among 
interactive and constitutive terms, and potential interpretations problems when highly 
collinear variables “are moving” at the same time, narrowing our room for substantial 
interpretations of their effects on the dependent variable, as explained in Appendix C, and 
shown in Table A4.1. In this dissertation, I just left one interactive model, the church 
attendance model, due to the conditional nature of my theoretical expectations.  
 
In particular, ART recommendations only apply to statistical models that come from 
formal models (Lavertu and Moynihan 2012: 336), and actually, Achen does not recommend 
ART when formal models specify a larger number of variables (Achen 2002: 446). It is 
important to recall the main characteristics of formal models: “they may be game-theoretic 
models featuring highly informed and strategic actors or ‘behavioral’ models featuring goal-
oriented yet relatively unsophisticated agents. Formal models are mathematical” (Lavertu 
and Moynihan 2012: 335). 
 
Given that empirical models reported in this dissertation: a) do not come from formal 
models; b) variables included in these models try to tap a more realistic analysis than just the 
three variables suggested by ART; and c) empirical models also address different estimation 
issues, such as singularities, potential collinearity (which is addressed in Appendix C), and 
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simulations out of boundaries all via Bayesian framework (Schrodt 2013), it is reasonable to 
keep the initial interactive model in the way is reported.   
 
It is possible to argue that “in practice, the EITM approach simply entails considering 
more carefully the theoretical foundations of empirical analysis” (Lavertu and Moynihan 
2012). This “in practice” or “in general” considerations however, do not seem to solve 
additional problems regarding the ART approach. For instance, applying ART does not even 
allow researchers to test competing frames when testing political communication and 
framing hypotheses, because it would exceed the three variables rule.  In addition, selecting a 
sample based on a post-treatment variable, i.e. subsetting samples keeping in mind the three 
main variables of interest “it is equivalent in terms of bias to controlling for a post-treatment 
variable in a regression”, as Matt Blackwell points out (personal communication with the 
author, February 12 of 2013).128 
 
Regarding practicalities, even before trying to make subsamples, singularities 
potentially emerge, and they did, as I mentioned in the chapter ninth, that is, there are few 
cases in some cells, producing simulations out of boundaries, a problem hard to solve using 
classical estimations. Thus, a Bayesian model is an appropriate solution to deal with 
singularities due to prior distributions that treat unobservables (it is fair to say that data and 
unobservables are treated as random in Bayesian analysis).  
                                               
128 Along Achen’ suggestions, I just tested whether a combination of being exposed to church messages and 
messages themselves was associated to parishioners’ attitudes toward politics and policies. As explained by 
Christopher Achen himself, according to my personal notes “in your work you may want to take advantage of 
liberation theology as theoretical background, but be aware of moral values concerns in the new Latin American 
Catholic Church. You guys have an enormous variation, so, be aware. I recall discussions about the Latin 
American variation with my classmate Guillermo [Guillermo O’Donnell]” (Christopher Achen, during a brief 
meet and greet at Vanderbilt University, CSDI, December 3rd of 2011, when talking about my at the time 
recently defended proposal). 
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A final challenge faced by ART is that continuous subsampling could lead to alter 
original distributions and representative samples when dealing with surveys, a minor concern 
when researchers effectively deal with causal inference (Imai, King, and Lau 2008). In this 
case, however, while I tried to deal with causal inference, data limitations did not allow me to 
test causality.129  
 
Finally, the reason why I dropped two of the three sets of original models was the 
higher levels of collinearity among interactive and constitutive terms, when I include 
interaction terms among church attendance, importance of religion, attendance to church 
groups and the three types of church messages, as shown in Table A4.1. 
 
 
  
                                               
129 In order to deal with causal heterogeneity, additional models included a pre-processing technique, matching 
by nearest neighbor, in which weekly church attendance was the dichotomous variable that divided the two 
groups of the 2010 AmericasBarometer surveys using the Mexican sample. After matching, I included the three 
types of church messages, and also different specification including messages in a separated way. Results from 
these models (not shown) revealed that the combination between weekly attendance and church messages about 
moral values was statistically associated to rejection of gay marriage. In the case of the other two dependent 
variables, support for democracy and support for the Army patrolling the streets, the interaction term between 
weekly attendance and the respective church messages did not reach statistical significance employing classical 
linear models. It is important to recall that even in the case of the combination between weekly attendance and 
messages about moral values when estimating a rejection of gay marriage model, I am not making any claim 
regarding causality. 
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Variable VIF (Baseline) VIF (Model 1) VIF (Model 2) VIF (Model 3) 
Attendance 1.6 5.7 118.2 559.3 
Imp. of religion 1.3 1.3 50.2 195.4 
Church groups 1.4 1.4 1.4 1201.1 
Age 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Wealth 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Education 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.0 
Urban 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Female 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Peasant 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Worker 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Nat. Economy 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Percep crime 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Victim crime 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Ideology (pol) 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Ideology (eco) 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 
News 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 
Interpers trust 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Pol knowledge 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 
PID PRI 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 
PID PAN 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
PID PRD 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Moral messag 1.4 10.7 165.1 685.8 
Social messag 2.1 19.3 291.2 1239.6 
Pol messag 2.3 18.2 245.8 1080.5 
North 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.0 
Central 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
South 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 
Drug state 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.2 
Att : Moral mess 12.2 251.9 1130.8 
Att : Social mess 22.7 440.0 1998.9 
Att : Pol mess 18.8 345.8 1497.5 
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Variable VIF (Baseline) VIF (Model 1) VIF (Model 2) VIF (Model 3) 
Imp: Moral mess 198.8 815.3 
Imp: Social mess 371.8 1532.5 
Imp: Pol mess 289.7 1245.7 
Att: Imp 210.3 965.1 
Att: Imp: Mor mess 293.1 1308.7 
Att: Imp: Soc mess 549.9 2469.1 
Att: Imp: Pol mess 400.1 1763.2 
Att: Groups 2445.4 
Imp: Groups 1794.1 
Att: Imp: Groups 3202.6 
Groups: Moral mess 1659.4 
Groups: Social mess 3948.9 
Groups: Pol mess 2768.6 
Att: Groups: Mor mess 2311.3 
Att: Groups: Soc mess 5409.1 
Att: Groups: Pol mess 3551.8 
Imp: Groups: Mor mess 2036.5 
Imp: Groups: Soc mess 4606.8 
Imp: Groups: Pol mess 3092.4 
Att: Imp: Groups: Mor mess 2755.9 
Att: Imp: Groups: Soc mess 6215.9 
Att: Imp: Groups: Pol mess 3993.4 
 
Table A4.1. Collinearity Diagnostics, Multiple interactions Terms Models.  VIF= Variance 
inflating factor. 
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